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Abstract

America's Vietnam War had profound ramifications beyond its immediate effect
on Southeast Asia and the United States. This dissertation utilizes the debate over
Vietnam between the United States and its major European allies, Britain, France, and
West Germany, as an analytical framework to examine inter-allied relations. The
“Vietnam problem” strained the trans-Atlantic alliance and revealed the respective selfinterest o f the four member nations. The British, French, and West Germans had serious
misgivings about the American strategy in Vietnam, based on a differing view o f the
nature o f the conflict and a pessimistic assessment o f American chances for success in
South Vietnam. Equally important, the Europeans feared that Washington might
disengage from Europe and that the fighting in Southeast Asia might develop into a
major, perhaps even world war. European security hence might be dangerously
undermined by further American escalation in Vietnam. According to the European
powers, the Cold War should be primarily fought in Europe. Although London, Paris, and
Bonn were deeply apprehensive about the American engagement in Vietnam they failed
to develop a unified policy to affect American decision-making because they were unable
to transcend their nationalistic agendas. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson unsuccessfully
attempted to win substantial European support for America’s role in Vietnam. To the
United States, Vietnam was a prune domino that could not be allowed to fall and
Washington viewed European concerns as parochial and counter-productive. The
essentially unilateral approach o f the United States in Vietnam led to tragic failure.
Subsequent o f the Vietnam experience, Washington realized that it could not fulfill all its
global obligations without the backing o f its European allies. The lack o f a cohesive
European policy toward America’s engagement in Vietnam revealed inherent
shortcomings o f the European nation-states which were still guided by a nationalistic
approach in foreign policy-making. Britain, France, West Germany, and the United States
painfully recognized that in order to successfully meet global challenges they needed to
listen more closely to each other and develop a mutuaiistic policy that would better serve
their shared interests as allies and Mends.

he
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The United States has n otfatty learned that the political advice or criticism o f less
pow erful friends who share a common heritage does not necessarily denote
hostility or envy or malice - or even bad judgem ent
George Ball, The Discipline o f Power, 1968

Introduction

The American involvement in and subsequent escalation o f the conflict in South
Vietnam has been intensely researched and documented. Most historiography on the
subject is limited to examining American and Vietnamese policies and actions.‘Only a
few historians have adopted a broader approach that investigates the global ramifications
and significance o f America’s Vietnam War.2 Recent scholarship acknowledges the need
to better understand the American past within the framework o f international politics.
Currently, historians are taking a fresh look at the American experience ranging from a
reinterpretation o f the Colonial period based on an Atlantic perspective to inclusive

'For an overview o f the varying interpretations o f American scholars on the Vietnam War see two articles
by George Herring, “America and Vietnam: The Debate Continues,” in: American Historical Review. 92,
(April, 1987) and “The War in Vietnam,” in Robert A. Devine (ed.), Exploring the Johnson Years. (Austin,
1981), hi addition to historians’ analysis o f the Vietnam War, the interested reader can find a plethora o f
autobiographical accounts ranging from Ambassador Frederick Nolting’s, From Trust to Tragedy. (Hew
York, 1988) to Mark Baker’s, Ham: The Vietnam War m the Words o f the Soldiers Who Fought There.
(Hew York, 1981) and Truong Nhu Tang's, A Viet Cong Memoir: An Inside Account o f the Vietnam War
and Its Aftermath. (Hew York, 1985). Lyndon B. Johnson, Robert McHamara, and Dean Rusk also address
Vietnam and its implication m them autobiographies. Journalist like Stanley Kamow and David Halberstam
provide yet another angle to the complex American experience hr Vietnam.
1The standard was set by Ralph Bernhard Smith’s three volume work: An International History o f the
Vietnam War. (New York. 1983, VoLH, 1985, and VoL HI, 1991). Smith discusses American,
Vietnamese, Soviet, Chinese perspectives, and also the British role m finding a diplomatic settlement, from
1955 to 1966. Ilya V. Gaiduk’s book The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War. (Chicago. 1996), uses newly
available Soviet documents to demonstrate that for Moscow the conflict in Vietnam was also less than
welcome and that the Soviets struggled to please their allies without creating “showdowns” with their
rivals. Fredrik Logevail incorporates French and British points o f view m his recent book Choosing Wan
The Lost Chance for Peace and die Escalation o f War in Vietnam. (University o f California Press, 1999).
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2
studies on Cold War history.3 Given the global obligations, challenges, and opportunities
that have influenced and still affect the United States, an international approach in
researching America7s past is important.
This dissertation examines America’s Vietnam policy in a global context by
focusing on the United States’ relationship with its Cold W ar partners Great Britain,
France, and West Germany. The European response to America’s Vietnam policy
provides an analytical framework to assess this important chapter in recent American
history within the wider perspective o f international relations. Equally significant, the
respective approaches to the “Vietnam question” by the Europeans and Americans reveal
the on-going challenge for nation-states o f transcending narrowly defined state-centered
policies for a global perspective pursuant o f common goals among the trans-Atlantic
allies.
During the Kennedy and Johnson administrations Great Britain, France, and West
Germany perceived the growing American military involvement in South Vietnam as
misguided, dangerous, and unwanted. Did European “criticism” o f America’s role in
Vietnam, to use Ball’s phrase quoted above, “denote hostility, o r envy or malice?” While
some envy o f America’s super-power status affected all three European powers, their
anxiety over U.S. policy in Vietnam first and foremost resulted from both a concern for
their respective national self-interest and a pragmatic, realistic assessment o f the situation
m Southeast Asia. European leadership feared that the crisis in Asia portended a

1For Colonial and Revolutionary history see for example the recentAmerican Historical Review, February
2000, which discusses Revolutions in the Americas. Cold War Studies proceed along similar lines by
employing newly accessible archives in the Soviet Union and recently released documents o f America*s
European allies. The German documents on foreign relations for the 1960’s, which have been recently
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decreasing American interest in European affairs, and a possible reduction o f American
troops which, might leave Western Europe more vulnerable to potential Soviet
encroachments. The Europeans also worried that the conflict in Vietnam m ight escalate
into a major Asian and perhaps even world war, thereby endangering the security o f
Western Europe.
In light o f these profound concerns, the failure o f Britain, France, and West
Germany to significantly influence American policy-making is intriguing and of
historical importance. Disregarding European concerns, the United States unilaterally
embarked on a strategy o f escalation in South Vietnam. Had Washington listened closer
to European advice, the American quagmire in Vietnam might have been averted. In
addition, the United States was forced to fight in Vietnam without its European allies.
Whether European troops might have improved the military situation in South Vietnam
cannot be assessed, but European assistance certainly would have reinforced America’s
Vietnam policy both in the court of world opinion and within the United States. A joint
Western position proved essential to secure the independence o f South Korea during 1950
to 1953, but ten years later American leaders were unable to form a similar alliance with
the West Europeans to defeat Communism in South Vietnam.
Why, then, was a mutualistic trans-Atlantic approach to the Vietnam question
unattainable? First, the Europeans missed the opportunity to develop a joint, well
coordinated critical response to America’s policy in Vietnam. The Europeans were
hampered by a centuries old paradigm o f state-interest which precluded any unified

published, have been extremely helpful to this author to interpret U.S.-German relations and the Vietnam
question.
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strategy aimed at affecting U.S. decision-making. Reliance upon “nationalistic”
ideologies prevented the British, French, and Germans from moving beyond them
individual agendas to come to an understanding with each other regarding the American
role in Vietnam. The “Vietnam question” became a lesson for the Europeans about the
limitations o f their impact on global politics. Second, unilateral advice and expressed
misgivings from the Europeans were ignored by Washington. All three European powers
had a grander imperialist past but were reduced to secondary rank in global affairs
following the Second World War. Britain and France, especially, had profound
experience in the affairs o f Asia which led to the conviction that American policy in
South Vietnam was mistaken and portended little chance o f success. While some o f their
advice may have been valid, their behavior still exhibited the patterns o f a bygone era.
The United States was less inclined to follow suggestions o f Europeans states which,
until recently, had exploited Third World nations for their self-interest. Britain, France,
and even more so West Germany were in fact “less powerful friends.” In light o f the
world-wide obligations o f the United States, to Washington the European voices appeared
parochial and detrimental to America’s efforts in South Vietnam. Washington was even
more dismayed by the fact that European misgivings over the “Vietnam question” left the
United States fighting alone in Southeast Asia without the direct support o f its principal
European allies.
A closer analysis o f the motives and approaches taken by London, Paris, and
Bonn is necessary in order to define the respective “national” agenda o f each country.
What were the forces and factors that brought about such an ineffective European
response to Washington’s Vietnam policy? It was neither “hostility” toward the United
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States nor “bad judgement,” but rather self-interest. All three powers had to adapt to the
bi-polar world while trying to restore influence with the superpowers and thus enhance
their international status. Also, policy-makers in London, Paris, and Bonn faced a
domestic audience that was reluctant to endorse the American policy in Vietnam. While
most Europeans appreciated American military protection and were grateful for American
economic aid after the Second World War, the American escalation in Vietnam led to
concern and criticism o f the United States.
Great Britain, apprehensive o f losing its role as “special ally” to the United States,
was painfully aware o f the need for American military protection. But the crisis in
Southeast Asia ran counter to British goals and realities. During the 1960’s, London was
overseeing the demise o f its colonial empire but still hoped to play a global role as leader
o f the Commonwealth. British forces were strained already by commitments in Malaysia,
Aden, Cyprus, and the turmoil in Rhodesia. Economic difficulties within the United
Kingdom further precluded additional British military engagements elsewhere. Britain
neither desired to pardcipate in a doomed effort in Southeast Asia nor wished to risk its
own security in Europe. In addition, British leaders were apprehensive about negative
reactions within the Commonwealth to AmericaTs role in Vietnam. Hence London
attempted to find a peaceful political solution o f the Vietnam problem through quiet but
solid diplomatic initiatives. By doing so, Harold M acm illan, Alec Douglas-Home, and
Harold Wilson aspired to remain a “special ally” to the United States while carefully
balancing British economic limitations with the country’s political obligations toward its
Commonwealth partners.
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France analyzed America’s policy on Vietnam through the prism o f its own long,
disastrous experience in Indochina. Charles de Gaulle endeavored to convey France’s
hard-learned lessons in Asia to Washington by urging U.S. leaders not to become bogged
down in the jungles o f Vietnam. When his warnings went unheeded, de Gaulle used the
increasing difficulties o f the United States in Southeast Asia as an opportunity to enhance
the role o f France in global affairs. The French president sought closer relations with
Third World countries, particularly those o f the former French empire. Toward these
nations de Gaulle depicted his country as a trustworthy Mend genuinely interested in
promoting their well-being. De Gaulle’s rhetoric presented France as an alternative to
what he characterized as the ideologically driven interference o f the Soviet Union and the
United States. By pursuing this foreign policy de Gaulle hoped to restore France once
more to a position o f grandeur in the world - replacing Cold War ideology with one o f
French nationalism. French “envy” o f the United States was certainly a factor in de
Gaulle’s foreign policy. But de Gaulle could not afford to pursue an outwardly hostile
policy toward the United States and genuinely tried to save the Americans from
undertaking a doomed Vietnam policy. Despite a decade o f tensions with the United
States, de Gaulle provided good judgement on Vietnam.
The West Germans had far more immediate concerns to deal with than a struggle
o f distant people in Southeast Asia. The necessity o f American military protection, the
unity o f Berlin, and the issue o f German reunification topped the agenda o f West German
foreign policy-making. Berlin suffered division in 1961 and reunification was postponed
partly as a consequence o f the crisis in Southeast Asia. Consequently, the Vietnam
conflict became a major policy dilemma for Bonn. I f Washington continued to be
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7
distracted by events in Southeast Asia, what would happen to the German agenda? Yet,
open opposition to the widening American role in Vietnam was impossible because W est
Germany - still not a fully sovereign state at the time - relied on Washington's good-will
for survival and for possible German reunification in the future.
Obviously, the basis and aims o f foreign policy-making differed among the three
European powers. Nevertheless, their approach to global issues and the U.S. Vietnam
policy in particular was rather similar. British, French, and German foreign policy
decision-making was founded on an ideology o f nationalism, the notion that the nation’s
best interest was paramount. The divergent Europeans’ view on the Vietnam problem was
due to their interpretation o f Communism. Harold Macmillan keenly remarked on the
Soviet-Sino split that so-called “Communist” countries demonstrated similar political and
ideological debates that marked Europe’s history. Charles de Gaulle always referred to
“la Russie” refusing to use the term Soviet Union because to him ideologies were
temporary while nations were not. Konrad Adenauer believed that the Soviet Union
would ultimately have to relinquish its hold on the East Germans because the reality o f
freedom and prosperity in the West would prove far more desirable than a rigid planned
economy. The Soviet Union was threatening in the eyes o f Western Europeans because it
represented a totalitarian system, taking the guise o f Marxist idealism, and bent on
extending its influence further into Western Europe. Soviet goals vis-a-vis Western
Europe were not new historically. Ever since the days o f Tsar Peter the Great Russian
interest lay toward the West.
American policy-making was also driven by self-interest, but its objectives
differed profoundly from those o f the Western Europeans. Propelled into the role o f
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8
leader o f the Western world by the Second World War, it became America's self
assumed duty and burden to defend the freedom o f its allies against the Communist
threat John. F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson were guided by the demands o f domestic
politics and by a different ideological view on global affairs than were the Europeans.
While the Europeans pursued agendas o f national self-interest aimed at retaining or
enhancing their roles in global affairs, the cold-war dogma o f the Free World versus
Communist oppression pervaded the mind-set o f Americans and foreign-policy advisors.
After the “loss” o f China in 1949, stalemate in Korea in 1953, and a dissatisfactory
political settlement for Laos in 1962, for Washington Vietnam became the front-line in
the continuing Cold War struggle. According to the American doctrine o f containment,
South Vietnam simply could not be abandoned because its fall might open the flood-gates
to Communist expansion in the entire region. A lack o f American determination in
Southeast Asia might also backfire politically at home. Republicans as well as “hawks”
within the Democratic Party insisted that the United States had to stand up to any
Communist encroachment. Both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson were unwilling to risk
potential political defeat at home. Therefore, they chose to expand America’s
commitment against Communism in South Vietnam.
hi retrospect, Paris and London arrived at a more realistic assessment o f the
Vietnam situation than Washington and, based on their own history o f empire, believed
that nothing good could come out o f the deployment o f American forces to the region.
West German policy-makers also privately shared French and British reservations on the
conflict in Vietnam. Yet, the three European countries failed in their efforts to affect
American policy-decisions on Vietnam. Britain, France, and West Germany were miles
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apart from accepting a mutual agenda because then: self-centered perspectives remained
paramount. Internal differences among the Europeans were prevalent throughout the
1960’s. Britain applied for membership in the European Economic Community but was
twice rejected by de Gaulle’s veto. De Gaulle worked toward French leadership in Europe
but ultimately failed because other Europeans rejected French, dominance. Erhard looked
to Washington, Paris, and London for support o f German unification. His strategy was a
failure as well. A divided, contained Germany would not challenge the status quo in
Europe and to the United States, Great Britain, and France was preferable to a unified,
potentially powerful “greater” Germany.
The consequences o f the failed trans-Atlantic dialogue over U.S. policy in
Vietnam were twofold: Presidents Kennedy and Johnson escalated the war in Vietnam
despite European advice to the contrary and by doing so found itself fighting
Communism without its European allies’ support. The United States lost more than
58,000 Americans in this tragic chapter o f American history and ultimately also failed to
secure the independence o f South Vietnam. Secondly, the American refusal to listen
closer to European concerns led to a profound strain in trans-Atlantic relations. In the end
the conflict in Vietnam did not escalate into a major Asian or even Third World War. But
America’s effort to gain European support by means ranging from friendly coercion to
outright pressure left deep scars in U.S.- European relations. Instead o f desired support,
the United States faced a Europe critical o f the American role in Vietnam which further
undermined the American claim that Western liberty had to be defended in Vietnam. For
Washington the lack o f European support in Vietnam not only resulted in a set-back for
American goals in South-East Asia but caused a fissure in trans-Atlantic relations.
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The fall-out from the Vietnam conflict allowed the Europeans allies to assert their
agendas with varying degree o f success. But it was also obvious that these short-term
achievements o f national self-interest could not reap greater benefits in a multi-polar
world. On the one hand, for Britain, France, and West Germany, the “Vietnam question”
served as a lesson that their foreign policy-making was constructed under severe
limitations. None o f the European powers could succeed in the global framework on its
own. On the other hand, if the Europeans pursued a more mutualistic policy in the future,
these limitations might be overcome. On the other side o f the Atlantic, the Americans
experienced the inherent limitations o f a unilateral strategy to arrive at a solution o f the
Vietnam conflict and also realized the need to understand and consider the concerns and
thinking of its Cold War partners. Despite its military-economic might, the United States
could not dictate policy to the Europeans and, conversely, neither could the Europeans
tell Washington how to proceed in Vietnam.
The transatlantic debate over the “Vietnam question” served as a difficult and
painful lesson that neither the Europeans nor the Americans would benefit by pursuing a
state-centered policy. This learning process led to greater appreciation o f their respective
views and initiated a more profound and genuine conversation over common goals of all
four allies. The strengthened trans-Atlantic dialogue between the United States and its
European allies allowed for a more mutualistic approach to problems facing the alliance
during the following decades. AH four powers realized that “political advice or even
criticism” had little to do with envy or bad judgement, as Ball put it, but facilitated “good
judgement” among the trans-Atlantic friends in order to secure a safe future based on an
commitment to freedom and democracy.
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Part One:
The Reluctant Ally:
Great Britain and the Search for a Negotiated Settlement
in Vietnam
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The elements that will enter our understanding with America can only be assessed in the
light o f particular British policies. These must be brought together and talked over as a
whole with USA-with a coherent and understood give and take... We must back US in
SE Asia - though working slowlyfor a solution by leaving things to people o f the area.
Patrick Gordon Walker, Thoughts on Foreign Policy, August 1964
Great Britain experienced a taste o f the difficulties in Vietnam first-hand in 1945.
British troops under General Douglas Gracey cleared out Japanese soldiers from the
southern part o f Vietnam and helped restore French colonial rule. As a colonial power,
London did not question the legitimacy o f French imperialism, since Britain, too, had a
strong interest in maintaining its own dominions.4By 1948, Britain also faced a
Communist insurgency in Malaya. During the early 1950’s Winston Churchill shared
American beliefs about the threat o f a Communist take-over in Southeast Asia. Soon,
Churchill reevaluated the British policy on Southeast Asia. He distanced him self from the
French struggle in Indochina because he believed that the French effort was both a
quixotic endeavor to reestablish French colonial rule and a dangerous path risking war
with the People’s Republic o f China (PRC).
Britain was in the middle o f dissolving its colonial empire and not willing to
engage itself further in Southeast Asia to save French colonial rule. The Churchill
ministry supported a diplomatic solution and rejected an American proposal to intervene
jointly in Vietnam. Britain co-chaired the Geneva Conference in 1954 w ith the Soviet
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Union, resulting in international guarantees to adhere to the neutralization o f Vietnam.
Churchill agreed to join the American sponsored defense community for Southeast Asia
(SEATO), designed to forestall further Communist aggression in the region.5
Churchill’s policy during the First Indochina War set the pattern for his
successors o f how to respond to the growing American role in Indochina. While Britain
refused to intervene in Southeast Asia, no British leader felt at liberty to openly challenge
the U. S. policy in Vietnam. The United Kingdom relied on American military protection
for its security but this safety net might be weakened if Washington engaged in a major
war in Southeast Asia. London discerned a twofold scenario in case tensions intensified
in the Far East. First, U.S. primary interest would shift from Europe to Asia, leaving
Europe more vulnerable to Soviet encroachment. Second, the American commitment to
defending Southeast Asia could explode into a major, perhaps even world war. These
prospects were dismal but London also had to consider maintaining its “special
relationship” with the United States. The partnership with Washington became even more
important after Great Britain was denied entry into the European Economic Community
(EEC) by France’s president Charles de Gaulle in 1963. Britain had to find a policy that
accommodated its own self-interest without alienating the United States. In addition,
British prime ministers from Harold Macmillan to Harold Wilson faced intensifying

* See for the discussion o f British involvement m Vietnam: George Rosie, The British fa Vietnam: How the
Twentv-Five Year War Began. (London, 1970).
s On British policy during the Fust Indochina War see: Anthony Eden, Full Circle: The Memoirs o f
Anthony Eden. (Boston, I960), and Kevin Ruane^. Refusing the Pay the Price: British Foreign Policy and
the Pursuit o f Victory in Vietnam. 1952-1954, English Historical Review. (Feb. 1995); see also: Richard
Lamb. The Macmillan Years. 1957-1963: The Emerging Truth. (London. 1996), pp. 377-381: while
Churchill and his foreign minister Anthony Eden admitted that a French defeat would have serious
consequences for Southeast Asia, they ultimately decided that a British intervention would not serve the
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domestic opposition, to the American policy in Vietnam. The growing U.S. engagement
in Vietnam proved to be a serious test for British leaders to walk the tight rope o f staying
out o f an unwanted conflict in Vietnam, appeasing domestic opponents, and continuing
good relations with the United States.

I. The Tory Approach: Harold Macmillan (1961 to October 1963)

During the early 1960Ts Prime Minister Harold Macmillan followed the
framework set for Vietnam by Churchill. Admittedly, Communism threatened Southeast
Asia, but in the final assessment, it was neither in the best interest o f the United Kingdom
nor o f the United States to pursue a policy of greater involvement. Subsequently
Macmillan tried to discourage John F. Kennedy from a greater commitment in Southeast
Asia. Macmillan, bom in 1894, had been in government service since 1939. He became
Prime Minister in January 1957, after the Suez Crisis. The conservative leader enjoyed a
very cordial relationship, even friendship with President Eisenhower and he was
somewhat concerned whether this mutual understanding would continue with Kennedy a man a generation younger than himself. Soon these doubts were dispersed and both
leaders developed good personal relations, although each espoused a different approach
toward Southeast Asia.6

best interest o f the United Kingdom. Eden adamantly resisted American pressure to intervene m favor of
the French.
* Alistair Home, Harold Macmillan: VoL H. 1957-1986. (New York, 1989), p. 281; Arthur Schlesmger, Jr.,
A Thousand Davs: John F. Kennedy m the White House. (Boston, 1965). p. 375; Harold M acm illan , At the
End o f the Day. 1961-1963. (London, 1973), p. 517; Macmillan's understanding and support after
Kennedy’s dreary encounter with Krushchev m Vienna set the pattern for Macmillan’s relations with
Kennedy: “I was sort o f the son to Ike. and it was the other way around with Kennedy”. When M acm illan
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Macmillan strongly favored a political solution for Indochina. In February 1961
he sent David Ormsby-Gore to the newly inaugurated John F. Kennedy to convey British
concern about the American role in Southeast Asia in general, and the current crisis over
Laos in particular. The English ambassador openly criticized the American role in Laos
and accused the United States o f backing a corrupt government, a policy, the ambassador
warned, could lead to serious consequences for the Kennedy administration in the future.7
Less blunt, but in essence not that different, was the advice o f Macmillan when he met
Kennedy a month later. Macmillan indicated that America’s allies were unwilling to
support any major American intervention in Laos. Britain also could not subscribe to an
“unlimited commitment” to the region.8
The Prime Minister looked at Indochina not in terms o f Cold War ideology but
based on a pragmatic, state-centered assessment. The once solid Communist alliance had
been breaking apart since the late 1940’s when Marshall Tito had sought his own
independent version o f Communism in Yugoslavia. More importantly, in the early I960’s
Moscow and Beijing were at odds both over the interpretation of Marxism and how to
proceed internationally. The Soviet-Sino split demonstrated that, although both the Soviet
Union and the PRC adhered to Communist ideology, they also acted according to selfinterest, which led to the cessation o f diplomatic relations between both countries in late
1961. Macmillan concluded:

resigned from office because o f bad health, JFK send a “touching" letter, expressing his affection and
respect forthe Prime Minister.
7Ormsby-Gore was an old friend of JFK, dating back to Joseph P. Kennedy’s term as ambassador in Great
Britain. JFK trusted his advice; see: Schiesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 335; for a more detailed discussion
o f the American role m Laos, see chapter four.
* Lamb, The Macmillan Years,, p. 386; JFK asked Macmillan repeatedly whether Great Britain would “join
m” to save Laos, but the PM refused to give any firm support.
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These developments made it clear to me even at the time that the old lessons of history
were once again proving true. Ideological agreement Ted no more on the Communist side
to automatic cooperation than it did among the nations of Europe in the sixteenth and
seventeenth century.9

Macmillan blamed poor French colonial rule for the conflict in Indochina. Britain,
according to the Prime Minister, had done far better in India and Pakistan by providing “a
legacy o f efficient local, provincial and central administration.”10 In Indochina, the
situation was clearly different. Although granted formal but not actual independence, the
new states o f Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam experienced “confusion and internal
weakness, coupled with the unrelenting pressure under Communist direction.”11 British
foreign minister Anthony Eden had worked “tirelessly” to end the conflict in 1954,
because British interests were not served by war in Southeast Asia.12 Macmillan
conveniently overlooked the “tireless” French effort to end the debacle in Indochina with
an acceptable and face-saving settlement.
British hopes for a permanent peace in Southeast Asia proved elusive. French
influence was soon replaced with that o f the United States. In 1960, when the civil war in
Laos became a focal point o f the Eisenhower administration, Macmillan grew anxious
about a potential American intervention. He feared that American involvement might lead
to a wider conflict, eventually including the PRC and the Soviet Union. Consequently,
London urged a cease-fire and was strongly opposed to any direct Western interference.
Macmillan and his cabinet were also uncertain about American aims hi Laos and feared

9 Macmillan, End o f the Day, p. 223.
10IbfcL. p. 236; the British legacy allowed India under Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistan's leaders Muhammad
All Jamah and Liaqut Alt Khan to maintain law and order and make a “good start”.
tr Ibfd.
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that Britain could be dragged into an open-ended conflict- Like Churchill, Macmillan was
unwilling to get involved in Southeast Asia.
In his first meeting with Kennedy in March 1961 in Key West, the British leader
expressed his concern about Indochina, and Laos in particular, and warned Kennedy of
“the danger o f being sucked into these inhospitable areas without a base, without any
clear political or strategic aims and without any effective system o f deploying armed
forces or controlling local adimmstration.”l3MacmilIan did not want to engage Britain in
a widening conflict in Southeast Asia. But as a SEATO member London might still face
the decision to follow the American lead and send British troops. He had to convince
Kennedy that a major military operation in landlocked Laos was futile.
Macmillan discerned three options for the Americans in Laos. First, they could set
up a puppet regime, which “would be useless and corrupt,” eventually forcing the United
States to get more deeply involved in Laotian politics. Second, the United States could
intervene directly, with “bigger and bigger” armies. Third, the Americans could stay out.
To Kennedy, the first option was too close to imperialism and hence not feasible. The
other two possibilities required more deliberation. Macmillan felt however that Kennedy
was not keen on intensifying the American role and neither leader wanted to proceed in
Laos unilaterally.t4Kennedy, in turn, pressured Macmillan to agree that it might be
politically necessary “to do something” in Laos, before the West lost more ground to the

12Ibid. p. 237; M acm illan deplored the fact that the United States did not sign the Geneva Agreement and
quickly undermined the settlement by backing Ngo Dinh Diem and South Vietnamese independence.
D Macmillan, End o f the Day, pp. 238-239; Lamb, The Macmillan Years, p. 385..
Home, Macmillan, p. 293. Macmillan was briefed by his minister o f Defense, Harold Watkmson, that
“military intervention m Laos has always been nonsense” and that Britain could not risk “being drawn into
a major war”; Macmillan asked JFK whether “the thing was worth doing all”; see: Lamb, The Macmillan
Y ears,pp. 386-87.
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Soviet Union. Yet, Macmillan also made it clear that his government was not willing to
do more than “join in the appearance o f resistance” and emphasized that the geography
and conditions m Laos made it a dangerous place to fight.15
In a letter to Queen Elizabeth II in September 1961, Macmillan addressed his
misgivings and concern about the American course in Laos. He deplored particularly the
attempt o f some members o f the U.S. State Department, including Americans stationed in
Laos, to sabotage negotiations seeking to neutralize the country. The American officials
favored a military solution to the Southeast Asia “problem” involving SEATO.
Macmillan told the Queen that if he promised support to Washington, the United
Kingdom might be asked to intervene militarily, if a limited intervention became
necessary. The British leader was relieved to learn that President Kennedy decided
against the use o f force soon after their Key West meeting.16
The situation in Laos demonstrated the dangers o f the Cold W ar world, especially
the possibility o f the use o f nuclear weapons. Britain would seriously undermine its selfinterest by endorsing or even contributing militarily to an unnecessary show-down in
Southeast Asia. Already, by the summer o f 1961 Macmillan reconsidered his promised
support to the United States in case o f a SEATO intervention. He regarded his approval
given to Kennedy at Key West as “lapsed” and looked upon the entire operation as “more

“ Home, Macmillan., p.293; Lamb, The Macmillan Years, p. 386.
16Macmillan, End ofthe Day, p. 239; Schlesmger, A ThousandDays, p. 334; Macmillan explained to the
Queen that on Laos “ the dualism o f American policy is much worse than it is in Europe”. He perceived a
profound split between Kennedy and Rusk on the one hand and lesser ranks o f the State Department and
members o f the U.S. military on the other hand who urged intervention m Laos, which included SEATO
members. The British military strongly advised against such commitment. Macmillan concluded his report:
“We are thus threatened with the possibility o f being asked to intervene militarily m the Far East,just at the
tune the European crisis is deepening [Lee Berlin].”
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and more unreal.” 17 It was obviously far better for London to end conflicts in Southeast
Asia through diplomacy and negotiations. London’s insistence that Laos was not worth
risking a major war contributed to the American decision in favor o f a negotiated
settlement.
The Laotian crisis made clear that Great Britain was hesitant to commit any
military forces to fight in the jungles o f Southeast Asia. Foreign Secretary, Lord Alec
Frederick Douglas Home - Macmillan’s successor in office in 1963 - expressed the
profound relief o f the British government over the peaceful solution in Laos in a speech
before the United Nations. Lord Home pointed out that the other alternative might have
been warfare between the great powers. He added that both sides realized the difficulty of
containing a military face-off and fortunately chose to talk, instead o f escalating the
conflict. War would have devastated Southeast Asia and perhaps the rest o f the world.18
Negotiation, not armed contest, was the key to solve the problems o f that region and best
served Britain’s interest.
Yet, the possibility o f renewed conflict in Southeast Asia worried British leaders.
Kennedy demanded British financial contributions to rebuild Laos. Reluctantly, London
provided more than one million pounds. While pleased that Britain had regained its
traditionally good understanding with the United States, Macmillan understood that the
special relationship was not without hazard. Foreign Secretary, Alec Douglas-Home
noted:

17Lamb, The Macmillan Years,, p. 391; Home was more willing than Macmillan to send a token force to
Laos m case the Geneva Conference failed because Anglo-American relations were at stake and Britain
could not “back out.”
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I think th at our policy o f close co-operation w ith the Americans in South-East A sia has
been the right one. It is more likely w e should have been faced w ith a local w ar in the
area in I960 or 1961 if w e bad not been able to persuade the Americans to take the right
line. The risk o f a disaster in V ietnam , Laos, o r even Cambodia is still considerable.19

Home was partly correct. Washington and London were in close contact over
Laos and British objections had some impact on American thinking. But Home certainly
overestimated British influence on American foreign policy decisions. The growing
American involvement in South Vietnam soon revealed the limits o f British impact in
Washington. Kennedy and later Lyndon B. Johnson refused to make the “right”
decisions, decisions which reflected British self-interest Hoping to avoid disaster in
Indochina and, as importantly, keep Britain out o f another war in Southeast Asia while
retaining good relations with the United States, London continued the role o f honest
advisor and peace-maker.
Prime Minister Macmillan was increasingly troubled about the American
involvement m South Vietnam. In December 1961, Washington deployed helicopters,
planes, and four hundred additional men to Saigon to assist the South Vietnamese
military in the struggle against the Viet Cong. At the tune Macmillan did not foresee “any
more grave developments,” but admitted in hindsight that this arrangement was the first
step leading to a “long and inextricable entanglement” of the United States in Southeast
Asia.20 The Prime Minister also believed that American military operations were
inadequate “to deal with this kind o f infiltration” by Vietnamese Communists.

* John F. Kennedy National Security Files: Western Europe; Country Files: Great Britain; October 12,
1962; copy o f Lord Home’s speech o f September27,1962.
w Lamb, The Macmillan Tears, p. 394; Home urged Macmillan to financially contribute to Laos, despite
the objections o f the British treasury; good relations with W ashington were more important than fiscal
concerns.
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Macmillan relied on Britain’s own experience with Communist insurgents in
Malaya. The British combined political and military actions to crush the Communist
opposition. Macmillan maintained that the situation in Vietnam was different because the
United States neither had efficient control over the South Vietnamese government nor
offered a political alternative to those opposed to Diem. Unless the great m ajo rity o f local
population could be engaged in the struggle the Americans had no real basis on which to
build a successful policy.21 The Prime Minister was right in that the situation in Vietnam
differed from Malaya. However, it was not only British skills but different conditions that
facilitated British success in Malaya. There, insurgents were ethnic Chinese who found
little support among the indigenous population. The Malayans simply regarded British
rule as the lesser o f two evils. A more appropriate comparison should be the British
experience in India. After decades o f doing too little too late, Britain quit and handed the
“crown jewel” back to the Indians. Perhaps this would have been the better analogy for
Americans to study but too painful a memory for the British leader.
In February 1962, the United States sent four thousand additional troops to
Vietnam. Macmillan deplored that move because additional American aid could not cure
the failures o f Diem. But Britain’s concern over the consequences o f an expanded
American commitment to Vietnam required an open exchange with the United States
administration. Macmillan chose to express his apprehension privately to Kennedy,

30Macmillan, End o f the Day, p. 240.
21 Ibid. p .246; The msurgence at Malaya consisted mainly o f ethnic Chinese, supported by Beijing.
Macmillan points out that the English had established strategic hamlets to protect non-violent Chinese and
Malayan peasants and also offered political outlets for their grievances. Opposing Chinese were deported
to the PRC; all measures allowed Britain to gain the upper hand

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

22
refusing to publicly challenge American policy. The Prime Minister’s strategy soon
encountered domestic opposition in Parliament
Parliamentary debates on the “Vietnam problem” revealed not only profound
differences between Tory and Labour MPs but exemplified the ambiguity o f how to react
to both Washington and the perplexing situation in Southeast Asia. Most Tory
representatives endorsed the American policy in Vietnam. Labour was more critical,
voicing concerns that were shared in private by Macmillan. For most members o f the
Conservative Party allegiance to the United States was the overriding concern. Regarding
Vietnam, Tories generally subscribed to the American assessment that South Vietnam
was threatened by Communist insurgents sponsored by Hanoi and its allies. The Labour
view was more complex. The conflict in Vietnam was a civil war and also a struggle
against foreign interference. The United States had violated the Geneva agreement and its
growing aid to Saigon made things only worse. These divisions outlasted changes in
British government. The same Labour MPs who attacked Macmillan did so again when
their Prime Minister Harold Wilson refused to adopt them point o f view.
In March 1962, the House addressed the recent increase in American personnel,
the role o f American pilots in bombing raids, and the threat o f further escalation in South
Vietnam. MPs also questioned the legality o f the American involvement, and inquired
about the British position toward Vietnam and the government’s willingness to end the
fighting through diplomatic means. Peter Thomas, Joint Under Secretary o f State for
Foreign Affairs, defended his government’s policy and rejected charges that Washington

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

23
was responsible for the “inflam m ato ry development in Southeast Asia.22 The
Undersecretary emphasized that the “threat to peace in Vietnam” was not a result o f
American activities, but aggression from the North Vietnamese government, which was
encouraging and supporting an “insurrectionary movement” in the South.23
But Thomas agreed that the situation in Vietnam was serious. His government
awaited further information from the International Control Commission (ICC) before
Britain decided on any political action. Labour MP Harold Wilson was not satisfied with
the government’s position. He could not comprehend why Britain did not take responsive
action as co-chair o f the Geneva Conference. Wilson argued that the appropriate policy
was to put “pressure on all concerned” and that the Geneva Agreement had to be adhered
to.24 Two years later, as Prime Minister, Wilson would face similar questions and
criticism from his Labour MPs, who repeatedly reminded him o f his statements as
opposition leader.
Later in March 1962, Undersecretary Thomas again defended his government
policy on Vietnam from attacks by members o f Parliament Britain’s role as Geneva cochairman and influence on Washington were the prime issues.25 MPs Brockway, Davies,
and Mayhew worried how the conflict affected British obligations to SEATO, perhaps
even leading to a British military engagement Moreover, they inquired whether the
British government was discussing with Washington its military aid to South Vietnam,

—Parliamentary Debates, House o f Commons, (London, Her Majesty's Stationary Office), 14 March 1962,
p. 1318. William Warbey accused the U.S. of “military intervention in a civil war which the Americans
themselves have provoked by their sabotage ofthe Geneva. Agreement.”
3 Parliamentary Debates, House o f Commons, 14 March. 1962, p. 1318.
z*Ibi(L.p. 1319.
3 Ibid. 26 March 1962, pp. 836-837; several MPs were concerned about Anglo-Soviet differences
impeding a joint approach to work for a negotiated settlement on Vietnam.
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hoping that London urged the United States “not to go beyond operational military
training” o f South Vietnamese troops.
Thomas made clear that the United Kingdom had no responsibility to Saigon but
was less certain how the present situation affected British obligations within SEATO.
Labour MP Konni ZHliacus summed up his colleagues’ concerns and demanded definite
assurances that Great Britain would not be drawn into the Vietnam conflict or even a war
with China because o f the continuous American assistance to Diem:
Is the hon. Gentleman aw are that American armed intervention in Southern Vietnam,
w hatever may be the allegations concerning N orth Vietnam help or otherw ise to
Southern Vietnam, is contrary to the C harter and m ight involve us in war? W ill the hon.
Gentleman at least give the sam e w arning that M r. Eden, as he then was, gave to Mr.
Dulles over Dienbien-phu, that, if American m ilitary action in Vietnam results in war
with China, we will dissociated ourselves from such a w ar and w ill refuse to be involved
in it?26

Secretary Thomas was unable to give such guarantees, citing the need to await the ICC
report first before deciding on further action. His response reflected the position o f the
Macmillan government. While Macmillan was doubtful about American policy in
Vietnam, he was unwilling to openly pressure Washington to change course. Any
understanding with the Soviets or a unilateral British initiative in the U.N. council urging
negotiations might endanger Anglo-American friendship.
The ICC report arrived in the summer o f 1962 and recommended the immediate
withdrawal o f all American personnel and the a id to any American weapon shipments to
South Vietnam. The Soviet Union sent a note to Macmillan asking him to condone the
findings o f the commission.zrSome MPs backed the Soviet suggestions hut Edward

26Parliamentary Debates, House o f Commons, 26 March 1962, p. 839.
27The Soviet note to Her Majesty's Government is printed in: Parliamentary Debates, House o f Commons,
23 M y, 1962, pp. 114-116; Moscow accused Washington and Saigon o f preventing national elections to
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Heath, speaking for the government, firmly rejected the Soviet point o f view. Heath
regarded North Vietnam as solely responsible for the present dangerous situation in
Vietnam. According to Heath, not Washington but Hanoi violated the 1954 Accords in its
attempt to overthrow the Saigon government.2*
The discussions in Parliament illuminated domestic concern about events in
Vietnam. Like Macmillan, members o f Parliament were deeply anxious about further
military escalation, particularly a war with the PRC. Consistent with British policy since
the I950’s, they believed that Britain could not and should not support any policy leading
to war in Indochina. Several Members o f Parliament attacked the U.S. engagement which
they charged violated the Geneva Agreement and risked a major war. In their view,
Britain should bring the issue before the U N . Security Council and dissociate itself from
the dangerous American policy. Parliament was increasingly divided between supporters
and critics o f the American policy. Consequently, Macmillan and his successors
confronted the difficult task o f how to stand up to critics at home and at the same time
counsel Washington against further escalation in Vietnam - how to stay out o f Vietnam
without alienating the United States.
Prime Minister Macmillan expressed his doubts o f the American strategy
repeatedly in consultations with American leaders during the Kennedy presidency. He
hoped that solid advice and also Britain’s own experience in the Far East might influence
American thinking and allow a reevaluation o f the engagement in South Vietnam.

unify Vietnam. Moscow also pointed to previous communications with London in which the Soviets had
urged Britain to support the demand for an immediate American withdrawal from South Vietnam. London
refused to do so and in Soviet eyes only encouraged the United States in its aggressive course in South
Vietnam.
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Macmillan rejected any British troop deployments to Vietnam and favored a negotiated
settlement following the example o f Laos. In addition, British global security interests
drained Britain’s resources. British troops were stationed in West Germany, Kenya,
Southern Arabia, and the Far East. In 1963, the United Kingdom spent almost two billion
pounds on defense, about a tenth o f the gross national product.29Britain simply could not
afford another war. Unlike the French, who openly attacked the American intervention in
Vietnam, Britain’s leaders Macmillan, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, and even Labour Prime
Minister Harold Wilson, believed that solid diplomatic work might bring all involved
countries to the conference table and that an all-out attack on the American policy would
only hurt British interest.

Tories Again: Sir Alec Douglas-Home (October 1963 to October 19641

After seven years at the helm, Macmillan resigned as Prime Minister in October,
1963 due to health problems. His last days in office saw a decline o f general support for
his Conservative Party. Foreign secretary Lord Alec Frederick Douglas-Home, heir to an
old and distinguished Scottish family, was invited by Queen Elizabeth II to form a new
government on October 18, 1963. Bom in 1903, Home had served in the British
government since 1951 and became Foreign minister in I960.30
Home represented the ambiguities o f Britain after 1945. Britain had to come to
terms with its loss o f empire and global status. Home supported the British decision to

3 Parliamentary Debates, House o f Commons, 23 July 1962, p. 116-117.
29Kenneth O. Morgan, The People’s Peace: British History. 194S-I989. (Oxford, UK, 1990), pp. 217-218.
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build its own nuclear force and favored an independent course toward the two super
powers. Communism was an obvious threat to Western security but Britain also had to
play an autonomous role in global affairs, albeit within the framework o f the North
Atlantic aIIiance.3IHome accepted the limits o f British global power but insisted that the
United Kingdom continue to be a special partner, though with lessened influence, o f the
United States. Britain faced the dilemma to fulfill its military commitments while it
barely had the resources to do so. London could no longer maintain its prestige by
military might but had to resort to diplomacy in maintaining prestige throughout the
world.32 Home held firm in his belief that the United Kingdom should not become
engaged in South Vietnam. As foreign minister, Home expressed this conviction to
Kennedy on several occasions, pointing to the British commitment in Malaya and
Singapore. Britain did not have sufficient forces to intervene in Vietnam but even if it had
Home maintained that the “country would swallow up almost any army, as indeed it
swallowed the French and then the American.” Moreover, public opinion in Britain was
against British intervention or outright endorsement o f the American role in Vietnam.33
As Prime Minister Home had a rocky start. Rumors persisted that he was handpicked by Macmillan and not really up to the job. His status as peer was also seen as an
impediment. How could a Scottish aristocrat understand the problems o f the poor and

30See passim: Kenneth Young, Sir Alec Douglas-Home. (London, 1970), pp. 80-122.
Jt Young, Alec Douglas-Home, pp. 103-105; Home stressed that Britain could not feave “everything to the
United States and the Soviet Union" because otherwise Britain would lose her “national soul" and would
be unable to preserve peace.
32Ibid.. pp. 123-124; Home remained suspicious o f Soviet policy but also was anxious about American
design, which was obvious m Laos. He felt that the American interference m Southeast Asia was
misguided and dangerous for Britain. He was relieved when Washington agreed to a diplomatic settlement,
removing another obstacle m Anglo-American relations.
g IbicLp. 146.
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underprivileged in Britain? Labour leader Harold Wilson even labeled Home the “scion
o f effete establishment.” The Prime Minister responded by disclaiming his peerage,
leaving it to his son, and from Earl o f Home transformed himself into Sir Alec.34 Yet,
problems persisted and the British economy was clearly in decline while the pound was
losing in value. Home underestimated the economic difficulties in Great Britain which
aided in the Labour victory m 1964. In foreign policy, the prime minister faced crises
ranging from Cyprus, Rhodesia, to once again Malaya which further strained British
finances. Economics and self-interest clearly dictated that Britain could not embark on
any major foreign policy operation in Southeast Asia.3SBoth Cyprus and Southeast Asia
complicated Anglo-American relations and despite attempts to conceal their differences
defense planners were at odds on how to proceed.36
Home’s first visit to the United States as Prime Minister was the sad occasion of
John F. Kennedy’s funeral in late November 1963. Three months later he returned to
meet with Lyndon Johnson. The Prime Minister received a warm welcome and Johnson
reaffirmed the close relations between both countries despite recent differences in
opinion. Home emphasized that Britain and the United States shared the same goal of
worldwide peace. Regardless o f sometimes contrary approaches - British sale o f buses to
Cuba being one - Home maintained that it was his sincere desire to “keep as close as we

34Morgan, The People's Peace, pp. 226-227.
35 In Cyprus, conflict between the British and Greek radicals, seeking a union with Greek proper dated back
to the mfd-I950’s; adding to the problem, were claims by the Turkish population o f Cyprus. In Rhodesia,
the southern half o f the country gamed independence as the state o f Zambia, while in the north, white
supremacists led by Tan Smith tried to establish their independence. Malaysia, now a member o f the British
Commonwealth suffered horn guerrilla activity sponsored by its neighbor Indonesia.
34The Tunes, London, February 1 ,1964, p. 8; Young, Alec Douglas Home, pp. 197-198; Robert M.
Hathaway, Great Britain and the United States: Special Relation since World War Ilf Boston, 1990), p. 88;
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can” to the United States as partners and as allies since th e “peace o f the world” depended
on their understanding.37!!! his conversation with Johnson the main topics were Vietnam
and Malaysia- The meeting resulted in a compromise; both sides agreed that they were
facing similar problems in Southeast Asia. While the United States recognized the British
position to maintain the independence o f Malaya against encroachment from Indonesia,
Home announced his support for the American policy in Vietnam.38
The Prime Minister also agreed to explore the French position on Vietnam and to
discuss with President Charles de Gaulle the French proposal calling for the
neutralization o f both Vietnams. Home was interested in the American progress in
Vietnam but received the bad news that the situation was not improving. Johnson
emphasized that it was crucial that the United States and Britain concurred on Southeast
Asia in adopting a policy that offered both the “olive branch and arrows,” instead o f the
vague and counterproductive French, neutralization proposaI.39Both leaders agreed on the
need to assist the free nations in that area in maintaining their independence and
reaffirmed their defense commitment to the region:
The Prime Minister and the President gave special consideration to South-east Asian
matters and to the problem o f assisting free states in the area to maintain their
independence. . . The Prime Minister reemphasized the United Kingdom’s support for
the United States policy in South Vietnam. The President reaffirmed the support for the
peaceful national independence of Malaysia. Both expressed their sincere hope that the
leaders o f the independent countries m the region would by mutual friendship and
cooperation establish an area o f prosperity and stability.. . Both Governments reaffirm
that in all these fields [i.e. Southeast Asia and Latin America] then aim remains solely to
Anglo-American, misgivings surfaced with a visit by Robert Kennedy to London. The attorney general
accused the British o f colonialism m Malaysia, to which Home strongly objected.
17The Times, February 13,1964, p. 12.
11FRUS, Vietnam, 1964-1968, VoL I, Memorandum o f Conversation, White House, Washington, February
12,1964, p. 69.
39De Gaulle suggested the neutralization ofboth Vietnams following the withdrawal o f all foreign forces.
See below, chapter two.
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achieve and safeguard the integrity and stability o f the countries o f the free w orld on the
basis o f full independence.40

To Home the visit was a success. Washington, finally accepted the British, position
on Malayan security and the American role in Southeast Asia was defined solely in terms
o f assistance. Home also hoped that in the future Britain would be closely consulted by
Washington on ail global issues.” Like France, Britain was not willing to be dominated
by the United States and wherever possible expressed its independence and sovereignty.
Johnson, however, was angered by Home’s insistence to send non-military machinery to
Cuba in defiance o f the American embargo, and henceforth distrusted British leaders.
The events in the Tonkin Gulf in early August 1964 surprised Home in the middle
o f his summer holidays. The first news was not too worrisome since Washington
described the attack on the Maddox as an “isolated incident” Though the United States
increased naval patrols in the Gulf, along with a protest note to the United Nations, the
situation did not appear serious.42A second attack two days later led to retaliatory airstrikes against North Vietnam and a Congressional Resolution on Southeast Asia. On
August 4, 1964 Johnson informed Home o f the attack and the retaliatory air raids. The
American president expressed his determination to “take all measures necessary to
prevent such attacks and protect our forces.” Johnson assured Home that the American
goal in Southeast Asia remained unchanged and focused on maintaining peace and
security. Johnson promised to stay in close contact and continuously inform the Prune

40FRUS, Vietnam,1964-1968, VoL I, Memorandum o f Conversation, February,12,1964, pp. 69-70;
Quote: The Times, February 14,1964, p. 8.
41 The Times, February 14,1964, p. 10; Britain also insisted on retaining its own nuclear deterrent despite
American efforts o f nuclear disarmament. Home strongly rejected an American proposal to tra n sfo rm
British forces into a conscript military. To him this ran counter British tradition and was completely
unnecessary because UK forces did then job efficiently.
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Minister o f future developments.43 Home and his foreign secretary, R. A. Butler
expressed then full support for Johnson’s actions:
A s regards to the North V ietnam ese attacks on U nited States naval forces, H M .
Government m ade their position clear in the Security C ouncil when they supported the
action taken by the U nited States Government, in accordance w ith the inherent right o f
se lf defence recognized by A rticle 51 o f the charter o f th e U nited Nations. They share
the desire o f the President o f the U nited States to avoid risk spreading the conflict.44

Britain was not alone in its support of the American reaction to the Tonkin Gulf
attack. Bonn showed “full understanding,” New Zealand and Australia also responded
favorably. In Canada and France approval was mixed with caution. However, not all
British papers endorsed the American course in Vietnam. The Manchester Guardian
actually went so far as to question the circumstances o f the attack on the Maddox and
accused Washington o f having manufactured the entire crisis so that it could implement
air-strikes planned months earlier.45 The Times commentary on the events also expressed
some concern while it dismissed the “furious responses” o f Beijing and Hanoi to
American airstrikes. Danger could arise if either Beijing and Hanoi claimed the Tonkin
Gulf as territorial waters or if Washington changed its strategy:
I f President Johnson had announced that he was henceforth carrying the w ar by land, sea,
and air into N orth Vietnam, o r even w as going on w ith air raids indefinitely, then more
o f the allied peoples would have qualms and doubts. It is true that some Americans
would like to broaden the w ar in that w a y . . . yet the answ er is not to let American o r

41 The Tones, August4, 1964, p. 8.
43FRUS, Vietnam, 1964-1968, VoL I, Message from President Johnson to Prune Minister Macmillan [the
editors o f the FRUS obviously missed that Macmillan resigned in October 1963], W ashington, August 4,
1964, pp. 622-623.
44The Tones, August 7,1964, p. 10.
45see: The Times August 7,1964, p. 8, Wide Supportfo r U.S Action against N . Vietnam; Hathaway, Great
Britain and the UnitedStates, p. 89.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

32
any other foreign servicemen invade o r bomb North. Vietnam indefinitely. Such, an
action, in China’s doorstep would alm ost certainly bring m ore havoc than profit.46

Times editorialists argued that the best course for saving South Vietnam was to expand
on the current approach, which included military aid and training, economic support, as
well as confidence building measures for the Vietnamese people. Without such help
South Vietnam would be lo st Military escalation by either Washington, which seemed
unlikely for the time being, or the Chinese would only make matters worse. The place to
settle the tensions in Southeast Asia was the U.N. Security council and not the
battlefield.47 The Times summed up the thinking of many British citizens and their
government when editorialists held that the American response to the attack in the Tonkin
G ulf was justified, but any further escalation had to be prevented.

II. The Labour approach; Harold Wilson

In October 1964, after thirteen years o f Tory rule, the Labour Party won the
majority in Parliament, by the very slim margin o f three seats. Harold Wilson was invited
by the Queen to form the new government. Wilson, bom 1916 in Yorkshire, studied
economics at Oxford and entered government as minister for trade during the Labour
cabinet o f Clement Attlee from 1947 to 1951. In 1963 Wilson was elected leader o f the
Labour party and restored party discipline to exploit the Tory weaknesses and oust the
Conservative party.48 In terms o f British foreign policy, particularly toward the United

46 The Timesr August 7, 1964,p. I I , Saving South Vietnam.
47IbfcL. p. II.
■
“ Morgan, The People’s Peace* p. 239, 243-244.
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States, Wilson’s election did not represent a departure from the attitudes o f his Tory
predecessors. Although Wilson as opposition leader urged for a more independent policy
from Washington, as Prime Minister he too placed great emphasis on close AngloAmerican relations.
The serious economic crisis o f the mid and late 1960’s revealed that Britain was
far over-extended in its international commitments and could no longer play great power
policies. Britain depended on American economic support and Wilson realized that
political autonomy could not be achieved without economic strength.49 Patrick Gordon
Walker, Wilson’s first foreign minister, outlined Labour foreign policy shortly before the
1964 election victory. The United Kingdom could not afford a “full nuclear armoury” and
instead had to rely on the United States for protection, which meant that Britain needed to
base its policy on the alliance with Washington. Generally, W alker argued:
The basis of British foreign policy must be to re-think the US alliance and coordinate it.
Almost every British policy will react in one way or another upon relations with the US.
We must try to co-ordinate them and build a coherent whole out of them. If we are
dependent upon the US for ultimate nuclear protection we must so arrange our relations
with US that our share in the pattern of this alliance is as indispensable as we can make it
. . . In some matters we must adapt our views to theirs - in exchange for similar
concessions by US in matters which greatly concern us.50

Britain had to retain its independence but needed to approach foreign policy based
on the obvious limitations as a global power. Accordingly, W alker advocated a more
active role in Europe and closer ties with West Germany. France would always be a
difficult partner but Britain should work out a “common analysis o f Latin America and

49Chris Wrigley, Mowyou see itr now you don’t: H arold Wilson and Labour’s Foreign Policy 1964-I970~r
m: Richard Coopey, Steven Fieldmg. and Nick Tiratsoo (eds.), The Wilson Governments. 1964-1970.
(London, 1993, p. 128.
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SE Asian policies” with Paris. Walker recommended consulting with Washington on the
Sino-Soviet split and find a joint position on the “nature o f Communism in the new
context.” He was determined to support the United States in Southeast Asia but suggested
that Britain bring about a solution that allowed for American disengagement by leaving a
settlement up to the peoples o f the region.slUndoubtedly, Britain was dependent on the
United States’ nuclear shield and therefore had to devise foreign policy skillfully to
pursue its best interest without causing strains in Anglo-American relations.
The major concern for Wilson was the deteriorating situation in Vietnam. Lyndon
Johnson remained angry about Alec Douglas-Home’s refusal to abide by the American
embargo against Cuba. In spring 1964 Johnson told Wilson, then still opposition leader,
that he would never again trust a British Prime Minister.^Wilson faced a rather complex
challenge. He had to strengthen the special relationship and then try to influence
American decision-making on Vietnam. But he could and would not commit British
forces to the conflict in Southeast Asia despite the British need for continuous American
military protection in Europe.
The Prime Minister also had to fend o ff domestic criticism, mostly from the ranks
of his own Labour party, on British support for Washington in Vietnam, along with
possible complications with members o f the Commonwealth who sympathized with the
Communist-Nationalist forces in Vietnam. Wflson’s solution was to play the role o f

50Patrick Gordon Walker, Political Diaries. 1932-1971. Edited with an introduction by Robert Pearce,
(London, 1991), pp. 298-299; Wrigley, Harold Wilson and Labour'sforeign policy, p. 127.
51Walker, Political Diaries, pp. 299-302.
52Harold Wilson, The Labour Government. 1964-1970: A Personal Record. (London, 1971), p. 46;
Stemmger, Grossbritannien und der VTetnamkrieg, p. 591; Wrigley, Labour’sforeign polity, 1964-70, pp.
123-125,128; Wrigley ma in ta in s that Wilson was determined to maintain a voice in world affairs and tried
to master crisis with multifaceted initiatives.
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mediator and work for a political settlement. The British co-chairmanship in the 1954
Geneva conference gave Wilson the political framework in which he could operate.
Wilson’s goal was to prevent further escalation in Southeast Asia, and protect British
security hi Europe by maintaining close ties with the United States.

The British assessment o f Vietnam (1964)
In October 1964, American Secretary o f State Dean Rusk emphasized to British
Foreign Minister Walker that the United States had no intentions o f withdrawing from
Vietnam, and instead might even expand its commitment. Shortly afterwards, Walker
received an assessment o f the conditions in South Vietnam from his Ambassador in
Saigon, Sir Gordon Etherington-Smith. The ambassador criticized the uncoordinated and
often misguided American economic aid to Vietnam. The general population saw little o f
the millions and millions o f dollars pouring into the country while South Vietnamese
leaders indulged in costly pet projects such as a four lane highway leading nowhere.
Overall, the situation was not hopeless. What was required was a more effective
American contribution to the development o f South Vietnam, particularly in the country
side.53
The Southeast Asia experts in London disagreed with Etherington-Smith by
pointing to the lack o f over-all analysis in the ambassador’s report. The problem was not
only whether economic aid reached Vietnamese farmers, but if the American effort was
sufficient to defeat the Viet Cong. Moreover, the overriding concern in the Foreign

51G. Etherington Smith to PJLPeck (Foreign Office), October 10,1964, Public Records Office; in:
Stemmger, Grossbritannien undder Vietnamkrieg, pp. 593-594.
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Ministry focused on possible escalation o f the war by the Americans if their current
policy proved futile. London generally regarded the chances o f an American victory
against the Vietnamese Communists as rather slim.
The Wilson government hoped that the United States might against the greater
odds still turn the tide and prevail against the insurgents in South Vietnam. If the effort
failed, however, British interest would not be severely harmed by the loss o f South
Vietnam. London had already been very pessimistic about the survival o f South Vietnam
in 1954 and despite the dire predictions the country actually still survived. In 1964, no
one could foresee how long Saigon might be able to prevail. I f Saigon fell and the West
had to withdraw to its major defense line in Thailand, this would not result in a major
catastrophe, at least in the assessment o f Whitehall. Nevertheless, it would be detrimental
for the West if American international prestige was severely damaged by failure to save
South Vietnam.54Ambassador Etherington-Smith challenged this judgement; he saw the
dominoes falling in Southeast Asia and even favored the deployment o f American combat
troops. But he could not with certainty predict future developments in Vietnam that might
undermine the American effort. In light o f the unstable situation in Vietnam, the
ambassador agreed that it was necessary to prepare Washington for the worst case
scenario.55
To gather a more detailed estimate about American prospects in Vietnam, London
turned to Robert Thompson, head o f the British Advisory Mission in Saigon (BRIAM) -

54Memorandum LE. Cable (Foreign Office), October30,1964; E£L Peck (Foreign Office) to Ambassador
Etherington-Smith, PRO; in: Stemmger, Grossbritannien undder Vtetnamhrieg, pp. 594-59S; London was
also concerned that failure m South Vietnam would affect the neutrality o f Cambodia and Laos.
55Ibid.. Etherington-Smith. to Peck, November II, 1965, p. 595.
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the English counterpart to CIA expert Edward Lansdale. Thompson was the most
seasoned British expert on the region and guerrilla warfare. He had served in Southeast
Asia, particularly Malaysia since the 1950Ts. His estimate was sim ilar to the briefings
Johnson received from his advisors but Thompson’s conclusions clearly differed from
these o f his American colleagues. Thompson discerned three options for the United
States: Continue the war along the current lines, or bomb North Vietnam and its supply
lines to the South, or last, withdraw and lose South Vietnam.S6Options A and B were not
very promising. The present course had led only to further deterioration o f the situation in
South Vietnam and bombing would not end North Vietnamese aggression either. Attacks
on the North might increasingly undermine the will o f the South to stand up to
aggression, seeing outsiders killing their own people. Moreover, bombings ultimately
would not prevent Northern infiltration o f supplies and men to the South and posed the
danger o f Chinese and Soviet involvement.57 Withdrawal was not a pleasant alternative,
but Thompson argued that it was “better to accept the consequences o f defeat and try to
ameliorate the situation than making everything worse” in escalating the conflict. In
conclusion, the best solution for Washington was to negotiate with the National
Liberation Front (NLF), withdraw American forces, and reach a political settlement with
Hanoi. Thompson also maintained that, whatever decision made by Washington, Vietnam

36Thompson to Peck, November25,1964, PRO; m: Stemmger, Grossbritarmien und der Vietnamkrieg., pp.
595-597; for more detail on Thompson see his book: Robert Thompson, No Exit From Vietnam- Updated
Edition, (New York, 1970); Thompson argues that generally the United States misunderstood the nature o f
the conflict and Vietnamese conditions. Instead o f responding to indigenous problems the United States
perceived the conflict solely m terms o f the containment o f Communism and was step by step drawn into
an undefined commitment.
57Stemmger, Grossbritarmien und der Vietnamkrieg, p. 596. See also, Thompson, No Batfrom Vietnam, p.
120; Thompson held that the U.S. should have stuck to their limited commitment even after Diem’s fill
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would eventually be united under Communist rule. Yet, this prospect was not as dreadful
as many in the West thought because the prime motive o f the North Vietnamese was
reunification. This nationalist agenda, in addition to the centuries old enmity with China
precluded Vietnam from ever becoming a mere satellite o f Beijing.5*
The Foreign Office agreed with Thompson’s analysis. The task now was to
develop a strategy to convince Washington that negotiations were the best choice, and to
prevent further escalation o f the conflict. A peaceful settlement in the near future was
recommendable before events in Vietnam might destroy any chances for an American
way out. London was not so much concerned about the fate o f Saigon rather than
maintaining Western influence in Southeast Asia, where Britain was worried about the
safety o f Malaysia as well as Singapore. London believed that it was important to convey
its position to Washington as soon as possible. Wilson did not want to cause AngloAmerican tensions over Vietnam and repeat the mistakes o f Anthony Eden’s vacillating
course in 1954, which signaled first support for a united action on Dienbienphu and then
changed policy.59
Another military coup in Saigon made the Wilson mission more difficult. The
Americans were deeply angered by the violent infighting among the Vietnamese military
and Ambassador Maxwell Taylor expressed his frustration in no uncertain terms to the
new South Vietnamese leader, General Khanh. Further Viet Cong attacks on American
installations gave the hawks in Washington more ammunition to call for air-strikes

instead o f assuming full responsibility for the outcome ofthe war. The former approach would have placed
the blame for failure on the South Vietnamese, allowing Washington an honorable way out.
51Stemmger, Grassbriiannien und der VTetnamkrieg, p .597.
g Ibi(L
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against North Vietnam- In light o f the recent events in Vietnam, Wilson believed It
unwise to propose negotiations to Jobnson dining his visit to Washington.
Wilson’s first visit to Washington in early December 1964 went better than
expected. Johnson opened the conversation by restating that he would never trust a
British Prime Minister again, perhaps Johnson’s way of checking out what his
counterpart was made off. Wilson remembered the President’s earlier remark, but was
determined to hold his ground. The Prime Minister expressed his understanding o f
American concerns about British allegiance and promised complete confidentiality o f any
talks with Johnson. Johnson set the tone o f the discussions by complaining that he was
fired o f being constantly told that it was the United States’ “business to solve all the
world’s problems and do so mainly alone.” Obviously, the president was not so much
interested in British advice but action.60
The American desire for a more active British role in Southeast Asia was also
apparent in Wilson’s conversation with Rusk. The American Foreign Secretary asked
Wilson for British cooperation in Vietnam, even on a token basis. The United States
contacted a number o f allied states for assistance “both for its practical effect as well as
for the political impact” to demonstrate “free world solidarity” to North Vietnam and
China. Washington hoped that Britain would deploy both civilians and military advisors
to the country-side where support was needed the m ost Wilson refused to enter such a
commitment because Great Britain, as co-chairman o f the Geneva conference, was

40Wilson, Labour Government, p. 47; FRUS, Western European Region, 1964-1968, Memorandum for the
Record, Washington, December7,1964, p. 137. LBJ emphasized that he did not want to become bogged
down as FDR was in 1937when totalitarianism was on the rise and the American people and Congress
were opposed to an active foreign policy.
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obligated to a peaceful settlement in Vietnam. In addition, Britain was already deeply
engaged in Malaysia with fifty-four thousand troops and could not spare any more for
Vietnam.61
In fact, Wilson not only opposed any British commitment in Vietnam, but any
further escalation o f the conflict, with or without his government. In his opinion, any
Western effort in South V ietnam would prove futile and additional military engagement
by the United States potentially endangered world peace. A larger conflict with the PRC
and even perhaps the Soviet Union did directly affect Britain’s own self-interest both in
terms o f its Asian interests and security in Europe. Britain, like France and West
Germany, was strongly against such a perilous course.
Members o f Parliament were concerned about the events in Vietnam as well.
They were appalled by the cruelty o f the conflict, including the torture o f prisoners o f war
by all sides involved. They desired better information on the conflict and a British
initiative to “call attention to the universal horror and disgust and grief caused to all
civilised men” by the current practice o f torture in Vietnam. MP Derek Page asked
whether Britain, as co-chair o f the Geneva conference, was bent on inviting all powers
concerned to the conference table as soon as possible to prevent further escalation.62
These questions put Wilson between a rock and a hard place. He did not agree
with the potentially dangerous American strategy in Vietnam, but he also did not desire to
alienate his major ally. It was his government’s policy to “support the Republic o f
Vietnam in them effort to put an end to the Communist insurrection” which, was aided by

6t FRUS, Vietnam, 1964-1968, VoL I, Memorandum o f Conversation, Washington December 8,1964, pp.
985-987; Wilson, Labour Government, p. 48.
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Hanoi in direct violation o f the 1954 agreement61 Hence the Wilson government
recognized the effort o f the United States to aid the South Vietnamese. Labour MP Konni
ZQIiacus did not agree with the British government's view and accused the United States
o f breaking the Geneva agreement and Wilson of further abetting the American
transgression:
Does not m y hon. Friend recognise that the American policy in Southern Vietnam is in
violation o f the 1954 Treaties, to w hich w e are a party, that th e Government which they
are supporting is a puppet Government which they them selves have imposed, that public
opinion w ill be shocked a t the revelation that we are following th e policy o f the Tories in
this m atter and that, apart from being a crime, this policy is a blunder because it w ill
m ake our name stink throughout the Far East, and that this policy is bound to fail
anyway?64

These strong and divisive words impacted Wilson. As opposition leader, he had
taken a similar stand but as Prime Minister he needed to diffuse Labour criticism to stay
in power. If he endorsed the view o f radical Labour on Vietnam he would cause a crisis in
Anglo-American relations. If he favored American strategy in Vietnam, he might lose his
slim parliamentary majority. The Prime Minister needed to find a course that silenced his
Labour opponents without creating tensions with Washington.65
Under pressure at home, Wilson was determined to urge Washington to consider
negotiations and withdrawal from South Vietnam. At the end o f December 1964 he
consulted with Foreign Secretary Walker about British strategy in Washington. Walker
recommended against any initiatives for the time being since Wilson had given his

a Parliamentary Records, House o f Commons, 14 December 1964, pp. 7-8.
“ Ibid.. pp. 7-10.
“ Ibid- p. 10.
65 Ibid.. 22 December, 1964, pp. 1049-1050; Zilliacus reminded Wilson ofhis previous statements on
Vietnam as opposition leader. Wilson affirmed what he had said but an outright attack on U.S. Vietnam
policy was no longer an option for a sitting Prune Minister.
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diplomatic support to the American policy during his recent visit to Washington. In
addition, Wilson had to appreciate the pressures facing Johnson at home. To abruptly
change course, Walker argued, might lead to American accusations o f British disloyalty.
London could clearly not become the scape-goat for any failure in Washington. In order
to avoid possible tensions with the Americans, it was preferable that Johnson make the
first move to initiate a political settlement. In case Johnson desired British assistance, he
would probably not be shy to ask for itJ^Britain obviously did not want to step right in
the middle o f the firing line; and though peace in Vietnam was a major goal, amiable
Anglo-American relations were o f equal importance. Wilson agreed with Walker. He was
not willing to risk trans-Atlantic misunderstanding over Vietnam even though it created
considerable difficulties in Parliament. Surely, it had been easier for him to attack
government policy than making it. Like his predecessors Wilson chose amicable relations
with W ashington instead o f Anglo-American confrontation over the Vietnam question.

Wilson’s effort to prevent escalation: February- March 1965
Wilson decided to wait for a more opportune moment to present his views to
Washington. But the conflict in Vietnam again developed its own momentum. General
Khanh resigned and a civilian government was formed in January 1965, yet within days
was purged by Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky and General Nguyen Chanh Thi. For the
Americans the coup presented a “real mess.” As a result o f widespread Buddhist revolts,

66 Memorandum o f Patrick Gordon Walker for Harold Wilson, December29,1964, PRO, in: Stemmger,
Grossbritannien und der VTetnamkrieg, p. 600; British ambassador to Washington, Lord Harlech agreed
with Walker. Nobody m Washington was willing to talk about retreat and Britain had to be very cautious m
proposing negotiations.
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attacking both, the Saigon government and the American presence in the country, the
South Vietnamese military finally agreed to cooperate with the civilian government.
Conspiracy rumors persisted and Washington feared that a new government might be
willing to negotiate with the Viet Cong and advocate an American withdrawal. In
Washington the supporters o f greater military involvement gained the upper hand,
waiting only for another incident that justified further intensifying the air-war and
possible troop deployments. The attack on U.S. army barracks in Pleiku on February 6,
1965 gave Washington the reason to strike back forcefully at North Vietnam.67
Wilson endorsed the immediate American retaliation against North Vietnam after
the attack on Pleiku and so did his new foreign secretary, Michael Stewart.6*
Understandably, it was impossible for the Americans not to respond to the sustained
violence against their personnel. Moreover, following strict interpretation, Washington
actually could not be accused o f breaking the Geneva agreement, because it was not a
party to the settlement, and North Vietnam had repeatedly disobeyed the stipulations o f
1954. The British government hoped - against all odds - that the Viet Cong would cease
then* guerrilla attacks and leave the South Vietnamese in peace. London then would have
the opportunity to work for negotiations:
The British government would be glad to see negotiations fo r a new settlement begin,
but until a basis for reasonable negotiations has been achieved, suggestions that a new
Geneva conference should be convened are regarded as premature.0

w George C. Herring, America's Longest Wan The United States and Vietnam. 1950-1975. Second
Edition, (New York, 1986), pp. 127-131.
“ Gordon Walker bad Tost bis seat m Parliament and was forced to resign bis position as Foreign Secretary.
69 The Times, “Britain Supports America”', February 9,1965, p. 9.
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Pleiku and the subsequent attack on Americans at Qui Nhon, profoundly disturbed
Wilson because he feared that Johnson might give in to the demand o f his hard-liners and
escalate the war in Vietnam.70 Wilson, once more under pressure from Parliament about
the implications o f American air-strikes, tried to establish contact with Johnson. Late in
the evening o f February 10, the Prime Minister met with Stewart after receiving the news
o f the assault on Qui Nhon. Wilson believed it was urgent to have a personal encounter
with the American president to better express British concerns. After several attempts
Wilson reached Johnson by phone.71 It turned out to be a very unpleasant conversation.
Johnson admonished the British leader not to get overexcited and when Wilson replied
that his cabinet suggested he fly to Washington perhaps the next day, Johnson cut him o ff
and harshly rejected the idea:

I think a trip, Mr. Prime Minister, on this situation would be very misunderstood and I
don't think any good would flow from it. If one of us jumps across the Atlantic every
time there is a critical situation next week I shall be flying over when Soekamo jumps on
you and I will be giving you advice. . . As far as my problem in Vietnam we have asked
everyone to share with us. They were willing to share advice and not responsibility.. . I
won't tell you how to run Malaysia and you don't tell us how to run Vietnam. . . If you
want to help us in Vietnam send us some men and send us some folk to deal with these
guerrillas. And announce to the press that you are going to help us.72
Wilson was baffled and asked what he could tell the House o f Commons and
Johnson snapped back that it was actually Wilson who called him. Wilson responded that

70On February 10,1965 a bomb killed twenty-three Americans at the coastal city o f Qui Nhon, wounding
thirty mom FRUS, Vietnam, 1964-1968, VoL Q, Diary Entry by the Ambassador to the United Kingdom
(Bruce), Washington, February 10,1964, p. 213; Bruce reported that Johnson was by now clearly obsessed
with events m Vietnam.
n Wilson felt the situation was comparable to 1950 when the U.S. considered the use o f nuclear weapons in
Korea. Then PM Clement Atfee flew immediately to Washington to consult with Truman. Wilson’s effort
m 1965 turned out to be far more quixotic. His ambassador Harlech reached Bundy on the phone, who
rejected Wilson's travel plans. So did LBJ, but Johnson finally accepted Wilson’s phone tall, see:
Steinmger, Grossbritaniert ttnd der VTetnamkrieg, p. 602.
72Wilson, Labour Government, pp. 79-80.
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he had to say something to his constituency and suggested a conference on Vietnam.
Johnson was clearly not in the mood to consider a political settlement. Instead, he argued
in terms o f self defense; when the Communists attacked in the middle o f the night and
killed his people there was only one immediate and appropriate response. I f Wilson ever
faced a similar challenge Johnson would expect the same straightforward forceful
response and back him up “one hundred percent.”73
Johnson’s outburst definitely ended the prospect for a peace conference for the
time being. Instead the president preferred to see the Union Jack flying in the Vietnamese
country side. But the Prime Minister was not ready to back down either. Despite the
negative signals coming from Washington, Wilson was determined to initiate
negotiations on Vietnam. Whether or not successful, the Prime Minister could only gain
both internationally and domestically. By playing the role o f peace-maker Wilson could
neutralize his own Labour opponents in Parliament. After consultations with Washington,
Wilson sent a note to Moscow on February 20, 1965 to contact the governments o f the
Geneva conference to seek then: view “on the circumstances in which a peaceful
settlement” might be obtained.74 London urged Washington to delay further attacks on
North Vietnam to allow the Soviets sufficient time to consider the proposal and contact
Hanoi. Secretary Rusk concurred but would not delay reprisals against North Vietnam
much longer. Ultimately, Moscow and Washington were not interested in the British
conference proposal and Soviet leaders responded to Wilson’s proposal by denouncing

71 Stemmger, Grossbritannien vmdder Vtetrtamhieg, pp. 601-603.
7* Wilson, Labour Government^ pp. 80-8.
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the United States’ policy in Vietnam and demanding the withdrawal o f all American
forces and equipment.75
Even before Moscow replied to the British proposal, on March 2, 1965
Washington started operation Rolling Thunder - the air-campaign against North Vietnam
and deployed 3500 Mamies to South Vietnam. Washington had made its decision to
resolve the conflict in Vietnam by military means. Negotiations were relegated to
secondary importance and could only take place from an American position o f strength.
To placate Wilson, Washington continued to signal its eagerness for a peaceful solution.
Former Foreign Minister Walker met with Rusk on March 6, 1965, and the American
assured Walker that Johnson indeed appreciated the British initiative on Vietnam. Rusk
considered two possibilities: a follow-up conference on Laos where Vietnam would be
informally discussed or direct negotiations with the Soviet Union.76Rusk had also
contacted the Soviets and hoped for a productive dialogue on the Vietnam question. Even
if the Soviets did not cooperate, Britain should pursue its role as Geneva co-chairman and
approach various governments to hear then opinion on possible venues for a settlement.
Walker had sufficient experience to realize that Rusk’s overtures were little more
than a smoke screen. When Rusk suggested that Johnson was willing to risk war against
Indonesia to show loyalty to the British support o f Malaysia it was evident that
Washington aimed at British military contributions to Vietnam. Walker remained non
committal on Vietnam but expressed the willingness o f his government to work for a
genuine settlement for Vietnam. He emphasized that Britain did not desire the role o f a

75FRUS, Vietnam, 1964-1968, VoL II, Memorandum o f Conversation, Washington, February 21,1965,
pp. 543-345; Stemmger, Grossbritcumien undder Vietnamkriegy pp. 604-608.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

47
neutral negotiator between Russia and the United States. However, American willingness
to settle in Vietnam would strengthen Wilson’s control over Labour in Parliament.77
Britain neither wanted a war over Malaysia nor to be forced to intervene in Vietnam. In
order to maintain his narrow majority in Parliament, Wilson needed negotiations not
escalation in Vietnam.

Wilson under Fire at Home
Wilson’s domestic difficulties increased after the Pleiku attack. In several
parliamentary debates during March 1965 the Tories generally supported the American
strategy in Vietnam and labeled the Prime Minister’s peace initiatives as an attempt in
“appeasement.” Politically more dangerous to Wilson was Labour opposition to the
American engagement in Vietnam. Labour MPs demanded greater British pressure on
Johnson to accept negotiations and even suggested a joint British-French initiative
leading to the neutralization o f Vietnam. Wilson had no intentions to team up with de
Gaulle and defended American air-strikes. The culprit was not Washington but Hanoi.7*
Wilson’s solution to the complex “Vietnam question” and his domestic problems was
negotiations. The British leader hoped to quiet radical Labour MPs and critical
Conservatives by playing the role o f constructive peace-maker. This approach would also

75Walker, Political Diaries, pp. 302-303.
77Ibid. pp. 303-304; Walker quickly got the Impression, that Rusk's readiness to negotiate was far from
being decided policy. Hence, he refused to commit Britain to either Vietnam or a futile role of intermediary
between Washington and Moscow.
71Parliamentary Records, House o f Commons, 22 February 1965, pp. 4-6; and March 1,1965, pp. 166168; 9 March, 1965, pp. 236-241; MPs wondered whether Britain was willing to reconvene the Geneva
conference m achieving the peaceful reunification and neutralization ofVietnam or et least work to
convene any type of high level conference in an “attempt to stop the war m Vietnam.”; ZBIiacus favored de
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allow continuous good relations with the United States. Wilson argued that Parliament
should endorse his policy o f a negotiated settlement and refrain from destructive narrow
minded accusations o f both his government and the United States:
In the past few weeks I have made our position quite clear about the situation in
Vietnam. I have said that we are pursuing these matters through diplomatic channels. I
am more concerned with getting the right answer than with getting the right
declaration.75
Years before a large number o f Congress members began to question the
American commitment in Vietnam, British MPs voiced pertinent concerns about the
conflict in Vietnam. Certainly many MPs stood by the United States but others, refusing
to follow the containment theory, squarely blamed Washington for intensifying a civil
war and endangering world peace. They demanded that Wilson take action to bring about
a peaceful settlement. Even less so were these politicians willing to send a single British
soldier to Vietnam.
Former Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas Home, well aware o f Wilson’s
dilemma, endorsed the Prime Minister’s course and favored support o f the United States,
at least for the time being. Once again, Wilson encountered more understanding for his
effort to seek negotiations, without alienating the United States, from the Tories rather
than his own Labour Party. Regardless o f the debate in the House o f Commons about the

Gaulle's plan o f neutralization, but Wilson obviously preferred his own approach o f international
diplomacy. See also: Wilson, Labour Government, p . 8?
79 Parliamentary Records, 16 March, 1965, pp. 1069-1070 and 9 March 1965, pp. 239-241. Wilson fought
a valiant battle mainly against bis own party. He admonished his colleagues to out aside then: selfrighteousness which made his job even more difficult. Wilson also had to answer to charges by Labour
Sydney Silverman that American action m Vietnam was an "act o f plain, naked w ar”
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means to restore peace m V ietnam , Wilson was convinced that his way o f diplomatic
initiatives was the “only way.”80
The Soviet refusal to cooperate with London in reconvening the Geneva
conference was a set-back but did not discourage Wilson. But his chances to convene an
international conference on the Vietnam problem became increasingly remote. A visit by
Soviet foreign Secretary Andrei Gromyko to London in March 1965 did not produce any
results on Vietnam. Gromyko indicated that Moscow was no longer interested in
reconvening the Geneva Conference and supported Hanoi’s demand of an immediate
American withdrawal from Vietnam . Wilson refused to concede failure. While Moscow
stalled on reconvening the Geneva conference it might change its mind in the future.
Consequently, it was important to m aintain contact with the Soviet Union while Britain
also needed to explore further venues to influence Washington. Wilson realized that the
climate, wherein both Washington and Moscow put the blame on each other, was not
conducive to create an atmosphere o f trust, yet there was no other way than to keep
trying to find a political solution.81 Washington disagreed and hoped for military success
to turn things around in Vietnam.

The Stew art M ission to W ashington
“Time is running out swiftly in Vietnam and temporizing or expedient measures
will not suffice” summed up a report to President Johnson in March 1965. Before any

50Parliamentary Records, 16 March, 1965, p. 1071.
w Wilson, Labour Government, p. 85; RJ5. Smith, An International History o f the Vietnam War. Volnme
III: The Making o f a Limited War. 1965-1966. OTewr YoriL 1991), p. 59; Moscow faced strong pressure by
Hanoi and Beijing. Hanoi demanded more support while Beijing accused Moscow o f doing too little.
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negotiations could begin, Washington insisted on a program o f “graduated reprisals”
against Hanoi.*2 On March. 22, 1965 American ambassador to Saigon, Maxwell Taylor,

suggested that the U.S. might further expand the war in Vietnam. On the same day, the
Pentagon admitted that American troops were using a “variety o f gas” in Vietnam.
Wilson’s Labour Party was enraged and the British public was shocked. In Parliament
Wilson was asked to end his “unconditional” support o f the United States and dissociate
himself from American actions by pronouncing the “horror and indignation” felt in
Britain.
In this charged atmosphere, British foreign secretary Stewart arrived in
Washington to explore whether the Johnson administration was either willing to work for
apolitical settlement or force Hanoi into submission. Several members o f Parliament, led
by Labour MPs Michael Foot and Philip Noel-Baker, sent a telegram to Stewart en route
to Washington which made it clear that they found the recent escalation simply appalling.
In a letter to Wilson they added to these complaints by pointing out that the ideals of the
Labour Party were at risk if London condoned Washington’s course in V ietnam Both the
Labour party and Wilson’s government would face a severe crisis unless London issued a
strong protest.83 Vietnam was increasingly threatening the unity o f the Labour Party.
While Stewart empathized with the American effort in Vietnam, he was determined to
confront Rusk and President Johnson to calm the brewing storm at home.

c FRUS, Vietnam, 1964-L968, VoL II, Johnson Report Outline, March 14,1965, p. 438; and Memorandum
from the Joint Chiefs o f Staff to Secretary o f Defense, McNamara, March 15,1965, pp. 440-441;
Washington EnsCstedthat Hanoiend its infiltration to South Vietnam before any talks could commence.
“ Wilson, Labour Government, p. 85; Stemmger, Grossbritannien undder Vietnamkrieg, pp. 6II-6I2.
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The Americans were prepared for the British charge. A memorandum from
National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy to Johnson revealed that Washington was
fully aware o f the domestic pressure on Wilson. The British leader needed some
cooperation from Johnson to get out o f an increasingly untenable situation at home. The
question for Washington was whether it was willing to help Wilson out o f his d ilem m a,
but Bundy decided not to.MUltimately, Wilson was responsible for the troubles he was in
and everyone in England was rather misstating the Vietnam situation. Obviously, the
Prime Minister was more interested in saving his own neck than helping the United
States. Given his “outrageous phone call” to the president in February it was tempting to
let him struggle with his own problems. In the long run, however, Bundy believed it was
not wise to “fall out with Prime Ministers” since the blame usually ended up in
Washington. Moreover, a strong rebuttal from Washington would probably induce
Wilson to “make critical noises about us, thus appealing both to his own party and the
natural nationalism of many independent Englishmen.”85
In the context o f the obstinate French attitude on Vietnam it was not prudent for
Washington to alienate another Western ally and reap more dam agin g criticism for its
policy in Southeast Asia. W hat then was the best way out for Washington? In the end, it
was some give and take from both sides. Washington would publicly announce that it was
in close contact and folly exchanged views with London on Vietnam, saving some o f
Wilson’s reputation and making the British feel significant. Bundy added:

54FRUS, Vietnam, 1964—
1968, Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson, Washington, March 22, 1965, p. 468. U.S. ambassadorto GB, David
Brace fully related the criticism Wilson faced from within the Labour party.
" Ibid.
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Then w e can put on some parsley about how glad w e are to have M r. Stewart and how
much w e look forward to the Prune M inisters v isit [planned for A pril]. In return, th e
British should undertake not to advocate negotiations and not to go back on their existing
announced approval o f our present course o f action. They should Innit them selves to the
expression o f hope that a path to a peaceful settlem ent w ill come, plus expression o f
alertness, as Co-Chairman o f the Geneva conference, to any opportunities fo r peaceful
settlem ent w hich may develop in the future.86

Wilson would not be exhilarated about the American position, but according to
his ambassador an expression o f kind words and mutual understanding was preferable to
an open split with the United States. As with de Gaulle’s insistence on neutralization o f
both Vietnams and lack o f efficient support by West Germany, Washington was not
concerned about the motives o f Britain m suggesting negotiations, but only the impact a
divergent European views had on Washington’s own success in Vietnam. The British
position was another nuisance that might affect European, and perhaps world opinion,
undermining the effort to subdue the Communists in Vietnam. To pre-empt the
accusations o f spraying lethal gas in Vietnam, Bundy sent another memo to the President,
explaining that no poison was used but that it was simply “riot-control gas” that police
forces all over the world employed.87
Both sides, ready for the diplomatic battle, met on March 23, 1965. Rusk took
some wind out o f Stewart’s sails by addressing possible diplomatic channels for a
settlement. Stewart interrupted and addressed the use o f “poison-gas” which Rusk denied.
Stewart was not finished and maintained that the use o f gas as well as napalm led to
inappropriate suffering o f civilians and produced only limited military gains. Rusk
strongly disagreed and emphasized that napalm was o f great value for military progress.
He contended that the United States limited the deployment o f napalm to attacks on

“ FRUS, Vietnam, 1964-1968, Memorandum from Bundy to Johnson. March 23,1965, p. 469.
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military targets and stressed that Britain had previously used napalm as well. He added
that this war “was not a Sunday- school party” but was a “rough business.”88Rusk was not
against British initiatives to explore a diplomatic solution o f the conflict as Co-chair o f
the Geneva conference but he was opposed to any British role as arbiter or intermediary
on Vietnam.
President Johnson, too, deflected Steward’s complaints about employing
“barbarous and horrible weapons” by explaining that poison gas was in fact never used,
yet admitted that London should have been better informed. Then Johnson worked hard
to win British sympathy. For an hour he told Stewart about his own hopes and fears, as
well as the fierce domestic pressure he had to face. He did impress Stewart and suddenly
changed gear. Johnson favored negotiations “if one could offer a reasonable prospect o f
their succeeding.”89^ the meantime, he had to pursue a policy a “appropriate and
measured response” to aggression in Vietnam. Nobody could expect that the United
States would abandon South Vietnam and American withdrawal would lead to the fall o f
Southeast Asia, perhaps even India. Ambassador to the United Kingdom David Bruce
described Johnson’s performance as “grand theatre” with the president as forceful as
“Niagara Falls.” Johnson told Bruce after the meeting that Stewart had offered not a

” re tlS , Vietnam, 1964-1968, Memorandum Bundy to Johnson, March 22,1965, p .470.
“ M. Stewart to Harold Wilson, Secret Record o fa Conversation between the Foreign Secretary and M r.
Dean Rusk, Washington March 23,1965, PRO; mr Steininger, Grossbritarmiert undder Vtetnamkrteg, p.
612.
89FRUS, Vietnam, VoL U, Diary Entry fay the Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Bruce), Washington,
March23,1965, pp.471-472; Johnson explained that some Americans wanted to quit the war while others
demanded that he bomb China and destroy HanoL
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“single practical or helpful suggestion”.90 Like the French, the British complained a great
deal but did not provide Johnson with what he really wanted - an unequivocal
endorsement o f the American policy in Vietnam.
Although Wilson failed to change Johnson’s mind on negotiations, the Prime
M inister claimed the Stewart visit was a success. His foreign minister had voiced
profound concern and opposition to the American policy in Vietnam. He was pleased
with his secretary’s comments after the meeting with Johnson, issuing a statement
intended to reflect the Labour government position and also appease Wilson’s critics at
home. Stewart told the National Press Club in Washington:
In the choice o f measures everyone responsible should consider not only w hat is
m ilitarily appropriate for the job in hand but the effect on people around the w orld. W hat
I am, in fact, asking the United States to display is w hat your D eclaration o f
Independence called ‘a decent respect for the opinions o f mankind.’91

De Gaulle used the same argument in his Phnom Phenh speech a year later in
September 1966. On neither occasion did European opinion make a profound impact on
Washington. De Gaulle’s persistent criticism, though, was far more irritating than British
statements, by influencing opinions in Southeast Asia, and in the Third World in general.
Wilson felt he scored a point with Stewart’s visit, but Johnson saw things otherwise and
complained bitterly over the lack o f European support. The president was determ in ed to
pursue the commitment o f his predecessors and respond to North Vietnamese aggression
until it erased. He thought it was “insulting” that all these politicians from Europe came
over to see him to use these meetings for solely domestic purposes although they had no

90FRUS, Vietnam, 1964-1968, VoL II; Bruce remarked that LBJ “is power sublimated” and served the
British “oratorical sandwiches, with layers ofgravity and levity” Stewart probably would never forget
these ninety minutes with LBJ.
91 Wilson, Labour Government, pp. 85-86.
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“practicable solutions to offer for American probIems.”92On the same day o f the Stewart
visit, Johnson emphasized that he was not willing to negotiate and believed his message
was “getting through” to both the Europeans and Hanoi. He added: “I don’t wanna go to
Hanoi. I was a hell o f a long time getting into this. But I like it.”93
The American view was not encouraging to Wilson, coming shortly after the
Soviet refusal to reconvene the Geneva conference. But in face o f his rebellious party
members in the Commons, he remained determined that his peace initiatives would lead
to a initial first step, some kind o f response by any side, however minor, but nevertheless
better than further military escalation. Wilson eagerly awaited a memorandum by Rusk
explaining the American policy in Vietnam, which Rusk had promised to Stewart. The
British leader hoped he could use a more detailed and encouraging statement by
Washington to deflect domestic criticism in Parliament The position paper never arrived
and Wilson once more took the initiative, publicly reaffirm in g the British proposal o f
February 1965 to convene a conference.9* Since Washington was not responding to
British suggestions, Wilson’s conference idea was the only face-saving measure le ft
In early April Wilson m et with de Gaulle in Paris and discussed the crisis in
Vietnam. The French President was openly anti-American and unwilling to modify his

92FRUS, Vietnam, Vol. II, Diary Entry by the Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Bruce), Washington,
March 23,1965, p. 472.
” National Security Files, Files ofMcGeorge Bundy, Luncheons with the President, VoL I, March 23,
1965, LBJ library; the issue o f gas warfare almost led to an open, skirmish between Washington and
London. Stewart condemned the American use o f gas m Vietnam m his Washington press conference. LBJ
was enraged and was ready to send a note o f protest to Wilson, but decided otherwise. McNamara charged
that Britain had used gas m Cyprus and was one o f the leading manufacturers m tear gas. Now the British
felt insulted, see: FRUS, Vietnam, 1964-1968, VoL B, pp.481-482.
**Stemmger, Grossbritanniert und der Vtetnamkrieg, pp. 614-615.
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neutralization proposal for Vietnam.95WiIson defended the United States but could not
overcome the intransigence o f de Gaulle on Vietnam. Wilson explained to de Gaulle the
British peace initiative and the overall difficulty to precisely assess the intentions o f
Hanoi and Beijing. The North Vietnamese demand o f an American withdrawal, and the
American precondition o f an end o f North Vietnamese infiltration made any negotiations
impossible.96
Anglo-French differences in the approach to Vietnam were even more obvious in
the meeting between Stewart and Maurice Couve de Murville, the French foreign
minister. Murville reiterated that the conflict in Vietnam was essentially a civil war in
which the United States had no right to interfere. The American engagement was only
aggravating an already bad situation. Stewart strongly disagreed. He regarded an
American withdrawal from South Vietnam as an open invitation to Beijing to intervene
directly. Ultimately, negotiations were the only possible way to end the conflict and
Britain was willing to take the lead in organizing a conference. Murville replied that
France had only recently probed the chances for negotiations after the Soviets suggested a
conference based on the cessation o f American air attacks on North Vietnam. It was
obvious that the Communists were willing to negotiate, while the United States refused to
stop its attacks on North Vietnam, which diminished the possibility o f a political

* Wilson, Labour Government, pp. 92-93.
96Record o f Conversation between the Prime Minister and the President ofFrance, April 2,1965; PRO; in:
Stemmger, Grossbritanien undder VTetnamkrieg, p. 615.
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solution.97 The entice exchange reflected the inability o f both London and Paris to set
aside past differences in Anglo-French relations and pursue common goals.
Sim ilar conversations over V ietnam took place between the French and the West
G erm ans and, on a few occasions, between the British and the West Germans. The French

were increasingly outspoken in their criticism o f the United States and also held that the
chances for a negotiated settlement faded with every American bomb dropped on North
Vietnam. Obviously, Wilson and German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard shared the French
skepticism about the possibilities o f American success in Vietnam. All three European
countries were deeply troubled about further escalation in Vietnam and a potential larger
war with the PRC. A larger conflict might result in American troop reductions in Western
Europe, which would obviously affect European security. However, Wilson as well as
Erhard were unwilling to join the French position because neither was ready to follow the
French lead and risk complications with the United States.98
Wilson valued the good relations with Washington higher than causing further
tensions by adopting a common position with de Gaulle. Certainly de Gaulle’s own
leadership ambitions in Europe played a significant role in Wilson’s analysis and Britain
would not and could not renounce its own voice in global affairs in favor o f Paris. The
need for American military protection, therefore, outweighed the possibility o f a closer
alliance with France. While a unified policy by Britain, France, and West Germany
regarding the American engagement in Vietnam m ight have had a greater impact on
Washington, a common strategy was never considered by all three countries. Wilson

97Record of a Meeting between the Foreign Secretary and Monsieur Couve de Murville, the French
Foreign Minister, April 2, 1965, PRO; in: Steininger, Grossbritanien und der VietnamkriegTp. 616.
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decided to continue his course and work for negotiations* while refraining from publicly
condemning the American role in Vietnam.

Second Wilson Visit to W ashington; Separate Functions but Common Course?
In mid-April 1965, Wilson was back in Washington, fully prepared to hold his
own on the issue o f Vietnam. A few days before his arrival Johnson had finally publicly
outlined his goals for Vietnam at John Hopkins University, where he announced his
readiness to enter negotiations with Hanoi without preconditions. Wilson regarded the
speech as a promising sign and hoped he could facilitate the process by offering British
help. At lunch with the Prime Minister, Johnson was clearly in a better mood than during
their phone conversation in February.99 George Ball prepared Johnson for the meeting by
pointing out that British support for the American policy in Vietnam “has been stronger
than that o f our major allies” and that Wilson, despite increasing domestic opposition to
the war, “stoutfastly” remained on course. Johnson should express his appreciation for
British loyalty.100 The president followed Ball’s advice and Wilson found the discussion
on Vietnam far more constructive than during previous encounters. However, Johnson
was still reluctant to address negotiations and instead stressed the three “D’s”,
determination, development, and discussion. He asked again for a British military
contribution which Wilson politely declined. Johnson then expounded on what he
understood by discussions, which reassured Wilson that the Americans were at least

91The French and German position on Vietnam is discussed in detail below.
99Wilson, Labour Government* pp. 94-95.
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contemplating a political settlement. The Prime Minister pledged his full support in
urging the Soviet Union to revive the Geneva process and “build on this new American
willingness to secure a settlement round the conference tabIe.”10IUndoubtedly, Wilson
was pleased with the new attitude in Washington and the appreciation o f his efforts for a
political solution for Vietnam. He interpreted Johnson’s remarks as a division o f function
between both countries:
The American government would not be deflected from its military task; but equally he
[Johnson] would give his full backing to any British initiative which had any chance of
getting peace-talks on the move.102

Wilson started his initiative even before he met with Johnson by sending former
foreign secretary Walker on a tour o f Southeast Asia as Ms personal emissary to discuss
Vietnam. Walker produced some “useful” reports but was not admitted to meet with
leaders in Hanoi and Beijing.103 This setback did not discourage Wilson. He hoped to
employ a conference proposal by Cambodian leader, Prince Sihanouk, to open discussion
on all the issues troubling Indochina. The Soviets agreed to a conference over Cambodia
and Beijing also signaled its willingness to participate. Everything depended now on the
American position. Wilson discussed the idea with Rusk on April 15 and interpreted the
favorable response from Moscow as a sign that both Hanoi and Beijing might actually
consider talks. Rusk remained skeptical and wanted more details. Any conference had to
be well planned to evade a “total disaster.” Washington needed more time to evaluate the

100FRUS, Vietnam, 1964-1968, VoL II, p. 557.
101Wilson, Labour Government, p. 95.
IbtidL p. 96.
m IhfdL: and Walker, Political D iaries, p. 302; Walker was m the region from April 14 to May 4 and
visited Saigon, Phnom Penh, Tokyo, and Delhi; Smith, InternationalHistory ofthe Vietnam War, p. 61.
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proposal, but in general terms the United States was interested in the Soviet offer for a
conference.10*
Soon after Wilson’s visit to Washington Foreign Secretary Stewart received a
reply from the Americans which again indicated that Washington required additional tune
to decide on a conference, and for the tune being could only endorse Walker’s fact
finding mission in Southeast Asia. Stewart was disconcerted by the American response.
He simply could not understand the reluctance o f Washington to embark on a political
initiative, which in fact had been outlined and promoted by Johnson in the Johns Hopkins
speech. Stewart argued that American failure to act on any conference proposal probably
would be interpreted as lack o f sincerity to reach a negotiated solution for Vietnam. The
Foreign Secretary urged his ambassador to Washington, Sir Patrick Dean, to do
everything possible to obtain a quick American response.l0SWashington did not comply.
Rusk was waiting for an assessment o f the top brass in Honolulu. He further argued that
the South Vietnamese could not be forced to accept a conference. London was not
impressed and regarded American hesitation as a calculated policy to prevent a
conference. London felt that time was an issue and the longer Washington waited to agree
to talks the slimmer the chances were for any diplomatic success.106

,w Stemmger, Grossbritanien und der Vietnamkrieg, pp. 617-619; Smith, International History o f the
Vietnam War, pp. 61-62,108-109. China was interested m the conference to increase its own role in
Southeast Asia and curb North Vietnamese growing influence in Laos and Cambodia. Washington did not
want to reject a conference on Cambodia outrightly, fearful that Sihanouk might completely break relations
with the U.S. and drift toward the Communist side.
105Stewart to Embassy in Washington, 18 April 1965, PRO; in: Stemmger, Grossbritanien und der
Vietnamkrieg, p. 619.
106Stemmger, Grossbritanien und der Vietnamkrieg, pp. 619-620; both administrations also disagreed
about the conference format. London hoped for extended discussion to give Hanoi and Beijing tone to
accept serious talks, Washington insisted on a detailed agenda on which a conference would put a stamp o f
approval.
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Again Wilson met with disappointment. Prince Sihanouk distanced himself from
his own conference proposal and the Honolulu meeting o f American policy makers
recommended a further increase in U.S. troops and continuous aerial attacks on North
Vietnam . The division o f functions that Wilson had envisioned after his visit to Johnson

was far from becoming reality. In fact, Washington fulfilled its part by solely focusing on
the m ilitary side o f the conflict but it was not willing to allow Britain to play the role o f
peace-maker. Partly Washington’s intransigence resulted from Hanoi’s unwillingness to
accept negotiations without preconditions. Hanoi insisted on an American withdrawal and
cessation o f air-attacks, no foreign interference, recognition o f the NLF by Saigon, and
“peaceful unification” of Vietnam. Only after these conditions were met would Hanoi be
interested in a Geneva type conference.107
W ashing to n stressed that the basis for a settlement must be the independence o f

South Vietnam. Nevertheless, Undersecretary George Ball argued that Washington
should seek some common ground with North Vietnam. He felt that a peaceful
reunification o f Vietnam could be achieved, provided that it was based on free elections,
expressing truly the will of the Vietnamese peopIe.t08Johnson gave the Ball proposal a try
and ordered a short bombing halt in May 1965. hi addition, he was willing to explore the
diplomatic angle and send Foy Kohler to present a note to the North Vietnamese embassy

m FRUS, Vietnam, 1964-1968, Vol. II, Intelligence Memorandum horn the Deputy Director of the Bureau
of Intelligence and Research (Danney) to the Secretary of State Rusk, April 15,1965, pp. 558-559; Smith,
InternationalH istory o f the Vietnam War, pp. I09-110; Sihanouk demanded that Saigon not be represented
at the conference, knowing that this request would be unacceptable to the U.S.; Sihanouk was primarily
interested in settled issues on Cambodia. In addition, the prince was angry over a Newsweek articles
insulting his wife and the incidental bombing o f a Cambodian village by the Americans.
I0*FRUS, Vietnam. 1964-1968, Vol. I f . Memorandum from the Under Secretary o f State (Ball) to
President Johnson, pp. 586-589. Ball early on criticized the growing American involvement m Vietnam
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in Moscow. The North Vietnamese refused to accept any communication and the effort to
deliver an oral message through Soviet channels also failed.109
Wilson, after the disappointment over his Cambodia initiative, was elated by the
bombing pause and the American effort to establish a direct contact with Hanoi. Once
again, he saw an opportunity to act as peacemaker and silence growing criticism at home.
This bubble burst due to Hanoi’s intransigence to respond to Kohler and the subsequent
American resumption o f aerial attacks. The Soviets also refused to consider a conference
after these recent set-backs.noThe Prime Minister was “extremely concerned about the
worsening Vietnam situation” and his cabinet feared a widening o f the war which would
inextricably draw Great Britain into the fighting. Also, Wilson’s failure on the diplomatic
front did not ease any o f his domestic problems. Adding to Wilson’s quagmire was the
issue o f British credibility in the Commonwealth.
Wilson wondered how the Vietnam problem might affect the upcoming
Commonwealth conference in June 1965. It was obvious that the Asian and African
members o f the Commonwealth would take a strong anti-American line, complicating
proceeding within the Commonwealth, and adding further fodder to his domestic
crMcs.mWiIson worked hard to find a way out o f the dilemma he faced in the

and eventually gamed the position o f“deviTs advocate” during the Johnson, administration. Ball position is
discussed below.
109FRUS, Vietnam, 1964-1968. Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson, May 13,1965, pp. 651-652. In June 1965, Johnson again asked for
international pressure to bring Hanoi to the conference table, see also: Smith, International History o f the
Vietnam War, p. 154.
no Record o f a Conversation between the Foreign Secretary and the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr.
Gromyko, at the Imperial Hotel, Vienna, 15 May 1965, PRO; m Stemmger, p. 623. Gromyko rejected any
conference for the time being and was “singularly negative; even by his own standards?* on any prospect in
Vietnam.
m Wilson, Labour Government, p. 108.
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Commonwealth and in Parliament, and to obtain additional leverage on Washington. The
result was the Commonwealth peace initiative. The Commonwealth represented about a
sixth o f the U.N. members and its political views ranged from strongly pro-American, as
in Australia and New Zealand, to neutral or non-aligned, to anti-American. I f all o f them
agreed on a common policy, it would obviously give Wilson a stronger backing vis-a-vis
Washington, keep the Commonwealth from disunity, and score valuable points in
Parliament
As soon as the Commonwealth leaders arrived in London, Wilson made his
rounds and won the endorsement o f most o f them. The Commonwealth leaders proposed
both an end to American bombing o f North Vietnam and infiltration by North
Vietnamese troops to the South. The next step would be a cease-fire and an international
conference, leading to the withdrawal o f all foreign troops from South Vietnam. Vietnam
eventually should become a neutral country and an international force was to guarantee
peace. Washington also gave its “warm support” and Wilson promised Johnson to go
“into battle” and win endorsement o f the Commonwealth."2
Domestically, too, Wilson’s initiative brought the desired rewards. Both Douglas
Home for the Tories, and Jo Grimond for the radical wing o f Labour endorsed the Prime
Minister’s strategy. The press applauded the Commonwealth initiative calling it a “bold
and imaginative stroke.” Johnson responded favorably and so did the government o f

IC Wilson, Labour Government, pp. IOS-t 10; Stemmger, Grossbritanien undder Vietnamkrieg, p. 625;
Smith, [nternational History o fthe Vietnam War, p. 154; Julius Nyerere of Tanzania proved the greatest
obstacle to the Commonwealth initiative. He was strongly anti-American and also very much concerned
about his image as an independent African leader m an up-coming African Third World Conference in
Algiers. In the end Nyerere was forced to accept the majority view o f the Commonwealth countries.
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Saigon. By June 23,1965 four Commonwealth ambassadors delivered a joint message to
Soviet Premier Kosygin asking for his backing.113
But Wilson experienced disappointment once again. Washington did not agree to
a bombing pause for the duration o f the Commonwealth initiative unless North Vietnam
ceased its own aggression in the South. The reactions in Moscow, Beijing, and Hanoi
turned out discouragingly as well. Beijing even accused London o f supporting American
aggression in Vietnam. Hanoi flatly rejected the proposal and restated that peace would
be restored only after an American withdrawal and cessation o f their “aggressive
war.”114A last stance effort to personally deliver the peace proposal by British MP Harold
Davies, who had maintained good connections with Hanoi, did not succeed.115 Wilson
had tried and failed again. Domestically he had to suffer through Tory advice that he
should not try anything “unless you are sure that it will succeed.” But given the domestic
and international constraints on Wilson the question remains, what else could be done?
Britain did not want the war in Vietnam to threaten its own security interests. As a
SEATO member, though, London still faced the possibility to be forced to deploy British
soldiers.ns Wilson would face even more opposition from his Labour Party and might
lose his slight majority in Parliament. Given the overextension o f British forces, any
intervention in Vietnam was for too costly. It would also be too costly in terms o f British
security interest in Europe. The role o f peacemaker was the only alternative left But any

tu Wilson, Labour Government, pp. 111-l 13.
IWIbftL pp. 121-122; Stemmger, Grossbritanien und der Vietnamkrieg, pp. 625-626; Smith, International
History o f the Vietnam Warr p. 154.
115Wilson, Labour Government, p. 122; Davies met an adamant Ho Chi Minh and returned to London
empty-handed.
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opportunity to reach a negotiated settlement was evaporating quickly with the increasing
number o f G i/s arriving in South Vietnam.
La July 1965 McNamara admitted to Walker that the chances of success in
Vietnam were rather small. Joint South Vietnamese and American forces were far from
gaining the upper hand. Even additional American troops were unlikely to succeed in a
limited war such as in Vietnam, McNamara hoped the Soviet Union would still apply
pressure on Hanoi to reach a negotiated settlement. At the same time he prepared a
memorandum asking for a substantial increase o f American troops in Vietnam. Three
weeks later, Johnson announced that he would do precisely what McNamara suggested
and increase the number o f American soldiers “by a number which may equal or exceed
the 80,000” already in Vietnam.117
Against growing odds and rising numbers o f U.S. soldiers in Vietnam, Wilson
still hoped for a negotiated settlement. In December 1965, he met again with President
Johnson and once more Vietnam topped the agenda. Arriving in Washington, Wilson
received a telegram from sixty-eight Labour MPs who demanded that the United States
cease its bombing raids on North Vietnam. The MPs were appalled that American bombs
hit increasingly close to population centers such as Haiphong. They also were
apprehensive o f a recent McNamara statement alluding to the “near certainty o f war with
China.” Wilson urged Johnson to suspend aerial attacks in order to assess recent hints that
Hanoi was in fact willing to begin negotiations. A t least, Johnson did not outrightly reject

tls Smith, InternationalHistory o fth e Vietnam War, pp. 154-155; Britain stated that the defense o f
Malaysia already strained its resources and hence could not commit combat forces to Vietnam. Yet,
Commonwealth members Australia and New Zealand were willing to do so, however as allies to the U.S.
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the British request and both leaders discussed possible venues for negotiations with North
Vietnam. Wilson made it clear that in case U.S. planes directly attacked Hanoi and
Haiphong he would be forced to publicly denounce any such attack.118 Later that day,
Johnson publicly affirm ed that he regarded Britain’s role as Geneva co-chair essential in
bringing all sides to the conference table. Furthermore, Johnson promised to support any
British initiative leading to negotiation on Vietnam. The British media responded
favorably to Wilson’s visit. Most importantly, Johnson had not insisted on British troops
bound for Vietnam. Also the American president was welcoming Wilson’s approach to a
conference on Vietnam.119

The failure to urge “Common Sense”
Wilson’s success in Washington was another pyrrhic victory. By the time he
visited Johnson, more than 180.000 American troops were stationed in Vietnam and their
numbers were increasing. The exchange o f pleasantries with the American leaders could
not disguise the fact that they were not seriously interested m. any negotiations. Wilson,
while genuinely trying, could not prevent further escalation in Vietnam. His foreign
office was equally pessimistic. Even before the Prime Minister went to the States, his
advisors at Whitehall regarded any chance o f a negotiated settlement as bleak. For the
present, negotiations “would achieve precisely nothing.”t20But Wilson could not simply
abandon his policy o f reaching a negotiated settlement. Facing a rising number of Labour

117Stemmger, Grossbritanien und der Vtetnamkrieg, p. 628. see also: Robert McNamara, In Retrospect:
The Tragedy and Lessons o f Vietnam. (New York, 1995), pp. 192-200.
"* Wilson, Labour Government, p. 187.
119Ibid.. p. 188.
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MPs protesting the American policy in Vietnam, domestic challenges added to London’s
apprehension about the international implications o f American escalation in Vietnam.
With the extension o f the Christmas bombing halt o f late 1965, Wilson hoped that
another round o f diplomatic initiatives might finally bring results. Yet, in late January
1966 Johnson ordered the resumption o f air attacks on North Vietnam. The Foreign office
issued, a press statement supporting Johnson’s decision before it was cleared with Wilson.
The result was a major crisis within the Labour Party over Vietnam.121
In Parliament, Wilson defended his effort to seek negotiations but also expressed
understanding for Washington’s position. Hanoi and Beijing had not demonstrated any
desire to embark on a peaceful solution. Wilson deplored that his colleagues, while
strongly criticizing the Americans, had shown less enthusiasm in urging both Hanoi and
Beijing to come to the conference table.122 But domestic, particular Labour opposition
could not be denied and Wilson had to devise an approach that would both reunite the
Labour Party and promise results on Vietnam Again, diplomatic initiatives seemed the
best way, since outright criticism o f American policy appeared selfdefeating.
In Parliament, Wilson pleaded with Labour and Tories alike to consider the
consequences o f the war in Vietnam both for Britain and the United States. Surely, the
conflict was a tragedy for the Vietnamese people. But even more threatening was the
possibility o f escalation “to the scale o f a major land war in Asia.” Lastly, the fighting in
Vietnam prevented a lessening o f tensions between East and West. Wilson therefore had

120 Stemmger, Grossbritanien und der Vtetnamkrieg, p. 628.
Kt Wilson, Labour Government, pp. 204-205.
121Wilson. Labour Government, pp. 205-206; Parliamentary Records, House o f Commons, 8 February
1966, pp. 253-257.
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no other choice but to work for a political solution, pursuing British self-interest. Yet, he
reminded his colleagues that unilateral withdrawal by the United States was a doubleedged sword. American allies might question Washington’s word. But an American
withdrawal could only be seen as “a humiliating defeat” which most likely would drive
the United States into a position o f “intransigent isolation.”l23Once again, Wilson walked
the tight rope balancing immediate domestic concerns with the long-term interest o f Great
Britain. To the British leader the only possible approach to settle the thorny Vietnam
issue was in rinding a diplomatic solution.
In February, 1966 Wilson visited the Soviet Union but got nowhere on Vietnam.
However, Wilson managed to establish private contacts with Hanoi. Soon, too, this
prospect evaporated into thin air.124 Neither the Soviets nor the North Vietnamese were
receptive to Wilson’s efforts. Wilson agreed with Moscow during the official press
conference that “there can be no military solution in the interests o f the people o f
Vietnam.” He hastened to assure his allegiance to the United States by explaining that his
foremost loyalty was to British allies and friends. Despite the East-West divide both sides
should work to settle the Vietnam issue.125
Members o f Parliament were not satisfied. In June 1966 Wilson was urged to
meet with President Johnson and demand an end to the war in Vietnam. MP Winnick
pressured Wilson to express the view o f many British to Lyndon Johnson:
Is the Prim e M inister aware that there are many people in this country who would like
him to do precisely w hat A ttlee did m 1956 - to urge common sense on the Americans?

135Parliamentary Records, House o f Commons, 8 February 1966, pp. 250-252.
a* Wilson, Labour Government, pp. 213-214.
“ Ibid, p. 214.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

69
W ill th e Prune M inister inform President Johnson that the m ajority o f the British people
have no stomach for this colonial w ar th a t th e Americans are engaged in?126

A remarkable statement for a former colonial power. It summarized the ambiguities o f
Britain’s past and present. Chastened by the loss o f empire, Britain could only advise
against its own former mistakes. This advice was certainly not unbiased and reflected
British self-interest. Wilson rejected the comparison to the Attlee mission on Korea in
1950. Unlike 1950, Britain did not have troops on the battlefield in Vietnam. Wilson had
time and again explained British views on Vietnam to the Americans. He related his
effort to encourage the Soviet Union to participate in the process o f finding a peaceful
settlement. But neither Moscow nor Beijing proved receptive to British initiatives.
Wilson, in an almost quixotic endeavor, held fast to the approach adopted by his
predecessors. Unwilling and unable to commit Britain to the futile war in Vietnam he
tried repeatedly to initiate a negotiated settlement. In early 1967, Wilson was again
certain that the United States was earnestly interested in an initiative to end the war in
Vietnam. Johnson sent his personal envoy Chester Cooper to London to express the
genuine desire to establish contacts with. Hanoi. Accordingly, Washington offered to
suspend the bombing o f North Vietnam. Hanoi then would reduce its troops in the South,
leading to gradual de-escalation. Wilson was asked to convince the Soviets that
Washington was sincere in the newest initiative. Hopefully, the Soviets would pressure
Hanoi to seriously consider negotiations-127

06 Parliamentary Debates, House o f Commons, 21 June 1966, p. 282.
127Wilson, Labour Government, pp. 245-346.
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Wilson, complied. In fact, Soviet Premier Kosygin proved interested as well when
he visited Britain in February 1967. Wilson conveyed the so-called Phase AI Phase B
plan to Kosygin and hoped that the Soviets could impress Hanoi, leading to negotiations.
Kosygin was receptive and suggested that it should be the task o f the two Geneva
chairm en “to advise and assist the US and DRV to meet and discuss then problems at the

negotiating table "^Immediately, Wilson phoned U.S. ambassador Bruce and Chester
Cooper while Kosygin contacted Hanoi. W ilson handed a copy o f the American proposal
to Kosygin, after the Prime Minister had cleared the exact wording with Washington.
American Ambassador Bruce was elated that Kosygin not only took the proposal
seriously but expressed hope that Hanoi might accept the American plan. Bruce told the
Prune Minister: “I think you’ve made it. This is going to be the biggest diplomatic coup
o f the century.”129
It turned out otherwise. Hours later Wilson was informed that Washington had
changed the proposal. Johnson now insisted that Hanoi stop infiltration to the South
immediately as a precondition for any negotiations. Only when Washington was assured
that infiltration had ceased would the Americans halt in bombing North Vietnam. Wilson
fumed but to no avail. For Wilson Washington’s actions were a “total reversal o f policy”
and it “had been deliberately taken” just when there was a real chance for a settlement.
An angry Wilson could still not believe that the White House had taken him and Kosygin
“for a ride.” Even profound confusion in Washington could not explain this stab-in-the-

m Wilson, Labour Government, pp., 347-348; see also: Marilyn B. Young, The Vietnam Wars. 1945-1990.
(New York, 1991), p. 181; and Ilya V. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War. (Chicago, 1996),
pp. 102-103; Soviet contacts with Hanoi indicated some North Vietnamese willingness to talk; Moscow
was clearly interested m establishing contacts between the U S . and North Vietnam.
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back. Instead, Wilson deduced correctly, that hawks had won the day and changed
Johnson’s mind. Washington neglected to consider that its reversal put the Prime Minister
in “a hell o f a situation” for his remaining talks with Kosygin.130
Wilson was determined to salvage the honor o f his government and decided to go
it alone. Henceforth, he was presenting the views o f the British government and insisted
on the original two phase proposal. But Wilson remained in constant contact with
Washington, hoping that Johnson would fall in line. Ultimately, the American response
lay in between both proposals, insisting that Hanoi respond within hours. Kosygin proved
understanding to the British dilemma and forwarded the new American offer to Hanoi.
Nothing came out of it and within days the United States resumed the bombing o f North
Vietnam.131
To Wilson another “historic opportunity” had been missed by a “disastrous”
decision in Washington and his diplomatic approach was in shambles. As his
predecessors in office, Wilson chose behind the scenes diplomacy to urge common sense
on the Americans. His approach was based on what he perceived as Britain’s self-interest.
Wilson, Douglas-Home, and Macmillan shared the initial assessment that a war and
escalation in Vietnam run counter British goals. The United Kingdom feared that conflict
in Southeast Asia might not only demand British military intervention, which the country
could ill afford, but endangered security in Europe by increasing East-West tensions and
a lessening American ability to honor all its global commitments. From Churchill to

Wilson, Labour Government, p. 356.
130IhftL. pp. 357-359; Young, Vietnam Wars, pp. 181-182; Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and Vietnam, pp.
103-106; Kosygin was as disappointed as Wilson. He felt that Washington destroyed a real chance to open
negotiations.
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Wilson, British leaders did not share the American assessment that South Vietnam had to
be held at all costs. British dependence on American military protection and Londonrs
desire to remain the “special ally” precluded outright criticism o f American policy in
Vietnam. As reluctant hut loyal ally, London chose to initiate diplomatic solutions of the
Vietnam conflict and failed in this effort The “special relationship” also ruled out a joint
European initiative. After de Gaulle’s veto on the British entry into the Common market
in 1963, London depended even more so on a close relationship with the United States.
Like Paris and Bonn, London remained limited by its own perceived self-interest and
hence lacked the leverage to change American policy-making on Vietnam.
British leaders from Macmillan to Wilson painfully learned the lesson that they
could not change American policy-making on Vietnam. On Laos, it seemed that British
opposition actually impacted the Kennedy administration. But Kennedy’s decision was
mainly based on his astute assessment o f the military and geographical conditions of that
landlocked country. While Kennedy at least proved willing to listen his successor
Johnson was not inclined to do so. Johnson hoped to convert the British to his point o f
view and when they failed to follow his lead, gave time and again the impression contrary to his strategy in Vietnam - that he was considering negotiations.
In March 1968, Johnson finally did what Wilson had hoped for during the past
three years. Johnson announced an unconditional bombing halt north o f the demilitarized
zone and offered open peace talks to Hanoi. Wilson was elated and probably not too sorry
to see Johnson fade from leadership. The new administration o f Richard Nixon paid
more attention to European and British concerns, giving hope that London still had a

ot Wilson, Labour Government, pp. 363-365.
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voice in Washington. De Gaulle left the scene in 1969, removing the major obstacle to
British membership in the European Economic Community. In 1973, London bridged the
gap over the Channel and entered the EEC. The “Vietnam question’5was both a lesson in
failure but also one of opportunities. As a result o f cooling relations with Washington
over Vietnam, British leaders increasingly turned toward Europe. Today, Britain still
prides itself in the role o f “special ally” to the United States - the legacy o f Margaret
Thatcher and the Gulf War, but the United Kingdom’s international influence is at least
equally grounded in Europe. Like France and Germany, Britain is realizing that its
potential in global affairs has to be based on both the Europe pillar and mutual
understanding with the United States.
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You w ill fin d th a t intervention in th is area w ill be an endless entanglem ent. . . We
French have had experience o f i t You Am ericans w ant to take our place. I p red ict that
you w ill sin k step by step into a bottom less m ilitary and p o litica l quagm ire, how ever
m uch yo u spend in m en a n d money:

Charles de Gaulle to John F. Kennedy on the
prospect in Vietnam, May 1961

On August 31, 1966 French President Charles de Gaulle strongly criticized the
American War in Vietnam in a speech to a supportive crowd in Pnomh Penh, Cambodia.
He accused the United States o f outright aggression in Vietnam and urged the withdrawal
o f all American forces to allow for a negotiated settlement o f the conflict While leaders
in Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany also had misgivings and doubts
about America’s involvement in Vietnam, neither dared to challenge Washington as
openly and publicly as France. Why then, did de Gaulle?
Obviously, France had extensive and painful experiences in Vietnam, as the
colony gained its independence in a bloody and costly war. Based on French experience
in Indochina, beginning in 1960 de Gaulle urged Washington against extending its
commitment to the region. His advice went unheeded by both President John F. Kennedy
and Lyndon B. Johnson. Again, the question is why? Two related factors contributed to
divergent French and American views. First, de Gaulle approached foreign policy based
on an ideology o f superiority which depended for its maintenance on the restoration
French “grandeur”, a larger international role and voice for France. Washington placed
far greater emphasis on Cold War ideology and regarded the Vietnam conflict first and
foremost m terms o f the struggle against Communism. Second, de Gaulle steadfastly
insisted on an independent policy for France in Europe and globally in directly
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challenging American leadership o f the Western alliance. Washington was obviously
bewildered by the mixed signals coming from Paris and was therefore less inclined to
seriously consider de Gaulle’s advice concerning Vietnam.
Charles de Gaulle’s character and upbringing shaped his policy. He was bom in
November 1890 into a patriotic family and grew up cherishing the images o f France’s
past. In 1909 he joined the French, military and graduated from St. Cyr a lieutenant in
1912. Wounded twice during the First World War he was rewarded with the legion o f
honor medal. After the war, he moved up ranks only slowly. His superiors certainly
acknowledged his intelligence but his egotistical behavior did impede smooth, promotion
and he only made colonel in 1937. De Gaulle observed the rise o f Hitler with growing
concern and recommended an augmented defense strategy against the increasingly
aggressive Germany but his advice was discarded by his superiors. His fears became
reality when Hitler attacked France in the summer o f 1940. In London at the time o f the
French surrender, de Gaulle found himself cast in the role o f leader o f the French
resistance.132
Years spent as the leader o f the Free French left a profound mark on de Gaulle
and laid the foundation o f his policy toward Great Britain and the United States during
the I960’s. Although supported by Britain and the United States, de Gaulle was excluded
from most major decisions during the war and feared that French interests were not

02 Don Cook, Charles de Gaulle: A Biography. (New York, 1983), pp. 28-79; Herbert Lathy, “De Gaulle:
Pose and Policy”, m: Hamilton Fish Armstrong (etL), Fifty Years o f Foreign Affairs. (New York, 1972),
pp. 356-357; Luthy stressed that de Gaulle family “abhorred” the Third Republic and instead relished m the
images ofFrance’s former giory, the days o f Louis XIV and Napoleon Bonaparte. This upbringing instilled
m de Gaulle the “sublime idea” ofFrance, that she would again play a major role in world politics.
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sufficiently acknowledged.133 The general interpreted the “haughty” Anglo-American

attitude during the war as insults on French honor. De Gaulle was determined more than
ever to restore France to great power status. His first effort toward this goal was short
lived. With the establishment o f the Fourth Republic in January 1946, de Gaulle resigned
from office and left a burdensome legacy in Indochina to his successors.
During the Second World War de Gaulle was unwilling to grant Indochina
independence and quickly reaffirmed French sovereignty there in 1945. He regarded
possession o f colonies as an important element o f French prestige. After French
humiliation dining the Second World War, it was o f prime importance to de Gaulle to
restore the French colonial empire. The general postulated that neither the British nor the
Americans should be permitted to expropriate parts o f the French Empire. l34To continue
French rule in Southeast Asia, de Gaulle conceded limited autonomy to the people o f
Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, which became members o f the French Union.
In Vietnam the French faced fierce resistance from Ho Chi Minh, who aspired
toward the complete independence o f his country. Negotiations between Ho and the
French government failed due to French intransigence, leading to the Fust Indochina
War. Despite increasing American support, the French lost the war and agreed to the

ra Gordon Wright, France m Modem Times. (New York, 1987), Fourth Edition, pp. 396-400; Robert
Dallek, “■Roosevelt and de Gaulle”, uu Robert Paxton and Nicholas Wahl, (eds.), De Gaulle and the United
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intended to take over the French colonial empire. Churchill had no such attentions but colonial questions
did trouble Anglo-Franco understanding. Even more humiliating to de Gaulle was the fact that FDR.
questioned the general’s claim to represent all French. It took three months after the Normandy invasion
for Washington to recognize de Gaulle as the head to the new government m France.
w Charles de Gaulle, Memoirs ofHone: Renewal and Endeavor, translated by Terence Kflmartm, (New
York, 1971),p. 12; de Gaulle stronglyjustified his decision to offer only limited autonomy to Indochina; as
associated states these countries would better be prepared for eventual independence. He did admit that this
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neutralization o f the country in the Geneva Accord o f 1954.ns By then, de Gaulle
regarded the colonial question as being a burden to France. Conflicts within the empire
drained the strength o f the French military in distant wars while its main purpose, to
secure France proper, was undermined. Moreover, France could not possibly became a
major power player in Europe or globally as long as she was distracted and weakened in
the colonies. In Vietnam, it was evident that France was unable to maintain her influence
by force and, for de Gaulle, it was more important to focus on Europe first. Only from a
solid base in Europe could France then expand her role in global politics through
diplomatic and economic support o f her former colonies and other Third World countries.
In 1958, de Gaulle was back at the helm o f French politics. He replaced the
bankrupt Fourth Republic with his own creation - the Fifth Republic. A new constitution
gave wide powers to the president, particularly in foreign policy. Taking advantage o f his
increased mandate, de Gaulle ended French intervention in Algeria and facilitated
Algerian independence in 1962. Domestically, de Gaulle restored stability, ending the
rapid succession o f cabinets that marked the Fourth Republic. The Fifth Republic gave de
Gaulle the basis to continue the policy he envisioned for France during his first years in
power: independence and grandeur. The major obstacle to his grand design was what de
Gaulle defined as “Anglo-Saxon dominance” - the policies o f Great Britain and the

as Lacoutre; De Gaulle, pp. 85-88; Anthony Clayton, The Wars ofFrench Decolonization. (London, 1991),
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United States. Regarding the Soviet Union, de Gaulle desired a policy o f cooperation and
reaffirmation o f historical ties between both countries.13*
The growing conflict in Vietnam revealed to de Gaulle potential shortcomings in
American leadership o f the Western Alliance. The American commitment in Vietnam
also offered de Gaulle an opportunity to assert his country’s role in world affairs. France
could assume the part o f champion o f the non-aligned world. By supporting the
independence o f Third World countries politically and economically, de Gaulle hoped to
provide an alternative to these new nations, “freeing” them from the Cold War contest
between the United States and the Soviet Union.137 Greater influence around the globe
might allow France to become a third force, while not quite a superpower. Once again the
base for France’s greater role was Europe. De Gaulle preferred a multi-polar over the bi
polar world and hoped that France and Europe as well as the People’s Republic o f China
would create a new balanced power system going beyond the nuclear stalemate between
the United States and the Soviet Union.138
From 1961 until his resignation from office in March 1969, Charles de Gaulle
steadfastly reiterated his conviction that the Vietnam conflict could only be ended

u&Maurice Couve de Murville, Aussenpolitik. 1958-1969. translated into German by Herman Kusterer,
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de Gaulle. See also: W.W. Kulski, De Gaulle and the Worfd: The Foreign Policy o f the Fifth French
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still play a global role by actually fostering the independence o f its former colonies.
Hoffmann, Decline or Renewal, pp.285-286.
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through a negotiated settlement providing for the withdrawal o f all foreign forces and the
neutralisation o f the entire country. He argued strongly against further escalation o f the
conflict by increasing the American presence and directly engaging North Vietnam.
Initially, de Gaulle attempted to influence American policy-making on Southeast Asia
through confidential advice. When this approach failed, he went public in criticizing the
United States. Although de Gaulle addressed concerns shared by Great Britain and West
Germany, neither country endorsed his view.
French refusal to sanction American policy on Vietnam led to crisis and a turning
point for the trans-Atlantic alliance. Britain and West Germany were cautious not to
alienate the United States. But de Gaulle did challenge the United States on Vietnam and
skillfully utilized the Vietnam controversy to question American predominance in the
Western alliance. His withdrawal from NATO command in 1966 exemplified the rift
between France and the United States.139
De Gaulle’s policy o f independence certainly dismayed Washington. He
dismissed the Cold War framework o f American policy-makers and questioned American
leadership in the alliance. As a consequence he failed to change American policy on
Vietnam but left Washington fighting in Southeast Asia without his country’s support
The United States eventually learned that de Gaulle’s assessment on Vietnam was
correct Even more importantly, subsequent American administrations realized that the

m Murville, Aussenpolitik, p. 62; Membership in NATO accordingly might engulf France m an unwanted
and dangerous war in Southeast Asia. NATO membership also undermined French sovereignty and de
Gaulle insisted, on developing his own nuclear force to free his country from American control of the
nuclear trigger.
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United States needed the support o f its European allies as much as the European, needed
American protection.
The situation in Indochina in 1960 offered France the opportunity to embark on
the role o f honest broker. In Laos, to the dismay o f the Eisenhower administration, France
supported the neutralists led by Prince Souvanna Phouma. A year later France refused to
participate in any intervention by SEATO forces.I40For Vietnam, de Gaulle soon adopted
the same policy o f advocating neutralization, coupled with the demand o f withdrawal o f
all foreign forces, for Vietnam.

I. De Gaulle’s diplomatic Approach: 1961-1964

The election o f John F. Kennedy gave de Gaulle new hope that he might influence
American foreign-policy making. Eisenhower had increased the American commitment
to Indochina, but conflicts in Laos and South Vietnam nevertheless intensified. Perhaps
Kennedy was more amenable to de Gaulle’s suggestion o f a political settlement for the
entire region. In March 1961, Jacques Chaban-Delmas, president o f the National
Assembly, was scheduled to visit the United States. Before leaving, he received
instructions from de Gaulle, who asked Chaban-Delmas to report what impression
President Kennedy made. De Gaulle added: “See him and tell him not to get caught up in
the Vietnam affair. The United States could lose its forces, but also its soul.”141
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Kennedy listened and agreed in principle to the political settlement in Laos, but
rejected a similar solution for V ietn am . De Gaulle was concerned about the growing
crisis in South Vietnam and he repeated his advice during Kennedy’s visit to France in
May I96L Kennedy indicated that Western intervention in Southeast Asia might be
necessary to stop further advances o f the Communist forces. De Gaulle refused to directly
interfere in South Vietnam and rejected Kennedy’s plan to establish a barrier against the
Soviet Union and the People’s Republic o f China (PRC) in Indochina. The general
argued that military intervention was a hopeless endeavor that ultimately would do more
to strengthen the Communist than destroy them. He warned Kennedy:
You will find that intervention in this area will be an endless entanglement. Once a
Nation has been aroused no foreign power, however strong, can impose its will upon it.
You will discover this for yourself. For even if you find local leaders who in their own
interest are prepared to obey you, the people will not agree to it, and indeed not want it.
The ideology which you invoke will make no difference. Indeed, in the eyes of the
masses, it will become identified with your power. That is why the more you become
involved out there against Communists, the more the Communists will appear as
champions o f national independence, and the more support they will receive, if only
from despair. We French have had experience of it. You Americans want to take our
place. I predict that you will sink step by step into a bottomless military and political
quagmire, however much you spent in men and money. What you, we and others ought
to do for unhappy Asia is not to take over the running of these states ourselves, but to
provide them with the means to escape the misery and humiliation which, there as
elsewhere, are the causes of totalitarian regimes.142

Hindsight validates de Gaulle’s prediction. He correctly assessed the appeal o f
nationalism in Southeast Asia, having experienced its power both in Europe and within
the former French colonial empire. As de Gaulle noted, ideologies were temporal and

x De Gaulle, Memoirs o f Hope, p. 256.
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simply another tool to justify a nation’s self-interest and self-determination.143 Based on
this realistic assessment, the only successful way for the West to influence events in
Southeast Asia was an indirect approach through economic aid and political support.
Obviously, de Gaulle did not want to see the Communists succeed in Southeast Asia, but
military intervention was undoubtedly the wrong way to defeat the Communist
insurgents. Also, de Gaulle was not willing to relinquish the French role in her former
colony, and the best way to maintain ties was through economic aid to help improve the
viability o f South Vietnam.
Kennedy, however, could or would not perceive the turmoil in South Vietnam
within de Gaulle’s framework. In fact, Kennedy regarded the conflict in Vietnam
primarily m terms of the ideological battle o f the Cold War. Although the United States
already provided ample economic and military aid, Kennedy hoped that a concerted
Western policy might further prevent Communist successes. Western support o f
American strategy in Vietnam would further justify Kennedy’s policy and score some
points in Congress. In Asia, it was necessary to realize the dangers o f a North Vietnamese
thrust into Laos and South Vietnam, an operation which in American eyes was backed by
Moscow. In addition, Beijing might also become involved in Indochina, further
encouraging Communist insurgents in South Vietnam. To meet the Communist
challenge, the West had to adopt a joint strategy for the up-coming conference on Laos
and, in case the conference faded, a contingency plan for Indochina. Washington believed

141De Gaulle's conception o f the only relative importance o f ideologies is even more apparent m his
approach to the Soviet Union. He insisted m using the term Russia and regarded C om m unism as only
another chapter m the quest for great power politics that went back to the days o f Peter the Great.
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that an “increased understanding from the international community” would actually
accelerate a settlement in Vietnam.1"
Washington did appreciate the considerable role France still played in South
Vietnam- National Security advisor McGeorge Bundy suggested the formation o f joint
U.S.-French committees to find solutions for the complex problems in South Vietnam.
More importantly, Washington hoped to “eliminate past cross purposes in Southeast
Asia” and obtain an “urgent high-level effort to concert UK-French-US position on
Vietnam.”t45De Gaulle was receptive to these suggestions, favoring closer consultations
as well.146 But de Gaulle expected Washington to recognize the French position on
Indochina as a prerequisite for any French support o f America’s policy in Vietnam. He
rejected Western intervention and favored the neutralization o f the region. The French
president was unwilling to give up his own policy on Indochina simply to placate the
Americans.
For Kennedy to accept de Gaulle’s position but continue American policy in
Vietnam was virtually impossible. Kennedy remained confident that an honest debate on
American goals in South Vietnam could win the general’s endorsement In his encounters
with Chaban-Delmas and de Gaulle, Kennedy outlined his approach but was ultimately
unsuccessful in altering French perceptions. De Gaulle was convinced that Kennedy’s
policy on Vietnam would only lead to further escalation and possibly stalemate. It was

M*Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy, De Gaulle,, Africa* and Southeast Asia, May 13,1961; John. F.
Kennedy National Security Files, Western Europe, 1961-1963, France, Box 70.
MSMemorandum for Bundy, May 13,1961; and Memorandum: What we wantfrom Paris, May30,1961,
both m: National Security Files, Western Europe, 1961-1963, Box 70, JFKL.
146Record o f Conversation, February I?, 1961, and Memorandum o f Conversation, May 6,1961, both m:
JFK, NSF, Western Europe, 1961-1963, Box 70. De Gaulle expressed his desire for consultations within
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not in France’s best interest to either support such policy or become entangled in the
American struggle.147The general’s position was difficult for Washington to comprehend
or to accept since it ran counter to American perceptions. Over Laos, at least, a political
settlement could be reached, with both the United States and the Soviet Union as
guarantors o f that country’s neutrality. Yet, the issue o f Vietnam proved more thorny and
ultimately more divisive in future French-American relations. De Gaulle insisted on
complete neutrality for both Vietnams, allowing for closer ties between North and South,
and eventually leading to the peaceful unification o f the country.
In 1962 President Kennedy was not ready to acquiesce to de Gaulle’s policy o f
neutralizing Vietnam. The State Department duly noted de Gaulle’s “distaste” for Diem
and worried over French support o f Cambodia’s Prince Sihanouk, who pursued a neutral
course between East and West. In November 1962, presidential advisor Walt Rostow met
with Jean-CIaude Winkler, special envoy to de Gaulle, to devise a strategy to convince
the French president o f the validity o f the American approach in South Vietnam. A recent
attack by the PRC on India served as an pertinent example o f overall Communist
aggression. According to Rostow, the incident in the Himalayas should make it more than
obvious to de Gaulle that “the containment o f China can be conducted along the lines
similar to the containment o f Russia in Europe.”148 Washington was certain its policy o f

weeks o f Kennedy's inauguration. French. Ambassador Herve Alphand restated de Gaulle’s intentions in a
meeting with Paul NItze m May 1961.
,4TDe Gaulle, Memoirs o f Hoper pp. 204-205.
I4* Memorandum o f Conversation, Walt Rostow and Jean-CIaude Winkler, Nov. 29,1962, NSF: France,
Box, 72, JFKL.
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stem m ing the tide against Communism, in Vietnam would lead to positive results and

hoped to gain de Gaulle’s support.149
Again the general refused to join ranks. Washington, in turn, was unwilling to
accept French obstinacy to a concerted Western policy in Southeast Asia. While both
sides agreed that South Vietnam should not fall into the hands o f the Communists, their
respective approaches to prevent the loss o f South Vietnam differed profoundly. A
possible understanding was further complicated by a strong conviction - both in Paris and
Washington - that their policies exclusively promised success. Kennedy reiterated his
view that only Western support could save Vietnam in a meeting with French foreign
secretary Maurice Couve de Murville in May 1963. The president, deeply concerned
about the nuclear ambitions o f China, reiterated his obligation to preserve the
independence of South Vietnam to guarantee the freedom o f the entire region. Murville
believed that China did not intend to take over Southeast Asia and only desired to
establish a “buffer region” to protect itself from the United States. If the French view
proved correct, the best recourse was to “achieve a political solution to the problems in
the area.”150
In private with Kennedy, and then publicly in the Summer o f 1963, de Gaulle
expressed his misgivings about the American involvement in Vietnam. In a press
conference on August 29, 1963 the French leader maintained that only the Vietnamese
people could determine their future and choose the path to independence as well as

149Memorandum of Conversation, Rostow—Winkler, Nov. 29,1962, NSF: France. Boz 73, JFKL.
150Memorandum of Conversation, Kenned/ and Couve de Murville^ May25,1963, NSF: France, Box 73,
JFKL.
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fntemal peace and harmony. France was willing to do everything within its power to
facilitate the Vietnamese struggle for domestic stability and peace:
T he French Government is following w ith attention and emotion the grave events
occurring in Vietnam. T he task accomplished in the past by France in Cochin China,
A nnam and Tonkin, th e ties she has m aintained w ith the country as a whole, and the
interest she takes in th e development explains w hy she understands so w ell and shares so
sincerely in the trials o f th e Vietnamese people. In addition, France’s knowledge o f the
m erits o f this people m akes her appreciate th e ro le they would be capable o f playing in
th e current situation in A sia for then own progress and to further international
understanding, once they g o ahead with th e n activities independently o f the outside, in
internal peace and unity and harmony w ith th e ir neighbor. Today m ore than ever, this is
w hat France wishes fo r Vietnam as a w hole.151

For de Gaulle the best way to achieve peace m Vietnam was the neutralization o f
the country in accordance with the 1954 Geneva Agreement and the solution for Laos
reached in 1962. The French leader instructed his ambassador in Saigon, Roger
Laloulette, to convey de Gaulle’s vision of a peaceful settlement to Diem and his brother
Nhu who, facing mounting pressure from the United States, were receptive to the French
proposal o f negotiations with the Viet Cong and even Hanoi.132
Washington was disturbed by de Gaulle’s comments and was anxious to leam
what the general’s long term policy for Vietnam entailed. The Americans were also
concerned about possible contacts between Nhu and North Vietnamese leaders as well as
French knowledge o f or acquiescence to such talks.153 While Kennedy was well aware o f
de Gaulle’s position ever since their 1961 summit, he still did not “understand just how

I5t Statement an Vietnam by President Charles de Gaulle on August 29,1963', m: Major Addresses.
Statements and Press Conferences o f General Charles de Gaulle. Mav 19.1958 - January 31.1964. French.
Embassy, Press and Information Division, New York, p. 241.
151Murville, Aussenpolitik, pp. 94-95; Fredrik Logevall, “De Gaulle, Neutralization, and the American
Involvement nt Vietnam, 1963-1964,” in: Pacific Historical Review. VoL LXI, Feb. 1992, No. I, pp. 7980.
153Outgoing Telegram: Department o f State, George Ball, September23,1963, NSF, France: Box 73,
JFKL.
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General de Gaulle envisages the development o f a unified and neutral Vietnam without
the successful development o f a strong non-Communist society” in South Vietnam.ts*The
American president m aintained that South Vietnam still needed “external support and
cooperation” to establish a viable non-Communist society. Further he could not conceive
o f how, “ in the face o f Com m unist subversion,” a withdrawal by the West would lead to
any acceptable solution. Washington was certain that de Gaulle’s plan o f neutralization
would have no “other result than the abandonment o f Vietnam to the Communists.”155 If
de Gaulle perceived other venues o f solving the crisis in South Vietnam, Washington was
willing to listen. Bundy recommended “private conversations” between American
officials and the French president to prevent further misunderstandings and
counterproductive public statements by de Gaulle on Vietnam.
Actually, Washington was less willing to listen than to convey its point o f view or
at least stop de Gaulle from meddling in the affairs o f Vietnam. Not surprisingly, de
Gaulle continued to pursue a policy he regarded as proper. He reaffirmed the right o f selfdetermination o f Thud World countries in a late September 1963 speech. To Washington,
de Gaulle’s policy remained unpredictable in terms of how he would next proceed on
Vietnam.156
By October 1963, Kennedy received reports that de Gaulle was “exploring
possible deals with Communist China and North Vietnam” and also considered
diplomatic recognition o f the PRC. A CIA report conceded that Paris might be discussing

154Telegram from McGeorge Bundy to Embassy in Paris, September25,1963, NSF, France: Box 73,
JFKL.
“ Ibid.
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terms o f a negotiated settlement in Beijing and Hanoi. The CIA regarded the chances o f
success for such a diplomatic solution as slim and doubted that de Gaulle had a “grand
design” for the Far East.157 Even, if de Gaulle lacked a “grand design” his opposition to
the American commitment might diminish the chances o f success in South Vietnam. The
French leader was little impressed by American concerns and adamantly contended that
the American approach would only lead to a military quagmire and defeat.158
By the fall o f 1963, Washington and Paris were deeply entrenched in their
respective positions on Vietnam. The United States believed it had to defend the Free
world from C om m unist encroachment in South Vietnam. De Gaulle regarded the conflict
in Vietnam both as a struggle for self-determination as well as domestic opposition
against the corrupt Saigon regime. Foreign intervention would only make things worse.
Therefore, it was advisable to reach a political solution as quickly as possible. The
general also worried about the possible increase o f East-West tensions as a consequence
o f a deepening American engagement in Vietnam. He obviously could not envision a
victory should the United States become bogged down in the jungles o f Southeast Asia.
In addition, de Gaulle’s opposition to Washington’s Vietnam strategy gave him the
opportunity to pursue an independent foreign policy and enhance France’s image in the
Third World. A greater role in international affairs would also improve France’s position
in Europe. Both to the Western Europeans as well as to Moscow and its allies France
again demonstrated leadership and national independence.

156Memorandum for the President; Murville’s Meeting with the Secretary o f Statev Oct. 7,1963, NSF,
France: Box 73, JFKL.
157Telegram from Ambassador Charles Bohlen, Oct. 16,1963; Central Intelligence Agency, Office o f
National Estimates, Sherman Kent, both nu NSF, France: Box 73, JFKL.
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The widening gap: De G aulle and Johnson
From 1961 to 1963, Paris and Washington developed different approaches to the
increasing problems in South Vietnam based on then* respective foreign policy
paradigms. Each side tried to convince the other o f the validity o f its view toward ending
the conflict in Southeast Asia. Although Kennedy deployed a growing number of
personnel and military equipment to South Vietnam, he remained reluctant to folly
commit the United States in the struggle against the Communist insurgents. Kennedy’s
refusal to send American ground troops left the door still open for de Gaulle’s concept of
a negotiated settlement. Diem’s overthrow in early November 1963 ended the possibility
o f an internal Vietnamese settlement for the time being. Three weeks later Kennedy was
assassinated and Lyndon Johnson became president. During 1964 the situation in
Vietnam further deteriorated and the Johnson administration gradually expanded the
American commitment to Vietnam, resulting in the deployment o f ground forces in
March 1965.
De Gaulle refused to reconsider his initial assessment on Vietnam. Consequently,
both Washington and Paris grew more intransigent in their approaches to solve the
problems o f the region. De Gaulle’s opposition to the American course in Vietnam
became more outspoken and damaging to Washington. The Johnson administration tried
to contain the potential fall-out o f French p o licy both in Southeast Asia and within the
Western alliance by continuing to persuade de Gaulle o f the effectiveness o f the

l5x MurviUe. Aussenpolitik.rpp. 94-98.
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American strategy in Vietnam. De Gaulle remained unconvinced and persistently insisted
on apolitical settlement and the neutralization o f that country.
To the French leadership Lyndon Johnson appeared reserved and inscrutable - in
essence quite the contrary to John F. Kennedy, who was always willing to engage in open
discussion. French foreign secretary Murville described Johnson as an “cunning
politician” from the South, who had made his name in Congress, but was virtually
unknown outside o f the United States. Accordingly, Johnson assumed office unprepared
but with the determination to lead his country and control its policy.159
Johnson had misgivings about de Gaulle as well. The French leader had privately
complained that the United States had entered both World Wars rather late and wondered
whether the Americans would be reluctant to support freedom in Europe in the future.
Johnson, understandably, was apprehensive to meet the French president following
Kennedy’s funeral in November 1961. W hile both leaders generally agreed on overall
policies their encounter was dampened by a minor diplomatic spat over the planned de
Gaulle visit to the United States in May o f 1964.160 De Gaulle’s proclaimed confidence in
American support in case o f Soviet aggression sounded hollow to Johnson. French desire
o f a closer organization o f Europe, first economically and then politically, worried

Murville, Aussenpolitik, p. 99; Rusk described LBJ as “intelligent, authoritarian, and extremely
sensitive” to his French colleague. Rusk left no doubt that Johnson was determined to take the reins o f
power.
160Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History. 1929-1969. (New York, 1973), pp. 504-505; Cook, de Gaulle,
pp. 366-367; De Gaulle regarded the previous invitation invalidated by Kennedy's death and expected
Johnson to go through protocol procedure again. Johnson believed the visit was a done deal and told so to
reporters. De Gaulle, as the statesman already in power, felt slighted by Johnson's comments. Though the
entire episode appears silly and was based on a misunderstanding, it revealed again de Gaulle's insistence
on grandeur even m protocol procedure, which was probably quite difficult to follow by Lyndon Johnson,
who liked to take his state guest to his ranch and take them on a fast car trip through the Texas country
side. Johnson and de Gaulle would meet m person only once more - a t the funeral of Konrad Adenauer m
April 1967.
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Washington even more. To Johnson, it was unclear what the French president intended to
do in Europe.161 Johnson later expressed his ambiguous feelings about de Gaulle which
were overshadowed by the Vietnam controversy:
In the years that followed, when de Gaulle's criticism of our role in Vietnam became
intense, I had many occasions to remember that conversation. The French leader doubted
- in private, at least - the will of the United States to live up to its commitments. He
did not believe we would honor our NATO obligations, yet he criticized us for honoring
a commitment elsewhere in the world. If we had taken his advice to abandon Vietnam,
I suspect he might have cited that as “proof” of what he had been saying all along: that
the United States could not be counted on in times of trouble.162

The missed opportunity o f a good personal rapport between both leaders was not
only caused by the character and style o f the new American president, but according to
the French assessment, by Johnson's insufficient interest in the affairs of Europe. With
the mounting difficulties in Vietnam, Johnson's foreign policy focus shifted almost
exclusively to Southeast Asia. Murville was not completely surprised by Johnson's lack
o f concern about Western Europe. Kennedy had repeatedly complained about the narrow,
self-centered view o f the Europeans. In addition, Johnson faced a multitude o f domestic
problems, which became even more urgent from 1965 onward, when civil rights, racial
tensions, and domestic opposition to the war in Vietnam increasingly challenged and
undermined Johnson's “Great Society.”
Johnson displayed an interesting mixture o f distrust and respect for de Gaulle. He
described their peculiar relationship in very American terms, that o f baseball. He saw
himse lf “as the power hitter” whose rival, de Gaulle, was trying to outplay him, yet

I6t Lloyd Gardner, “Johnson and de Gaulle^’' m: Robert Paxton and Nicholas Wahl (eds.) De Gaulle and the
United States: A Centennial Reappraisal. (Oxford, UK, 1994), p. 258.
Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives o f the Presidency. 1963-1969. (New York,
1971), p. 23.
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Johnson “would just lean back and let the ball go in the catcher’s mitt.”1® Despite
increasing tensions with France because of de Gaulle’s contradictory policies and
American escalation in Vietnam, Johnson rejected a more forceful approach in
counteracting French policy. He admonished his administration to abstain from any
public criticism o f de Gaulle in the hope that Johnson could outlast the old general and
prevent further damage in the Western alliance.16*
The Vietnam conflict did not allow Johnson to neutralize the general. Since
Johnson was unwilling to change course over Vietnam de Gaulle had to find other means
to pursue French interests in Southeast Asia and increase French status in the world.
Consequently, de Gaulle explored new venues to facilitate a political setdement for
Vietnam. The obvious solution was a rapprochement with the People’s Republic o f China
(PRC). France did not recognize the PRC in 1949 because o f its own Indochina war. In
1963 global conditions had changed while war was still ravaging Vietnam. China was a
major force in Asia and de Gaulle postulated that no political solution could be found for
Vietnam without including Beijing. China proved receptive to French overtures during
the Geneva Conference on Laos in 1961-62. In late October 1963 de Gaulle sent China
expert Edgar Faure to Beijing to investigate the prospect o f diplomatic relations.
Chairman Mao and Prime Minister Chou En-Iai were openly pleased with the idea and

,6J Murville, Aussenpolitik, pp. 99-100; LogevaQ, De Gaulte, the U.S. and Vietnam, p. 79; George Ball, The
Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs. (New York, 1982), p. 336. The respective views ofMurville and
Johnson regarding the de Gaulle/Johnson relation are in itself interesting evidence in the different
perspectives o f each leader; de Gaulle would probably been quite pleased to make such a “good”
impression on his American counterpart. Ball noted the enormous patience LBJ had with de Gaulle - quite
against LBJ’s character - but it was obvious that LBJ respected the French leader because o f“his
presumption, cunning and imperial style.”
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negotiations finally led to full diplomatic recognition of the PRC by France in January
1964.165
Paris was folly aware that the French decision would perturb Washington, but de
Gaulle remained firm. It was a mistake for the United States to continue a policy o f non
recognition o f the PRC. While Mao’s regime was totalitarian and despicable, China’s
increasing role in Asia could simply not be discounted. French recognition o f Beijing
served two purposes; one affected Europe, the other might bring new initiatives to the
conflict in Southeast Asia. The Sino-Soviet split offered new opportunities for Western
Europe to play the China card against Moscow. In Southeast Asia, de Gaulle sought a
modus vivendi which would neutralize Vietnam. This solution presented the only
possible alternative to further military escalation but required Chinese consent. The basis
of any productive Western relations with Beijing was the recognition o f this vast country.
Admittedly, de Gaulle had no guarantee that the Chinese might actually agree to the
neutralization o f Vietnam but, in his opinion, it was at least worth the effort. Given the
profound domestic challenges facing Beijing, Chinese leaders might be willing to accept
the neutralization o f Vietnam.166
The Khanh government in South Vietnam fomed over de Gaulle’s decision and
resolutely criticized the recognition o f Beijing. From Saigon’s perspective the French

ls*H.W. Brands, “Johnson and de Gaulle: American Diplomacy Sotto Voce," in: Historian. XLIV, August
1987, pp. 478-479; Maurice Ferro, De Gaulte et I'Amdrioue. Uhe Amitfd tumulteuse. (Plon, Paris, 1973),
p. 359.
165Murville, Aussenpolitik, pp. 102-103; Philippe Devillers, “French, policy and the second Vietnam war,”
in: The World Today. June 1967, p .256; Le Monde, Jan. 18,1964, p. I. Eventually, the United States saw
the validity in de Gaulle's approach, during the presidency o f Richard Nixon and Ms understanding with
China facilitated the Paris Peace Accords o f 1973.
166Aktea zur Aussenpolitk der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (AAPD), 1964, VoL I, Conversation Erhard de Gaulle, Paris, Feb. 14,1964, pp. 211-212; Murville^ Aussenpolitik, pp. I02-103.
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move further condoned Communist aggression. Saigon took issue with, de Gaulle’s
interference in Vietnam’s business. Government officials called de Gaulle’s policy
illusionary and considered it just another French effort to restore her influence in
Southeast Asia, this time with the help o f Beijing. France was undermining the struggle
o f the South Vietnamese against Communism and Saigon contemplated breaking
diplomatic relations with Paris.167
Washington also deplored the French decision calling it an “unfortunate step,
particularly at a time when Chinese Communists are actively promoting aggression and
subversion in Southeast Asia and elsewhere.” A Senate resolution asked the French not to
recognize Beijing or face grave consequences in Franco-American relations. Secretary o f
Defense McNamara told journalists that countries which recognized the PRC were aiding
Communist expansion in Southeast Asia. He was also afraid that Paris’ decision would be
followed by the French speaking nations in Africa. Recognition o f the PRC might upset
the balance o f nations against Communist China in the United Nations complicating the
American role in that assembly. But de Gaulle was encouraged by the mostly positive
response to his decision in the rest o f the world, particularly in Asia.148
France had again a voice in world affairs. The general would definitely not
reverse his views on Vietnam in order to placate the United States and undermine his
strategy o f grandeur. Publicly de Gaulle defended his decision to recognize China in the
overriding context o f the conflict in Vietnam and the China’s role in Asia as a whole:

ISTLe Monde, January 22, 1964, p. 3.
Murville, Aussenpolitik, pp. 103-104; Le Monde, January 25,1964, p. 5, January 28,1964, p. I, January
29, 1964, pp. 1-2; Logevall, De Gaulle, the U S, and Vietnam, p. 85; Gardner, Johnson and de Gaulle, pp.
265-266; As expected Taiwan protested and recalled its ambassador m Parts.
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There is no political reality in A sia . . . which does not interest China. Neither war
nor peace is imaginable on th at continent without China’s becoming implicated. Thus it
is absolutely inconceivable th at w ithout her participation there can be any accord on
the eventual neutrality o f Southeast A sia.169

France had to recognize this vast country o f 700 million people to further French
involvement in matters o f international importance: “il est clair que la France doit
pouvoir entendre directement la Chine et aussi s’en faire ecouter.” Only with Chinese
participation was the neutralization o f Southeast Asia possible through ending foreign
interference in the region.170
The policy o f neutrality for Vietnam was discarded by Washington since it would
allegedly only lead to a Communist victory. All o f Johnson’s principal advisors rejected
de Gaulle’s concept as detrimental to American objectives in Vietnam. None o f them
gave more than a cursory glance at the French proposal. Only a few voices of dissent
within the U.S. government favored the French proposal but the Johnson administration
was displeased by an y suggestion o f neutralization. Washington aimed at convincing
Americans and the world that the United States would stand by its com m itm ent to South
Vietnam.171This would prove more difficult than anticipated.

The American, effort to contain de Gaulle
The Johnson administration grew apprehensive over the ram ifications de Gaulle’s
ideas had in Europe and also in South Vietnam. Although the Khanh government in

169Logevall, De Gaulle, the US. and Vietnam, p. 85.
m Le Monde, February2-3,1964, p. 3.
m Robert McNamara, fa Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons ofVietnam. (New York, 1995), p. 55;
Logevall, D e Gatdle, the U S, and Vietnam, pp. 82-83; Gardner, Johnson and die Gaulle, p.267; on dissent
within the American government see below Chapter IV.
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Saigon strongly rejected the idea o f negotiations, not all South Vietnamese were opposed
to French suggestions.172 General Khanh claimed that French agents were plotting to
assassinate him and were also cooperating with the Viet Cong. The Viet Cong, in fact,
did react positively to de Gaulle’s ideas and issued an official communication that
approved “President de Gaulle’s proposal to establish a regime o f neutrality m South
Viet-Nam.”173 Washington needed to take action to prevent further damage by de Gaulle
and once again adopted the strategy o f friendly coercion.
During the spring and summer o f 1964 Johnson explored ways o f influencing de
Gaulle’s position in Washington’s favor. Ambassador to Paris Charles Bohlen and John
Cabot Lodge in Saigon as well as CIA advisors set out to develop an approach to contain
de Gaulle. Bohlen characterized the French president as “highly egocentric and with
touches o f megalomania” but argued against any direct criticism o f the French leader by
the Johnson administration.174 Bohlen recommended that Washington should present a
clear political objective and course o f action in Vietnam to de Gaulle and request his
cooperation in that policy.t7SJohnson concurred with the ambassador. Hence, it became
Bohlen’s task to work directly with de Gaulle and win him over to the American point o f
view.
Johnson asked Lodge to reassure the South Vietnamese government that
Washington was determined to “stop neutralist talk wherever we can by whatever means

172Logevall, De Gaulte,, the U S., and Vietnam, p. 87.
03 FRUS, Vietnam, Telegram from the Embassy m Vietnam to the Department o f State, Saigon, March 23,
1964, p. 187.
Brands, Johnson and de Gaulle, pp. 479-480.
17SFRUS, Vietnam, 1964-1968, VoL I, Memorandum prepared by the Ambassador to France (Bohlen),
Washington, March 12,1964, pp. 140-141; the CIA also warned o f the detrimental consequences de
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we can.” 17* Further, Johnson hoped that Lodge could give advice on how to handle the
French president Lodge immediately went to work by devising a strategy that might
change de Gaulle’s m ind. De Gaulle had to understand that American goals in Vietnam
were profoundly different from French objectives during the First Indochina war. The
United States was not seeking an exclusively military solution, which by itself had no
chance o f success, but was sincerely endeavoring to improve the lives o f the Vietnamese
people. Moreover, American and French interests in Vietnam were not so different. The
American effort to strengthen South Vietnam was “directly to the advantage” o f French
doctors, teachers, and businessmen in that country. French nationals could play a
sign ifican t role for the overall progress in South Vietnam by aiding the American

commitment.
Given the still considerable French influence in South Vietnam Washington had
to convey to de Gaulle that neutralization at the present was counterproductive to both
countries’ objectives in Vietnam:
France has an influence in Viet-Nam way beyond what it contributes in the way of men,
weapons, and money. This is because French is still the Western language which is
possessed by the largest number of Vietnamese — at the present, the so-called people
who count in Viet-Nam read French newspapers; in particular, they read background
news stories which the Agence France Presse gets from the Quai d’Orsay. Some are
impressed by it and others are infuriated by it, and altogether no good purpose is served.
If what is desired is the eventual neutralization of Indo-China or o f Viet-Nam, the way
not to do rt is to create the furor which these statements out o f Paris create. General de
Gaulle is thus a very influential figure in Viet-Nam and, unwittingly, in a way which is
defeating his own stated purpose.177

Gaulle's policy had fit South Vietnam, and on Western unity in general. See: Brands, Johnson and de
Gaulle, p. 482.
175FRUS, Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the
President, Washington, March 15,1964, p. 152; Message from the President to the Ambassador in
Vietnam (Lodge), Washington. March 20,1964, p. 185.
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All de Gaulle needed to do was to modify his time-schedule for neutralization and
postpone it for some future time. Lodge suggested de Gaulle take a look back into
France’s own history during 1940 and 1944. Had Washington adopted neutralization for
France then, France might have suffered Nazi occupation far longer. As in the I940’s,
Americans continued to oppose neutralization because such policy only facilitated hostile
attacks.178
Johnson urged Bohlen to seek an appointment with de Gaulle as soon as possible
and inform the French president that the United States, after thorough investigation,
rejected the idea o f disengaging from Vietnam or initiating negotiations at the present
time. Based on Lodge’s recommendation, Johnson told Bohlen o f what he expected de
Gaulle to do:
W hat we actually w ant from de Gaulle is a public statement, prior to th e SEATO
m eeting [April 13-15, 1964], that the idea o f “neutralization” does not apply to the
attitudes or policies o f the government in Vietnam o r its friends in the face o f the current
com m unist aggression. W e w ant him to state that he does not favor “neutralization” o f
this sort a t the present tim e. W e are not asking him to drop his idea for all eternity. W hat
w e w ant is a statem ent that he does not think it applies now.179

Bohlen could use whatever argument he felt was most convincing but Johnson stressed in
no uncertain terms that he expected de Gaulle to comply with his wishes and, as an ally
and friend, “adopt an attitude o f cooperation rather than obstruction” in this area o f vital
interest to the United States.180

m FRUS, Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnam, March. 23.1964, p. 188.
08 Ibid.. 1964, pp. 188-189.
179FRUS, Vietnam, Message from the President to the Ambassador m France (Bohlen), Washington,
March 24,1964, p. 191.
*” Ibid, pp. 19I-L92. LBJ wanted to hear from de Gaulle what French diplomats said in private: an
American withdrawal from Vietnam would have disastrous results. The message to Bohlen included a
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The Khanh government reacted more quickly and demanded a public statement
from de Gaulle in which he would modify his view on neutralization. If France complied,
South Vietnam would remove current economic restrictions on French imports and
finally appoint a new ambassador to Paris. Washington was caught unprepared by the
Vietnamese move; Secretary Rusk deplored that “Khanh went roaring in” and decided to
wait a few days to allow things to calm down in order to prevent a strong response by de
Gaulle to the combined South Vietnamese-American pressure.181
On April 2,1964 Bohlen finally met with de Gaulle. During forty-five minutes o f
discussion Bohlen failed to convince the general o f the validity of the American Vietnam
strategy. De Gaulle flatly refused to reject neutralization for Vietnam. He disagreed with
the American prognosis that the Khanh government was winning the war against the
Communist insurgents. The French leader pointed to the similarities o f both the French
and American Indochina conflicts. He asserted that the South Vietnamese had “no taste
for this war” and therefore were unable to meet the challenge o f the Communist
insurgents.182 Bohlen did not concur with de Gaulle’s assessment. The French straggle
differed profoundly from the American efforts. France had fought a colonial war, while
the United States assisted South Vietnam against foreign aggression. The ambassador
implied that de Gaulle surely did not favor a Communist victory. Indeed, the general did
not want to see a Communist take-over in Vietnam, but questioned American strategy. He

personal note o f Johnson to de GauIFe which reiterated the main points in a very straightforward languag e
and was modified to prevent an adverse reaction from the general.
ISI FRUS, Vietnam, Message from the Ambassador m France (Bohlen) to the President, Paris, March 25,
1964, pp. 194-195.
182FRUS, Vietnam, Message from the Ambassador in France (Bohlen) to the President; Paris, April 2,
1964, pp. 216-217. De Gaulle did not even consider the Khan regime a real governm ent. Since the fall of
Diem, Saigon had been under the rule o f military usurpers.
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doubted whether the United States could even obtain military stabilization in the country
and, unless Washington changed course, would eventually suffer the same debacle as
France had a decade earlier.
According to de Gaulle’s judgement the best solution was the neutralization o f
Vietnam through another Geneva conference including Beijing. If Washington was
unwilling to consider negotiations, then it had to be willing to “really carry the war to the
North and if necessary against China.”183 The latter alternative was disconcerting but
presented a more clearly defined policy. De Gaulle regretted that France and the United
States had not done more to coordinate their policies in Southeast Asia. Bohlen
responded that the United States had in fact strongly supported France in Indochina from
1949 onward. Regardless, de Gaulle declined to support the American policy in Vietnam
because neutrality was the “only way out to the US other than engage in major hostilities
against North Vietnam and China.”1*4
The French leader rejected Bohlen’s view that neutralization would lead to further
Communist advances. Although de Gaulle could not guarantee Communist, particularly
Chinese, cooperation in a peace conference, he repeated that the sooner the United States
“went for neutralization the better o ff they would be.” Bohlen, quite displeased, ended the
conversation by pointing out that Washington would be considerably disappointed by de
Gaulle’s intransigence. The general unfortunately missed a “good opportunity” to work

“ *FRUS, Bohlen to the President, April 2,1964, pp. 217-218.
IWIbid. p. 218.
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closely with the United States on the situation in Vietnam.1“ But de Gaulle saw no reason
to reverse his views.
Bohlen left the meeting dismayed over his failure to impress de Gaulle. Although
Bohlen later questioned the w ar in Vietnam, in 1964 he concluded that de Gaulle was
misinformed and did not comprehend the seriousness o f the Communist threat in
Vietnam, a feeling that was shared by Lodge.186 The answer was simple, de Gaulle was
not misinformed. Unlike Washington, he did not perceive the conflict in Vietnam in
terms o f Cold War ideology. To him, conditions in Vietnam had not changed since the
Fust Indochina War. Now, as ten years ago, the Vietnamese were fighting for
independence and for a government that truly represented the people’s interests. By
supporting a corrupt regime, the United States only provoked Vietnamese resistance.
Washington and Paris perceived the conflict in Vietnam each in terms o f its own
national self-interest. Their differing self-interests and resulting political agenda were too
diametrically opposed to allow for compromise. Washington feared that a withdrawal
from Vietnam endangered not only its strategic interests in the Pacific but undermined
American credibility as leader o f the Western world. De Gaulle dreaded that further
escalation might thaw France and Europe into an unwanted war - a war that once the PRC
became involved, could become devastating for the entire world. Clearly, Vietnam was
not valuable enough to bring the world to the threshold o f annihilation. French opposition

185FRUS, Bohlen to the President, April 2,1964, pp. 218-221; Bohlen could not discern whether de Gaulle
was operating on genuine conviction based on the current situation orpast French experience in Indochina,
yet whatever the reasons the general remained firm that neutralization was the only alternative to further
escalation. De Gaulle displayed considerable contempt not only for the Khanh government but the
Vietnamese people in general. Khanh’s recent behavior might partly account for de Gaulle’s view. But
again it was also obvious that Vietnam served as a means to de Gaulle’s end - a greater role for France,
independent from the Anglo-Saxons.
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to the American policy, moreover, allowed France to distinguish her own views from
those o f Washington and present herself as an alternative leader to the Third World and in
Europe. Common ground was lost in this competition between the current superpower
and the “grande nation.”
The SEATO Conference in Manila o f April 1964 further exacerbated the FrenchAmerican rift over Vietnam. Rusk met with Murville to discuss the situation in South
Vietnam quickly learning that the French position was as resolute as ever. To the French
foreign minister the problems in South Vietnam were essentially political. He suggested
returning to the provisions o f the 1954 Geneva agreement which prohibited foreign
interference in Vietnam. If these provisions were obeyed, Vietnam could obtain
independence, nonaligment, and reunification. Non-intervention in fact affected both
North and South Vietnam because the North also was not independent but ruled by
outside forces.IS7Murville believed that Saigon could not defeat the Communists
insurgents unless the United States escalated its commitment He told Rusk:
P Jf you tell m e m ilitary victory, I w ill say th at is fine. But if the w ar is not
extended to the N orth and if U .S. forces do not participate, there is not likely to be a
m ilitary victory in Viet-Nam. The South Vietnamese people are out o f the gam e. A ll you
have is a professional army supported from outside.18*

But even escalation might not succeed. Once again Murville alluded to his
country’s experience. In 1962, France controlled most o f Algeria but still lost the battle.
He reminded Rusk that victory was impossible “without the people.” IX9MurvilIe also

l“ Logevall, De Gaulle, the U S., and Vietnam., pp. 88-89.
117FRUS, Vietnam, Memorandum o f Conversation, U S. Embassy Chancery, Manila, April 12, 1964, p.
234; Ferro, De Gaulle et VAmerique, p. 362.
“* FRUS, Vietnam, U S. Embassy Chancery, Manila, April 12,1964, p. 235.
“’ Ibid.
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maintained that the situation in Vietnam was further complicated by Beijing. Washington
needed to consider Chinese interests and influence in the region. For centuries China had
coveted Southeast Asia but in 1964 any imperialist aim was impeded by the immense
domestic difficulties within China. Thus, Beijing might be interested in any negotiated
solution for Vietnam provided it did not threaten the PRC. Hanoi would have to follow
suit and, at least for the time being, agree to “leave South Vietnam alone.”
Rusk was curious to leam what argument could induce China to accept
neutralization at the present since it had been reluctant to do so in the past. The French
answer was very simple; Beijing implicitly regarded the American presence in Vietnam
as a potential threat to China proper. Murville stressed that the Chinese were “terrified”
by U.S. personnel in Vietnam.190 Given the last two hundred years o f Western
imperialism in and around China even a few hundred Americans stationed in Vietnam
might be a potential threat to Beijing. While Murville perceived China from a historical
perspective, Rusk was unable to move beyond the more narrow American ideology o f
containment.
The meeting between Murville and Rusk was as unproductive as that o f Bohlen
and de Gaulle. While each side remained friendly and polite they were far from reaching
common ground. The French foreign minister acknowledged the divergence in opinion
but agreed with his American counterparts to keep the matter confidential. During the
SEATO conference, Murville was obliged to present the French view unequivocally
which made news headlines. He refused to embrace a joint communique endorsing the
American policy in Vietnam. Such act o f defiance had never occurred before in the
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history o f the alliance. Murville explained to his colleagues that France could not support
the American course because this policy would lead only to defeat South Vietnam might
MI or, even worse, the conflict could escalate, which was far more damaging for all
involved. The SEATO members firmly opposed the French position. They refused to
even consider neutralization because all were convinced that the United States would
prevail hi South Vietnam.191
Washington and Paris could only agree to disagree. Neither side was willing to
give way.192 To Paris, the American position hi Vietnam was obviously misguided. So
was the French view to the Americans. Murville recounted numerous discussions with
Rusk, who exemplified the thinking o f the Johnson administration. Accordingly, Rusk
was convinced that the United States fought a good fight for a ju st cause, namely the
battle again st World Communism. He did not distinguish between the Soviet and Chinese
Com m unism , ignoring the conflict between these two countries. Regarding Vietnam,

Murville maintained that Rusk also proved incapable to understand the determination o f
many South Vietnamese to resist American intervention. In addition, Paris alleged that
American intervention only intensified the already difficult situation in South Vietnam.193
Rusk grew increasingly irritated about the French attitude and regarded de Gaulle
as living a dream o f France’s past glory. The French had failed in Vietnam because they

190Ferro, D e Gaulte et ['Amerique, p. 235.
l9t Murville, Aussenpolitik p. 104.
191FRUS, Vietnam, Telegram from tbe Delegation at the SEATO Ministerial Council Meeting to the
Department o f States, Manila, April 15,1964, p. 239.
191Murville, Aussenpolitik pp. 105-107; Rusk, at least to Murville, never doubted that American strategy
in South Vietnam would lead to success. Also, Rusk persistently adhered to the domino theory, further
justifying the American role m Vietnam. Murville stated that Beijing was interested in peace talks but
could not tolerate an expanding American presence on the Asian mainland. See also: Ferro, De Gaulle e t
VAmerique, pp. 365-368.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

106
were a declining power that had tried in vain to uphold a colonial empire. He admitted
that the American commitment was not without peril but Washington was willing to
accept the risks in order to succeed against Communism.194 To the French, any military
intervention in Southeast Asia would prove futile. But Washington was increasingly
determined to use military means to end the conflict in Vietnam. As the conflict in
Vietnam approached a new phase so did Franco-American relations. Since Washington
refused to listen to de Gaulle, the general escalated his attacks o f America’s Vietnam
policy.

II: De G aulle recalcitrant. Sum m er 1964 to 1968

For Washington, a diplomatic solution was not feasible as long as the Viet Cong
and North. Vietnamese troops intensified their attacks on the Saigon government. Johnson
and most o f his counsel rejected the French, view as being mistaken. For the
administration, neutralization was only the first step toward a Communist victory in
Vietnam, endangering all o f Southeast Asia. The loss o f South. Vietnam would not only
have serious repercussions for American leadership in the Free World, but also at home.
Further criticism by de Gaulle was hence both, unwelcome and damaging.

I9* Logevall, De Gaulle, the U S., and Vietnam, p. 90; for {task's view on Vietnam, see: Dean Rusk, As I
Saw It. (New York, 1990), pp. 441-443.
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In June 1964 Johnson attempted once more to gam French approval o f his
Vietnam policy. This time he chose the skeptic among his advisors on Vietnam, George
Ball, to convey the American position to de Gaulle. Ball, like the French president,
favored an American withdrawal from Vietnam, but Johnson predicted correctly that Bail
would loyally defend American policy.l95Johnson instructed Ball to elucidate the
American commitment to a free and independent South Vietnam. More importantly,
Johnson counted on French cooperation to prevent “doubts between our two
Governments, and even division o f purpose” that could play into Communist hands and
lead to further escalation in Vietnam. The American leader expected full French support
in case he had to use military force:
In the event that the United States should find itself forced to act in defense of peace and
independence, in Southeast Asia, I am confident that I could place reliance upon the
firmness of General de Gaulle as a friend and ally, as America properly did in the Cuba
crisis o f ‘62, and if by any chance I am wrong in this point, it is a matter of importance
that we should know it now.196

Ball met de Gaulle on June 5,1964. The undersecretary explained that Johnson
was interested in de Gaulle’s comments and advice on the situation in Southeast Asia.
While both countries desired a viable government in South Vietnam, they differed over
methods and procedures. Washington and Paris agreed in fact that a Communist takeover
in Southeast Asia would be a “catastrophe for the whole free world.” Ball blamed Hanoi
for the guerrilla activities in South Vietnam and claimed it was Ho Chi Minh not

l9SBall, The Past Has Another Pattern, p. 377.
06 FRUS, Vietnam, Memorandum from the President to the Under Secretary o f State (Ball), Washington,
June 4,1964, pp.449*450; LBJ repeated that his favored a peaceful solution but was determined to see
things through if necessary. He stressed that Ball should not mention any contingency planning for South
Vietnam because he feared de Gaulle might leak this information to the Chinese. However, he was “open”
for any French suggestions to solve the conflict m Vietnam.
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Washington who decided over further escalation. 197 The United States, according Ball,
had no ambition o f establishing military or political control in Southeast Asia. But if
American aid to Saigon failed to lead to significant progress, Washington was resolved to
“bring increasing military pressure on Hanoi in order to change the Communists* course
o f action.”l98BalI argued that Washington did not prefer military action and still hoped for
a political solution. But Ho Chi Minh had to fully understand American determination.
The last statement was perhaps a hint to de Gaulle to utilize his diplomatic channels with
Beijing and convey the sincerity of the United States in holding its ground in South
Vietnam.
According to Ball, French and American views conflicted the most on the PRC.
Washington did not expect that Beijing would accept a solution for Vietnam that
contained the spread o f Communism. Past experiences demonstrated that the Communists
could only be stopped by a countervailing force. The United States could not abandon
Saigon, even after a political solution was reached, until the South Vietnamese
government was strong enough to control the entire country.199
De Gaulle listened patiently and took note o f the American “hope” to defeat the
insurgency. Yet he believed chances o f success were faint. The French leader then
repeated almost verbatim what he had told Kennedy in May 1961; the United States
could not win this struggle despite its military might. The conflict was not a military but a

l9TFRUS, Vietnam, Telegram from the Undersecretary o f State (Ball) to the Department o f State, Paris,
June 6,1964, pp. 464-465.
198IbfcL dp. 465-466.
199Ibid. p. 466; Ball argued that the PRC was still m an expansionist and bellicose phase o f its revolution
which precluded an understanding with Washington.
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political and psychological challenge, affecting not only the government o f General
Khanh but the entire Vietnamese people. De Gaulle explained to Ball:
“I [i.e. de Gaulle] do not mean th at all o f the V ietnam ese are against you b u t they regard
the US as a foreign power and a very powerful foreign power”. The m ore the US
becom es involved in the actual conduct o f m ilitary operations the m ore the Vietnamese
w ill turn against us, as others w ill in Southeast A sia.200

De Gaulle did not deny that the United States had the military m ight to destroy
Hanoi, Canton, and even Beijing. But what would the consequences be o f such a
strategy? For de Gaulle it was obviously not worth the risk to allow events to proceed that
far. Vietnam was a “rotten country” for the West to fight in, which France had learned
with much sorrow. If the United States decided to escalate the war in Vietnam, France
refused to have any part in it, as “an ally or otherwise.” The message to Johnson was
abundantly clean no French support for any policy other than negotiations as proposed by
de Gaulle.201
De Gaulle also doubted that present American support to Saigon could lead to
success. Washington had to realize that its involvement in Vietnam was futile and thereby
come to the conclusion that a political settlement was the only decent way out o f the
quagmire. A political agreement could not be reached without China and other regional
powers. Regarding China, de Gaulle was doubtful whether the American view o f an
aggressive, expansionist country was correct Nevertheless, the United States should have

300FRUS, Ball to Department o f State, June 6,1964, p .467.
201FRUS, Ball to Department ofState, June 6,1964, p .467; Ball. The Past Has Another Pattern, p. 378;
De Gaulle alluded to Chinese history and pointed to the relative ease m which Western powers had
defeated the Boxer Rebellion o f 1900. For the tune being, nobody could predict the outcome o f a war
between the West and the PRC.
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contact with Beijing to gain a better understanding o f “what China was up to.”202 Ball
interjected that diplomatic overtures to either Beijing and Hanoi at present would
undermine the will o f Saigon to combat the insurgents. Even if conditions in South
Vietnam were more agreeable toward peace talks, Washington questioned

stro n g ly

whether the Communists would fully honor an agreement203
De Gaulle maintained that U.S. diplomatic efforts alone might not bring the
expected results. He suggested a conference o f the major Western and Asian powers to
positively affect world opinion. International guarantees to uphold a settlement would
preclude further North Vietnamese aggression. De Gaulle recognized American concerns
but argued that all “policy involves risk. I f it is a policy that does not involve risk there is
no choice o f policy.”204The present American course was unfortunately self-defeating
and, as French experience had shown, it did not have any chance o f success. Again the
general did not move an inch from his position. Despite his assurance o f empathy with
American hardship Ball received the impression that de Gaulle was patiently waiting for
events in Southeast Asia to develop as he predicted:
He is confident th at they wilL He is certain no improvements w ill result from the present
efforts. He probably envisages that som e tim e in the not d istant future we w ill begin to
consider seriously his suggestions o f a conference. He quite likely assumes that w e w ill
then ask the French to take soundings w ith the Chinese and N orth Vietnamese.205

311FRUS, Ball to State Department, June 6,1964, p. 468; de GauHe dismissed BaU’s comparison o f the
PRC and Soviet Russia m 1917: “Russia had had an intelligentsia, an army, and agriculture. China has
none o f these things.”
30 Ib id : Bah maintained that South Vietnam had to be further strengthened and Hanoi’s infiltration had to
be reduced before any talks could take place. He also pointed to the repeated transgression by Hanoi in
violation o f the Laos accords.
** Ib id , p. 469.
305FRUS, Vietnam, Telegram. BaU to State Department. June 6,1964, 469-470. De GauHe resented
American criticism ofhis policy which cast him m the role o f scapegoat. BaU had privately hoped that de
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De Gaulle’s refusal to fall in line triggered another round o f diplomatic debate
between Paris and Washington on American policy in Vietnam. On July I, 1964 Rusk
met with French Ambassador Herve Alphand in yet an effort to find consensus.206 Once
more the discussion led nowhere. Both sides repeated the same arguments but the tone o f
the debate sharpened. Alphand blamed American interference in South Vietnam since
1954 for the current difficulties. Rusk discarded this view and demanded that France help
create a viable government in South Vietnam. Paris should publicly recognize the need
for a continuous American presence in Vietnam: “Standing aside and equating the U.S.
with Com m unist presence was definitely not helpful.”207 As soon as Hanoi and Beijing
would “leave Southeast Asia alone” the Americans could withdraw. Rusk asked Alphand
to inform the Chinese that the United States was determined to protect the independence
o f South Vietnam.208
Rusk then became “brutally frank” and in scarcely veiled terms charged de Gaulle
with rejecting America’s Vietnam policy in the false belief that Washington threatened to
diminish French influence in Southeast Asia. The United States, according to Rusk, did
not seek to challenge French power and welcomed an “extension o f French influence in
Southeast Asia, in Africa, and other parts o f the world.” Alphand angrily rejected Rusk’s
allegations and stated that nobody in the French government feared American
predominance at the cost o f French prestige. The ambassador emphasized that the global
role o f the United States had been a “good thing” and had helped in securing peace in the

Gaulle’s argument might affect and perhaps even change the perceptions ofLBJ and his “hawkish”
advisors. To no avafl.
506Logevall, De Gaulle, the U.S.»and Vietnam, p. 95; FRUS, Vietnam, Memorandum o f Conversation,
Rusk-AIphand, Department o f State, Washington, M y 1 ,1964, p. 533.
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West. Nevertheless, American policy-making led to the deep U.S. involvement in
Southeast Asia which obviously was not a good idea.209
Rusk strongly disagreed and attacked the parochial perspective o f the Europeans.
The United States looked beyond the confines o f the Atlantic and, as a Pacific power, the
security o f Asia was o f equal importance to that o f Europe: “To us, the defense o f South
Vietnam has the same significance as the defense o f Berlin.” The French ambassador
dismissed the comparison between Berlin and Vietnam as erroneous. The loss o f Berlin
would seriously threaten Western security while failure in Vietnam would not endanger
the Western world.210 Rusk was obviously frustrated with the inconclusive discussion and
once more demanded outright French support:
The secretary [Rusk] said that the appearance o f a division o f the W est in regard to
Southeast A sia had a definite bearing on the problem and m ade a solution m ore difficult.
He said that the French should tell the N orth Vietnamese that they must leave the South
Vietnamese alone and that France w ill oppose them if they continued their
interference.211

Rusk expected that the French would also emphasize to Beijing the need to refrain from
further support o f Hanoi. If the Chinese refused, then Paris should also oppose the PRC.
Ultimately, a persuasive French stand against the Communists would truly allow the
neutralization o f Southeast Asia. A non-aligned Southeast Asia would probably turn
toward Paris, increasing the French role and influence in the region.212

207 FRUS, Vietnam, Memorandum o f Conversation, Rusk-AIphand, July 1 ,1964, p. 534.
38 IbtU. p. 535.
38 Ibid.
710 Ibid.. pp. 535-536; Rusk maintained that the loss o f Saigon would undermine American credibility in
the West. Alphand did not share this view and affirmed European confidence in the United States.
211 Ibid- dp. 536-537.
212 Ibid, p. 537.
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The intense debate did not change de Gaulle’s mind- With every contact between
American and French diplomats the gap between the two powers widened, increasingly
preventing any mutual agreement concerning Vietnam. The more Washington intensified
its commitment to South Vietnam and implored de Gaulle to support U.S. policy, the
more obstinate de Gaulle became in his refusal to follow America’s lead. Ball and Rusk
identified the basic motivation o f de Gaulle in his desire to pursue an independent foreign
policy. Regarding Vietnam the French president, unlike Washington, also enjoyed the
leisure o f waiting for events to turn in his favor. Events did play into the hands o f de
Gaulle. He was probably not deeply interested in the fate o f the Vietnamese but focused
on how his government could benefit from the turmoil in Vietnam. France now
maintained relations with China, and offered an alternative from the Cold War conflict to
Third World countries. Both were important elements for de Gaulle’s policy in Europe
and the world.
De Gaulle would not relinquish the newly found opportunity for French grandeur
by placating Washington. Instead he used the conflict in Vietnam effectively to serve his
own political goals. But de Gaulle also profoundly worried over the possibility o f another
large-scale war in Asia, a sentiment that was shared by London and Bonn. A m ajor war in
Asia might refocus American attention away from Europe, possibly leading to the
withdrawal o f U.S. troops in Europe. Therefore Europe might be more vulnerable to the
Soviet Union. Lastly, de Gaulle, as Wilson and Erhard, was apprehensive o f being drawn
into an Asian war. Europe could live with the fall o f South Vietnam but not the fall of
West Berlin.
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Consequently, de Gaulle became increasingly outspoken about the American
course in V ietnam . A t a state dinner given in honor o f Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk de
Gaulle deplored the “'cruel division” o f Vietnam which only aggravated Vietnamese
hardships by unending foreign intervention. At a July 23, 1964 press conference de
Gaulle addressed V ietnam at length and criticized American policy. He regretted that the
1954 Geneva Accords, which prohibited outside interference, had not been adhered to for
long. The United States quickly established itself as the protector o f the Diem regime in
the sincere effort to combat Communism. When Diem tried to end the civil war he faced
American objection and was replaced by military rule. Other coups followed as the
Vietnamese grew less inclined to support a cause pushed on them by a foreign power.
Frankly, he argued, the United States could not desire a wider conflict but should
logically want a political solution. De Gaulle proposed a Geneva type conference,
including all major powers, to end the bloodshed in Vietnam.213 The alternative was that
Asia and then the rest of the world might be drawn into a major war which nobody
wanted.
French intelligence indicating that Johnson contemplated augmenting American
troops in Vietnam made de Gaulle even more pessimistic about the prospects for peace in
the region. He was encouraged to hear that the Secretary General of the United Nations,
U Thant, also favored a political solution for Vietnam and was asking other countries to
do likewise. By the end o f July 1964 the Soviet Union, China, Cambodia, North Vietnam
and the Viet Cong all expressed their interest in a peace conference.2I4Washmgton and

213Le Monde, July 25, 1964, p. 3.
2t* LogevaQ, De Gaulle, the CIS., and Vietnam, pp. 95-96.
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Saigon, however, refused to consider a conference for the time being. Saigon issued a
statement denouncing the idea o f another Geneva conference and neutralization as
contrary to the self-interest o f Vietnam. General Khanh added that he was committed to
pursue the fight for freedom and independence against the insurgents despite “colonialist
[Le. French] and Communist efforts.” He also appealed to his allies to expand their aid in
light o f growing Viet Cong aggression. Johnson backed Saigon by increasing the
American personnel in South Vietnam from 16,000 to 21,000 under the mantel o f further
military advisors and technicians.215
The Tonkin G ulf incident o f August 1964 and initial American bombings o f
North Vietnam led to Johnson’s decision m March 1965 to send the Marines to Da Nang.
To Paris this was a turning point which further exacerbated conditions in Vietnam. A
month before American ground troops arrived in Vietnam, Murville had another meeting
with Rusk and Johnson. Murville was distressed about the Tonkin Gulf incident, aerial
attacks on North Vietnam, and rumours that Washington might send substantial military
units to V ietnam . He urged Rusk to consider a political solution and suggested the
withdrawal o f all foreign forces so that the Vietnamese could finally determine their
future without any foreign interference. Rusk was not inclined to listen.216
President Johnson openly expressed his annoyance to Murville for anyone
desiring negotiations. In a long monologue he presented the French foreign minister with
his views on the situation in Vietnam. Accordingly, the Viet Cong grew increasingly

215 Logevall, D e Gaulle, the U.S., and Vietnam, pp. 96-97; Le Monde, July, 26,1964, pp. t-2; and July 29,
1964, p. 3; Pam was concerned by these developments and feared that Hanoi would increase its activity m
the South. American comments that Washington would respond "appropriately” to such aggression
intensified French anxiety.
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aggressive, causing serious incidents which also involved Americans. The United States
had to fight back to prevent another Korea. Johnson did not desire further escalation but
he had to decide which military response was appropriate for each incident:
W e are going to keep them guessing and use appropriate means in response to their
aggression. W e don’t w ant to move to escalation, but if the others do it, we w ill do
w hatever is required on th e basis o f the w isest m ilitary judgem ent. W e would like to
have everybody else’s help in our efforts and we haven’t had much help from others.217

Johnson was merely honoring a commitment made by his predecessors to assist
South Vietnam in establishing a viable government. He only desired that the Viet Cong
stop its aggression and allow peace to return in South Vietnam. But negotiations were
presently unrealistic. Saigon had first to improve its bargaining position. Johnson openly
wondered what de Gaulle would do if he were in the same situation facing attacks on his
people and installations. He also pointed out that he was under growing domestic
pressure from Republicans to respond more forcefully to Communist aggression in
Vietnam. Unless Johnson secured sufficient support from his European, allies, the
American public as well as Congress would maintain doubts about European reliability
and the purpose o f the Western alliance in general.218
Murville was neither intimidated nor convinced by the president’s arguments.
Although he understood the problems the president was facing, Murville insisted that a
political settlement was the only way out o f the American dilemma- The French politician
point by point refuted Johnson’s views about the current situation in Vietnam calling

2X6M urviRe,Aussenpolitk, pp. 107-108.
2X1Gardner. Johnson and de Gaulle, p. 271.
2ISM urville, Aussenpolitk, pp. 108-109; Gardner, Johnson and de Gaulle, pp. 270-271. LBPs intimidation
strategy and threat to withdraw American troops from Europe certainly worked with Bonn and nr a lesser
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them misguided, unrealistic, and unconvincing.219Johnson could obviously not count on
French support. But to Murville it was also apparent that he had no chance o f changing
Johnson’s mind. Once more both sides were deadlocked.220
On March 1,1965 de Gaulle made public his intention to cooperate with Moscow
in finding a negotiated settlement for Vietnam. IBs announcement came only days after
Johnson stated that the time was not yet ripe for negotiations. Washington was deeply
angered by the French initiative. Accordingly, de Gaulle violated the spirit o f SEATO
which had been created to defend Southeast Asia against Communist aggression.221 But
de Gaulle’s proposals received some favorable responses in South Vietnam.
The civilian government o f Dr. Pham Huy Quat was contemplating negotiations
as well. Sources close to the government revealed that his cabinet, under public pressure
to reach a peaceful solution, was willing to establish contact with the Viet Cong to
conclude a cease-fire. It was uncertain, however, whether this was just another political
move or a serious effort to secure peace for South Vietnam.222 Dr. Quat soon changed his
mind. He told the press that his country would continue to fight Communist aggression
and demanded that the NLF cease all hostilities before any settlement could be reached.
Quat also attacked any foreign power that demanded a return to the Geneva settlement
since, he claimed, the great majority o f the Vietnamese thought otherwise. The Buddhist

degree also with. London. But Paris was far from being impressed. Two years later, it was France which,
withdrew from NATO command, citing the war m Vietnam as one o f the reasons for this decision.
219Murville, Aussenpolitik., pp. 109-110; Murville afro pointed to recent French contacts with the PRC
which revealed that Beijing favored a peace conference. Paris received similar signals from Hanoi.
220Ibid, p. 110; Gardner, Johnson andde Gaulle, pp. 271-272. Murville partly blamed the influence o f the
CIA and some o f advisors for LBFs intransigence. Accordingly, the American president received too many
“facts” that were not based on realities m Vietnam.
222Gardner, Johnson and de Gaulle, p. 272.
~ LeM onde, March 1 ,1965, p. 2.
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movement defied the government position and demanded the withdrawal o f all foreign
forces from South Vietnam.223 While the South Vietnamese were divided on how to react
to the Viet Cong, W ashington was increasing its pressure on the insurgents in Vietnam.
Bombing o f North Vietnam continued as part o f the desire to negotiate only from a
position o f strength. Washington dismissed the notion that the conflict in Vietnam was
basically a civil war but instead increased its pressure on Hanoi.224
On March 8, 1965, two battalions o f Marines landed in Da Nang. Soon other
Marines and Army troops followed. The United States had begun the Americanization o f
the war in South V ietnam . Washington now faced the dangers o f an unlimited
commitment which de Gaulle had described to Kennedy in 1961; by pouring in more and
more troops, it hoped to turn the tide, but would find itself riding the tigers back. Paris
opposed the American escalation and intensified its criticism o f Washington's Vietnam
policy. This course eventually led to outright accusations that the United States was
primarily responsible for the war in Vietnam.
Although contacts between both countries continued, France and the United States
were evidently “hostile allies.” The tensions between both countries would only ease with
the beginning o f peace talks on Vietnam in 1968. While the other Western Europeans
initially endorsed the American escalation in Vietnam, despite private concerns, the
French position remained consistent labeling American policy as gravely mistaken.

23 Le Monde, March I, L965, p. 2.
-* Le Monde, March 2,1965, p. 2; the paper commented on a recently published “White Paper” that
alleged that most Americans were insufficiently informed on the complicated situation m Vietnam or why
the United States was involved m that countty. On the CIA White Paper see also: Marilyn B. Young. The
Vietnam Wars. 1945-1990. (New York, 1991), pp. 141-142; a few critics within the United States argued
along similar lines as Paris by stating that the pace o f escalation had accelerated not because ofVIetnamese
action but due to increased American pressure.
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Unlike the British Prune Minister Harold Wilson, de Gaulle was not willing to handle the
issue o f Vietnam solely through diplomatic channels, but chose to present his case to the
media. Once again, he was motivated by profound concerns over the world-wide
implications o f the conflict, and the possible geo-political benefits he could harvest for
France by openly defying the United States.
fit the spring o f 1965, Murville related to the Soviet ambassador that France was
more determined than ever to reconvene the Geneva conference and end the conflict in
Vietnam. While Washington was seeking Western support for a widening war in
Southeast Asia, France was talking to Cold War opponents, Moscow and Beijing, in
order to find a political solution. The French opposition to American escalation in
Vietnam found the approval o f U.N. General Secretary U Thant, and other Western
governments, as that o f Canada for example. India, Poland, and the Soviet Union,
representing the unaligned world and the Warsaw pact, also condemned the American
course as a violation o f the Geneva agreement, calling for an end o f hostilities.225
A visit by George Ball to Paris in early September 1965, renewed speculations
that the Americans might be willing to consider talks over Vietnam. It was quickly
apparent that Washington was not about to change course. Johnson was not interested in
any French mediation and sent Ball to reiterate American goals and policy in Vietnam.
North Vietnam was also unwilling to begin any negotiations as long as American troops
remained in the South. De Gaulle, nevertheless, insisted that military force could not end
the conflict and urged the return to the 1954 settlement, yet was unsuccessful at .

225Murville, Aussenpolitik, p. 110;

Mondey March 4 ,1965, p. I; March 9, 1965, p. I.
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convincing the Americans.226 The buildup in Vietnam continued and with it French
opposition to America’s policy in Southeast Asia.
Later in September 1965, Murville addressed the General Assembly o f United
Nations on Vietnam. He pleaded for the admission o f the PRC to the United Nations.
Without Beijing the agonizing problems o f Southeast Asia could not be solved
satisfactorily. Murville insisted on a political settlement for the conflict. But such a
solution was only feasible if all foreign powers involved in Vietnam ended them
interference:

a

V oict des annees, e t d’abord par la voix du general de Gaulle, que la France s’est
exprhnee tres clairem ent su r le reglem ent qul Iui parait seul etre possible e t qui doit etre,
son avis, fonde sur [’independence, la neutralite e t la non-intervention dans les affaires
interieures du V ietnam , tels que ces princtpes avaient ete definis dans les accords de
Geneve de 1954. Une negociation a cet effet aurait sans doute ete jadis immediatement
possible.227

According to Murville, the French were appalled by the devastation caused by war and
deeply empathized with the Vietnamese people who, despite the previous conflict with
France, remained a true Mend to the French nation. The war not only had bloody
repercussions in Vietnam but seriously hurt its neighbors Cambodia and Laos, which
were also tom apart by opposing factions. In the sole interest o f the people o f Southeast
Asia and world peace, France was willing to use all her experience, influence, and good
will to work for a peaceful settlement and the reconstruction o f Vietnam. The French
government once more reaffirmed that it did not support any “war o f aggression" in

226Le Monde, September 1 ,1965, pp. 1-2; September2,1965, p. I.
227Le Monde, October 1 ,1965, p. I.
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Vietnam, and opposed foreign interference by North Vietnamese, Chinese Communists..
as well as the United States.228
The war allowed de Gaulle to pursue his ‘Grand DesignT and he exploited
successfully the American dilemma in Vietnam, thereby enhancing the French position in
the world. He continued to seek contacts with North Vietnam leading to the resumption
o f diplomatic relations with Hanoi in July 1967.229 De Gaulle also sought better relations
with Moscow in order to promote French leadership in the West. In April 1965 the Soviet
foreign secretary, Andrei Gromyko, visited Paris with both sides agreeing on their
opposition to the American role in South Vietnam. De Gaulle used the occasion to
publicly distance himse lf horn Washington and present France as an honest Mend and
supporter o f the Third World:
Yes, we are helping these countries, and they rely on France as a result. In their view the
contrast between us and the United States has become immense: while we are helping
them , the Americans are using all th eir brilliant new technological inventions to
exterminate in the m ost horrible w ays thousands o f these poor long suffering
Vietnamese, who m erely w ant to be left alone.30

In the summer o f 1965 de Gaulle visited the Soviet Union, hoping to increase his status as
the leader o f Western Europe and creating a counter-balance to Washington. The
rapprochement with Moscow culminated in 1966 in the joint Soviet-French declaration o f
Mendship which constituted a virtual non-aggression pact.31

28 Murville, Aussenpolitik, pp. IIO -II I;Le Monde, October 1 ,1965, p. I.
2:9 Murville, Aussenpolitik, p. I I I .
30 Gardner, Lyndon Johnson and de Gaulle, pp. 272-273.
3 *Guy Carmoy, The Foreign Policies ofFrance. 1944-1968. translated by Elaine P. Halperin, (Chicago
and London, 1970), p .477; De Gaulle also used economic pressure to defy the United States. He decided
to convert U.S. currency into gold, which not only aimed to dim m ish American gold reserves but drained
American financial resources a t a tune when the U.S. government experienced the growing expenditures
caused by the commitment m Vietnam ,
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AH out ‘war* against the United States: Withdrawal from NATO and the Pnomh
Penh Speech
On March 7, 1966, de Gaulle wrote to Johnson that France appreciated the
achievements o f the Atlantic Alliance and the essential role o f the United States by
securing its members* freedom. However, the world and France had changed
considerably since the signing o f the NATO treaty in 1949:
France considers the changes which have taken place or are in process o f occurring since
1949 in Europe, A sia, and elsewhere as w ell as the evolution o f her own situation and
her own forces no longer justify insofar as that concerns her the arrangements o f m ilitary
nature adopted after the conclusion o f th e alliance.232

Because France no longer required foreign forces on her soil for defense, France would
“reassume on her territory the foil exercise o f her sovereignty.” All NATO forces had to
leave within thirteen months. Forewarned o f de Gaulle's move by Ambassador Bohlen
Johnson remained calm and accepted the decision by offering France a leading role in the
Alliance if de Gaulle changed his mind.233
De Gaulle did not change his mind. On March II, 1966 Paris sent an AideMemoire to Washington elaborating further the decision to resume its foil sovereignty.
Most importantly, Europe was no longer the center of international crisis. The threat o f

232FR.US, Western European Region, 1964-1968, VoL XIII, Letter from President de Gaulle to President
Johnson, Paris, March 7,1966, p. 325.
33 FRUS, Western European Region, 1964-1968, Memorandum from the President's Deputy Special
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) to President Johnson, March 7, 1966, p. 327. Washington
was clearly angered by de Gaulle's decision but would not criticize him in public because it might lead to
detrimental reactions by other European countries. Most frustrating was the fact that France did enjoy the
status of “free-rider” because its geography guaranteed NATO protection.
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co n flict lay now in Asia where the Alliance was “obviously not implicated.”251 De Gaulle

addressed two major concerns which forced him to disengage from NATO: the w ar in
Vietnam along with American demands to give at least moral support to its policy there
and the infringem ent on French sovereignty by NATO. Paris saw no choice but to
disengage after years o f discussion with the United States to revise the structure o f

NATO.
To Washington the French withdrawal along with the recent overtures to Moscow
indicated that de Gaulle was set on a neutralist course between the two blocs* which
might have serious repercussions in Europe.ZJSAmbassador Bohlen blamed de Gaulle and
his policy o f grandeur for this new affront to the United States. Regardless, Washington
would be unable to alter French policy. Bohlen commented that the current NATO crisis
revealed two “diametrically” opposed ideas toward the conduct o f foreign relations:
On one hand de Gaulle is fanatically a proponent o f the idea o f independence; th at the
nation-state is the sole enduring, viable entity ux international relations; that th is entity is
uncompromisable and m ultilateral arrangements tend to lim it its freedom and
independence. On the other hand is the concept espoused by the US and other states in
the modem world w hich considers all nations, even the m ost powerful, as inter
dependent in their relations w ith other like minded, particularly allied states.236

234FRUS, Western European Region, Aide-Memoire from the French Government to the U S.
Government, Paris, March 11,1966, p. 333.
35 Murville, Aussenpolitik^ pp. 61-66; Gardner, Lyndon Johnson and de Coulter pp. 273-275; Brands,
Johnson and de Gaulle, pp. 488-490.
236FRUS, Western European. Region, Telegram from the Embassy fixFrance to the Department o f State,
Paris, March, 3 i, 1966, p. 352.
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While the French would not find fault with the first part o f the statement they disagreed
profoundly with the seconcL Interdependence meant nuclear sharing and an equal voice in
the alliance, yet Washington had refused to comply with these French demands.237
Washington, albeit angered by the French decision, was hopeful that once de
Gaulle had gone U.S.-French relations would revert back to normal. Yet the resentment
over de Gaulle’s decision was obvious in McGeorge Bundy’s statement to the Senate
Foreign Relation Committee in June, 1966. Bundy regarded de Gaulle’s policy as
disappointing, “costly in its pride, wasteful in its lost opportunities, irrelevant in much of
its dramatics.” Both countries could still reach an understanding on larger issues but
Bundy dismissed the French claim that it presented an alternative to a bi-polar world. De
Gaulle’s leadership had foiled to unite West Germany or attract other Western European
countries:
The notion o f leadership in a third world w as simply unreal; this heady wine did not
survive its first voyage. The recognition o f China was a gesture w ith no practical result.
And the present specter o f a deal w ith M oscow is sheer fantasy - as far beyond French
pow er as it is contrary to French intentions. . . We have many differences w ith France,
but none that we cannot endure. The m ost painful m ay be the quite special French
position toward Vietnam, but in the light o f the French past there, it is not surprising that
there should be some differences between us. The French attitude is not helpful, but it is
understandable and marginal.238

Even if Americans regarded the French view on Vietnam as marginal, de Gaulle
was certainly not discouraged and continued his criticism o f the American Vietnam
policy. From mid-1965 to 1966 onward he expressed his misgivings to all foreign

37 Murville, Aussenpolitik, pp. 6.5-64; Murville emphasized that, while Paris had repeatedly asked for a
revision o f NATO, Washington considered its predominance m the alliance as the “easiest and most
efficient way.”
m Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 89th Congress, Second
Session, June 20,1966, Statement o f McGeorge Bundy, pp. 4-5.
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diplomats, particularly Americans. The conflict was not only devastating Vietnam but
poisoned the international climate by augmenting the fear o f another world war.
Moreover, the war in V ietnam demonstrated again that the United States simply could not
accept the sovereign will o f other nations.239 De Gaulle could perceive only one solution
for V ietnam - the immediate halt o f the bombing against North Vietnam and negotiations.
Washington did not comply and de Gaulle decided to take the offensive. He chose
the occasion o f his state visit to Cambodia to express his position on the conflict in
V ietnam -240 Upon his arrival to Phnom-Penh on August 31,1966 de Gaulle laid out what

was to follow. He told Prince Sihanouk that he appreciated Cambodia’s policy o f
independence and neutrality as promising precedent for the entire region. Vietnam deeply
troubled both de Gaulle and Sihanouk. The two leaders defended the resumption o f
diplomatic relations with North Vietnam as a venue to explore new possibilities o f peace
and gather further information about the future intentions o f Hanoi. Moreover, Sihanouk
shared de Gaulle’s pessimism about the outcome o f the Vietnam war and was
apprehensive o f further escalation.241
Although the prospect o f peace was distant, de Gaulle could not resist the
opportunity to voice his opinion on the Vietnam War. To a cheering crowd o f 100,000 he
congratulated the Cambodians for defending them independence from both the Khmer

239Anne Sa’adah, “Idees Simples and Idees Fixes: De Gaulle, the United States, and Vietnam,” in: Robert
Paxton and Nicholas Wahl, De Gaulle and the United States: A Centennial Reappraisal. (Oxford, UK,
1994), pp. 295-298.
240Murville, Aussenpalitik, p. 112; Ferro, De Gaulle et rAmerique, p. 370; De Gaulle urged LBJ in
February 1966 to accept a negotiated settlement, worried over the renewed bombing ofNorth Vietnam
after a short break during the Christmas Holidays.
2tt Le Monde, September 1 ,1966, p .I; Sihanouk deplored that recent initiatives by France and Canada to
Hanoi had failed. His country was certainly anxious to prevent any further escalation of the Vietnam
conflict.
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Rouge and the United States and saving “their lives and souls.” Unfortunately, the people
o f South Vietnam still suffered from outside intervention. The United States interfered in
a civil war. American attacks on North Vietnam, inching closer to Chinese territory,
endangered not only peace in Asia but in the world at large. Hence, American policy was
increasingly criticized by the peoples o f Europe, Africa, and Latin America.242
De Gaulle endorsed the Cambodian policy o f neutrality as the solution for all of
Indochina and condemned those who aspired otherwise. France had learned from its own
painful experience not to fight the will o f the people. The French leader advised all
combatants, particularly the Americans, to accept the lessons of history. Washington
lacked clearly defined political objectives and the Vietnamese resented American
intrusion on their domestic affairs. The peoples o f Indochina should demand an
explanation o f why the Americans were fighting in then: countries in the first place:
Eh bien! la France considere que les combats qui ravagent Plndochine n’apportent, par
eux-memes et eux non plus, aucune issue. Suivant elle, s’tl est invraisemblable que
Papparefl guerrier americain vienne a etre aneanti sur place, il n’y d’autre part aucune
chance pour les peuples de PAsie se soumettent a loi de Petranger venu de Pautre rive
du Pacifique, quelles que puissent etre ses intentions.243

Why did the United States resist a peaceful settlement and refuse to accept the
Geneva Accord o f 1954? Why did it oppose the right o f self-determination for the
peoples o f Indochina? The path o f negotiation was complicated and arduous, and would
require the eventual withdrawal o f all American forces, but it was the only way to secure
peace. While the chances for negotiation were presently remote, de Gaulle appealed once

2X1Le Monde, September 1 ,1966, p. 2; de Gaulle met with representatives from Hanoi and the NLF before
he addressed the Cambodians.
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again to the United States to listen to reason and not condemn the world to worse
afflictions. De Gaulle was obligated to speak out because o f France’s earlier experience
in Indochina and the strong ties she still maintained in the region. But it was also out o f a
deep and old friendship with the United States that de Gaulle had to remind the
Americans o f their long cherished belief in independence and selfdetermination o f all
nations.2*1
De Gaulle argued that Washington still had the opportunity to change course and
heed the advice he had repeatedly offered regarding Vietnam. It was time for the United
States to renounce a policy from which it did not benefit and which it could not justify.
Washington had to accept a settlement endorsed by the m ajor international powers which
would restore peace to Indochina and guaranteed prosperity o f this important region. To
continue its military engagement would only hurt American pride, contradict American
ideals, and undermined its national interest. Negotiation was also in the best interest of
the West, and would serve to restore the credibility o f the United States in Europe and in
Asia;
EUe [LeFrance] le dit enfin, avec la conviction qu’au degre de puissance, de richesse, de
rayonnement auquel les Etats-Unis sont actuellem ent parvenus le fait de renoncer, a leur
tour, a une expedition tointam e, des Iors qu’elle apparait sans benefice e t sans
justification, e t de Iui presenter un arrangement international organisant la paix et Ie
developpement d’une importance region du monde n’au ra rien, en definitive, qui btesser
leur fierte, contrarier leur ideal e t nuire a Ieurs interets. A u contraire, en prenant une voie
aussi conforme au genie de 1’Occident, quelle audience les Etats-Unis retrouverait-ils
d’un bout a I’autre monde et quelle chance recouverait la pane sur place e t partout
affleurs.245

244Le Monde, September 1 ,1956, p. 2.
245 Ibid.
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While a peaceful solution was de GauIIeTs most sincere desire, he refused to mediate the
conflict, believing that such effort did not promise any chance o f success. Instead of
France, Cambodia might be better situated to initiate negotiations and offer her service as
a model o f independence in Southeast Asia.246
It was de Gaulle at his best. Foreign minister Murville was deeply impressed by
the wisdom and clairvoyance expressed by his “glorious and venerated” president
advising Asia and the world on restoring peace in Southeast A sia De Gaulle was close to
having the best o f both worlds. He presented the solution for war-stricken Vietnam,
speaking only in terms o f “friendship and respect” for the United States. At the same time
he directly accused Washington o f imperialism. But de Gaulle refused to take any active
role in mediating the conflict and tossed this thankless task to the Cambodians.247 In the
final communique o f de Gaulle and Sihanouk, Paris promised to guarantee the
independence and neutrality o f Cambodia. Both heads o f state expressed their anxiety
about the situation in Vietnam, where foreign intervention had transformed a civil war
into an “international conflict.” All foreign powers involved had to recognize the Geneva
Accord o f 1954, cease their intervention and withdraw all troops from Vietnamese so2.248
Washington was infuriated by de Gaulle’s attempt to blame the United States for
the war in Vietnam. President Johnson, in public at least, again remained calm. But he
was worried about a domestic backlash to de Gaulle’s speech. French accusations might
either intensify opposition to the w ar or push Congress toward a more isolationist policy
in Europe. Within a week, Johnson responded to de Gaulle’s challenge in a press

Le Monde, September I, 1966, p. 2; Sa’adah. Idees Simples andIdees Faces, pp. 307-311.
147Murville, Aussenpolitik, pp. 112-113; Gardner, Lyndon Johnson and de Gaulle, pp.275-276.
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conference. The United States was more than ready to withdraw from Vietnam i f Hanoi
did so as well. However, Hanoi was not listening and mainly spoke about war. Johnson
emphasized that the world should not only scrutinize the American role in Vietnam but
also focus on the deeds o f the aggressor, North Vietnam and its allies.2*9 The French
responded with another attack on America’s Vietnam policy. Murville used a speech to
the General Assembly o f the United Nations to reiterate the main points de Gaulle made
in Phnom-Penh. He blamed the United States for the escalation of the war and maintained
that Washington was obligated to take the first steps for a negotiated settlement.250
In October, 1966, the French foreign minister met again with Johnson. Although
storms clouds were gathering between Paris and Washington, the American president was
surprisingly pensive during their ninety minute private meeting. Instead o f demanding
direct French support Johnson employed a much more subtle approach to convey his
views. He told the Frenchman about his life, his hopes and worries, and his endeavor to
reform American society. But most o f all he addressed his sorrows over Vietnam and the
dreadful responsibility the war had caused. Virtually day and night he was busy
supervising the progress o f military operations in Vietnam. On the day o f Murville’s visit
Johnson selected bombing targets in the Hanoi area, profoundly aware o f the casualties
and hardships his decision caused. The president’s monologue undoubtedly touched
Murville. He was impressed by Johnson’s inner turmoil. But the foreign minister also
worried that Johnson was unable to follow his moral instincts because he received biased
information on Vietnam. Johnson’s advisors dismissed any strategy other than war, which

** Le Monde, September3,1966, p. 3.
^B rands, Johnson and de Gaulle, pp.490-491; Ferro, De Gaulle et I’Amerique, pp. 372-373.
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precluded a meaningful appreciation o f the French proposal to seek a negotiated
solution.251
Johnson’s inner turmoil quickly evaporated and he made clear that he was iiritated
by French contacts with Hanoi. He hoped that de Gaulle would cease his efforts to find
channels for negotiations without consulting Washington first.252 After two years o f
inconclusive discussions with the French, the American leader recognized that de Gaulle
would remain obstinate. The only question was who could outlast the other. The Vietnam
War presented de Gaulle’s with a irresistible opportunity to enhance France’s role in
world politics. He refused to even consider the American point o f view and insisted on
pursuing any course he considered proper in the event the conflict in Vietnam might
further escalate.253
The low point in Franco-American relations was reached in 1966. Both sides
remained diametrically opposed to the future course in Vietnam and neither was willing
to make concessions to the other side. De Gaulle stated in October 1966 that the war in
Vietnam not only threatened world peace but forced France to pursue an independent
policy vis-a-vis the United States. French independence should not be interpreted as
either isolationist or hostile by Washington, but meant that “we decide ourselves what we
have to do and with whom.” France had surrendered to foreign dominance during the
Second World War and the Fourth Republic. She had almost lost her soul and identity

250Murville, Aussenpotitik, p. 113.
351Ibid. pp. 1I3-I14; LBJ gave a similar speech to Ludwig Erhard, leading to the question whether the
- American presidentjust needed an outlet to voice his own doubts about Vietnam or that he used the “teary
eyes” approach to wm approval for his policy.
251Ferro, De Gaulle et I Amerique, p. 374.
251FRUS, Western European Region, 1964-1968, Circular Telegram from the Department o f State to the
Embassy m France, Washington, October28,1966, p. 490.
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but, under de Gaulle’s lead, was no longer willing to be a mere tool in the hands o f
outsiders, be that Washington, Moscow, or any other nation.25* Both Washington and
Paris also thought they could outlast the other side and ultimately prevail. By the end o f
1966 Johnson predicted that a showdown was indeed coming and the day o f “reckoning”
with de Gaulle was quickly approaching.255
Yet the day o f reckoning did not come in terms o f outlasting de Gaulle, but rather
it was events in Vietnam that undid Johnson. Although the Tet Offensive in early 1968
was a military victory for American forces the joint VC - North Vietnamese forces
delivered a profound psychological defeat to the United States. Johnson accepted the
consequences in March 1968 by announcing that he was not seeking reelection and
ordered an end to the bombing of North Vietnam, opening the path for negotiations. Paris
greeted Johnson’s decision as a first step in the right direction and commended his
political courage. The bombing halt was a positive sign that the United States finally
considered de Gaulle’s proposal o f a negotiated settlement. Paris was selected by Hanoi
and Washington as meeting place for peace talks. For Johnson and de Gaulle, their “cold
war” over Vietnam was over, although the war in Vietnam would linger on for five more
years.
French-American antagonism over Vietnam serves as a valuable case study in the
trans-Atlantic relationship. Until 1969 both France and the United States persisted on the
exclusive validity o f their respective policies and failed to build on shared values. For the
United States in Vietnam this meant that a major European ally not only refused to

251Sa’adah, [dees Simples and Idees Fixes, pp. 310-311; Hoffmann,. D ecline or Renewal, p. 284.
755Gardner, Lyndon Johnson andde Gaulle, pp. 277-278; Brands, Johnson and de Gaulle, p. 491.
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support Washington but even publicly criticized the American role in Southeast Asia.
The Vietnam controversy marked a turning point in U.S.- French relations. As the
Vietnam War revealed the limitations o f American military intervention, French refusal
to sanction U.S. policy in Southeast Asia placed boundaries on American political
predominance w ithin the Atlantic Alliance. French-American antagonism over Vietnam
demonstrated that the United States could not dictate blind, obedient support from a key
European ally. Ultimately, the French-American debate over Vietnam revealed that the
United States needed the assistance o f its allies as much as they needed U.S. support.
America could not face the challenges around the globe alone and neither could Europe.
For the alliance to succeed and thrive on both sides o f the Atlantic, the allies had to listen
closely to each other’s concerns and realize that selfish interest is self-defeating. Had the
United States seriously entertained de Gaulle’s advice earlier, America’s experience in
Vietnam might have been less costly. The importance o f allied support and guidance has
not been lost on successive American administrations.
French-American relations improved considerably with the change o f American
administrations. The new president, Richard Nixon, visited France shortly after taking
office in February 1969, and played the game o f diplomacy more astutely than his
predecessor. Nixon reaffirmed that Europe was o f primary importance to the United
States. He asserted the political autonomy o f Western Europe in whose affairs the United
States had no intention or right to interfere.257 De Gaulle was particularly pleased with
Nixon’s recognition o f French leadership in Western Europe. To the ultimate delight o f

256Murville, Aussertpolitik, pp. 116-118.
257Ib id . p p . 126- 128.
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the French, president, Nixon treated Great Britain as merely another European power and
no longer as the special ally o f the U.S. As Nixon later reflected:
I wanted this trip, m y first abroad as President, to establish th e principle th at w e would
consult w ith our allies before negotiating with our potential adversaries. I also wanted to
show the world that the new American President was not com pletely obsessed w ith
Vietnam, and to dram atize to Americans at home that, despite opposition to the war,
their President could still be received abroad with respect and enthusiasm.258

De Gaulle could not agree more. Although Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968
ended any dreams de Gaulle had o f reviving the old French-Russian alliance, the future
looked promising for a new age o f French grandeur.
De Gaulle’s triumph lasted only a short time. Like Lyndon Johnson, de Gaulle
was challenged and eventually swept away by a younger generation disillusioned with the
values, goals, thinking, and self-assertive leadership o f its elders. In May 1968 student
protests erupted in Paris which were soon supported by French workers, leading to largescale strikes. De Gaulle managed to stay on for ten more months, then resigned in March
1969 after a popular referendum rejected his constitutional reforms. De Gaulle retired to
his ancestral home at Colombey and died there on November 9, 1970. Lyndon Johnson
survived the general for a little more than two years. Neither would see the end o f the
Vietnam War. As de Gaulle had envisioned the Second Indochina War ended with a
negotiated settlement. The United States withdrew its forces from Vietnam in early 1973.
Two years later Vietnam was unified by the Northern victory over the South. Even

as Richard Nixon, The Memoirs o f Richard Nixon. (New York, 1990) with. an. new mtroductibn by Richard
Nixon, pp. 370-374; Nixon and de Gaulle agreed on the necessity to engage China - certainly a departure
from previous American policy. Nixon felt that he and de Gaulle had established a “new entente cordiale”
between their countries. Regarding Vietnam, de Gaulle again stated that negotiations were the only way out
and suggested direct contacts with Hanoi. Nixon was indeed interested, confident that the French would
deliver his message to Hanoi.
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though Vietnam became a Communist country, most other “dominoes” in Southeast Asia
did not fall.
De Gaulle sought a greater voice for France in Europe and world affairs and
mostly succeeded. He increased French grandeur. He elevated his country from the
turmoil o f the Fourth Republic to a major voice in international politics and gave the
French a renewed sense o f se lf confidence. Certainly, not everyone would or could agree
with his methods. For the United States and, in a lesser degree also to Great Britain, the
general was a obstinate, worrisome “ally.” De Gaulle’s political goals as well as his
suspicion of “Anglo-Saxons” placed a heavy burden on French-American relations. The
growing conflict in Vietnam presented an irresistible opportunity to enlarge France’s role
in international politics and defy American predominance in the W est Yet his initial
advice on Vietnam given to Kennedy was both genuine and far-sighted. American refusal
to seriously consider de Gaulle’s approach, and heed that o f other voices o f dissent both
in Europe and the United States, triggered open French opposition to the American role in
Vietnam. By being less defiant and more understanding o f Washington de Gaulle might
have had a better chance to affect America’s Vietnam policy. While the general proved a
great statesman for France, his desire to enhance French prestige as well as his deeprooted suspicion o f “Anglo-Saxons” provoked crises and misgivings within the transAtlantic alliance. Once the storm created by the Vietnam conflict had cleared, the
successors o f de Gaulle and Johnson learned and profited from the lessons o f this
turbulent chapter o f the Western alliance. France proved a reliable ally to the United
States during the G ulf War and NATO intervention in the former Yugoslavia.
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Johnson hat diese Kalamitat nicht angefangen, er hat sie von Kennedy
geerbt
Aber wenn eine grofie Nation entdecfct, daft ein bestimmter Kurs
schwieriger ist, als erwartet, dann ist es keine Demutigungjur sie, wenn sie ihre
Politik andert. Sie mussen sich aus Vietnam zuruckziehen.. - Europa ist
schlieftlich die allerwichtigste Zoneju r die USA, nicht Lateinamerika, nicht
Asien. Wenn sie ims ignorieren besteht die M oglichkeit, daft die So\vfetunion die
Kontrolle uber Deutschland im d Frankreich erringt
Konrad Adenauer on America's Vietnam, policy, August 8,1966

In an interview with the New York Times in August 1966 former chancellor o f the
Federal Republic o f Germany Konrad Adenauer urged Lyndon B. Johnson to disengage
from Vietnam. Both the Erhard government and the Social Democratic Party (SPD)
deplored Adenauer’s frank statement and, taking the opposite position, strongly endorsed
America’s Vietnam policy.259The spat between Adenauer and Erhard on the “Vietnam
question” reflected their differing approaches to West German foreign policy-making.
Both chancellors were affected by limitiations on West German sovereignty in
international relations.2” Adenauer and Erhard were committed to secure American
protection, achieve German unity and maintain the freedom of Berlin. Both were afraid
that German goals might become o f secondary importance to the Western allies in a
climate of detente. Following the Berlin crisis Adenauer tried to expand the German role
in transatlantic relations by strengthening Bonn’s European base, most notably through
close cooperation with France. Erhard rejected this policy and regarded the United States
as Germany’s principal ally. He hoped that loyal support o f Washington would result in
new initiatives on the German question. But Erhard could not dismiss France’s role in

159For Adenauers statement and the reaction to it see: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, August 8,1966.
Erhard headed a coalition government o f the Christian Democrats (CDU) and Liberals (FDP).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

137
achieving unification. The “Vietnam question” intensified the German dilemma of how to
pursue the quest o f unity when its major allies, Washington and Paris, were at odds over
the conflict in Southeast Asia. Erhard faithful support o f Washington precluded an
unconstrained German voice regarding the Vietnam conflict and he chose to fully endorse
American policy in Southeast Asia. By doing so he alienated Charles de Gaulle and found
him self increasingly pressured by Lyndon Johnson to participate in the American effort in
Vietnam. America’s conflict in Southeast Asia and Bonn’s response to it not only
complicated relations between Germany, the United States, and France but impeded
progress on the issue o f German unification.

I. K onrad Adenauer: 1961 to 1963

The political life o f the Federal Republic during the first two decades o f its
existence was dominated by Konrad Adenauer. Bom January 5, 1876 in Cologne to a
middle class family, Adenauer was shaped by his roots as a Catholic and Rhinelander261
Early on, Adenauer was intrigued by politics and joined the Catholic Center Party
(Zentrum Partei). In 1906 he won a seat in the city council o f Cologne and was elected
mayor in 1917. He held this post until he was forcibly removed by the Hitler regime in

260 hi 1955, the FRG became officially sovereign, but the Allies still retained the final say m a peace
settlement for Germany, the issue o f reunification, and the status ofBerlin.
261AmuIfBaring, On Anfang war Adenauer: Die Enstehung der Kanzfenfemoicratfe. (MQnchen, 1982), pp.
86-91; see also Willy Brandt, Mv Life in Politics. (New York, 1992), p. 27; Though Adenauer resented
Prussian militarism, which he blamed for the First World War, many o f his contemporaries assign him
distinct “Prussian” traits. His home town, Cologne, maintained close ties to France. Catholicism, too,
represented a major cultural divide in Germany until recently. Adenauer’s views reflected this cultural
divide, to him the Elbe was the frontier with Asia, whereas the Rhineland reflected far greater liberal spirit
and sophistication.
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1933. Ia 1945, Adenauer joined the newly formed Christian Democratic Party (CDU) and
served as its chairman from 1946 to 1949 in the British occupied zone. In 1949 Adenauer
was chosen president o f the parliamentary council convened to write a new constitution
for Germany. This prominent position gave him national recognition and paved the road
to his election as first chancellor o f the Federal Republic with the majority o f one vote his own.262
From 1949 to his resignation in October 1963 Adenauer was the prime architect
o f West German foreign policy.263 IBs approach was based upon three basic assessments
o f the international system. First, international politics were ruled by the antagonism
between the free Western world and Communist expansion. The creation o f two German
states was the obvious result o f that conflict. Second, although Europe’s future was
primarily determined by the Soviet challenge, it was still influenced by horrors o f the
recent World War, which made it potentially an anti-German system. Finally, all Western
European democracies relied heavily on the United States for them survival in this
antagonistic system.264

262Baring, Im Anfang war Adenauer, pp. 108-109; Sonthenner, Die Adenauer Ara: Grundlegtmg der
Bimdesrennhlilc. (Mtachen, 1991), p. 26; Alfred Grosser, Geschichte Deutschlands sert 1945: Eme Bilanz.
(Mtlnchen, 1970), pp. 172-174; Adenauer was fervently opposed to Socialism and Communism and
believed that only a free market economy could best serve the nation's interest. He also clashed with the
Nazis and was arrested twice. His return as mayor o f Cologne m 1945 was short-lasted and he was soon
dismissed by the British.
20 Wolfram F. Hanrieder, Germany. America. Europe: Forty Years o f German Foreign Policy. (New
Haven, 1989), p. 5; Sonthenner, D ie Adenauer Ara, pp. 29-31; Baring, Im Anfang v/ar Adenauer, pp. 109I I I ; Grosser, Geschichte Deutschlands, pp. 420-425; The initial goals o f Adenauer were to end occupation
status and facilitate West German economic recovery. The latter was greatly aided by the European
Recovery Program (ERP or Marshall Plan) and by 1955 the Allied High Commission lifted the status o f
occupation and relinquished most o f its control over West German foreign policy.
264 Hans-Peter Schwarz. Adenauer und Europa. in: VTertelsiahreshefte filr Zeitgeschichte. 27. Jahrgang 4,
October 1979, pp.474-475.
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The solution for Adenauer was close relations with the United States and foil
integration o f West Germany into Western Europe, which actually fitted neatly into the
American policy toward Germany. Since 1947, the United States emphasized both West
Germany’s economic recovery as the core o f the Economic Recovery Program, as well as
the integration o f that country into the West European state system in order to contain any
potentially dangerous German political ambitions.265 Adenauer also believed that a fully
integrated Germany in an independent and internationally influential Europe might
preclude any American-Soviet settlement over Germany without consulting European
powers or Germany.266
West German foreign policy, according to Adenauer, had to be built upon the
pillars o f European integration and friendship with the United States. But dependency
upon the United States and allied restrictions on German sovereignty allowed only
limited room for maneuver which made the European aspect o f Adenauer’s foreign policy
equally important. The comer-stone for a unified Europe was to mend ways with France.
French-German friendship would provide a “Schutzwall” or protective wall against the
Soviet Union. At the same time, Adenauer was fully aware that without American
protection West Germany could not survive. But the European angle was a useful tool to

265Hans JQrgen SchrOder, “Die USA und westdeutscher Aufstieg,” in: Klaus Larres and Torsten Oppeland,
Deutschland und die USA an 20- Jahrfnmdert: Geschichte der Politischen Beziehungen. (Darmstadt, 1997),
pp. 99-101,103-105; Hanrieder, Germany^tmerica, Europe, pp. 6-7; Wolfram F. Hanrieder, West German
Foreign Policy, 1949-1979: Necessities and Choices, in: Wolfram Hanrieder. West German Foreign
Policy: 1949-1979. (Boulder, Colorado, 1980), pp. 16-17. To Adenauer, Western European intregation also
prevented a Franco-Russtan rapprochement. See: Schwarz, Adenauer und Europa, p. 480.
266Schwarz, Adenauer und Europa, pp. 480-481; Hans-Peter Schwarz, Adenauer’s Ostpolitik, in: Wolfram
F. Hanrieder, West German Foreign Policy: 1949-1979. p. 131; Adenauer feared another Potsdam
conference where German had no say about their own future.
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regain American attention in times when the United States displayed less interest in
German concerns.267
By integrating West Germany into Europe, while at the same time fostering ties
with the United States, Adenauer hoped to achieve his ultimate goal - German
reunification. He did not believe that reunification could be obtained in the short run.
Rather, a consistent and reliable foreign policy would eventually change the perception o f
Germany from an aggressive power to reliable partner, both in the West and in Moscow.
Nothing could be gained by a neutralist position which might bring unity at the price o f
freedom. In addition, the resulting and economic prosperity o f the West would make it
increasingly impossible for the Soviet Union to keep East Germans under then rule.
Western prosperity and liberty would be irresistible.268 Adenauer refused to recognize the
German Democratic Republic (GDR) because its existence perpetuated the German
division. Accordingly, West Germany solely represented the German nation and was the
successor state to the Weimar republic. In order to maintain the claim o f sole
representation, Adenauer also refused to establish or ceased diplomatic relations with any
country that recognized the GDR.2®

267Schwarz, Adenauer und Europa, pp. 482-485. Adenauer also hoped to engage Britain deeper into
European politics but London remained aloofo f the European Economic Community until the early
I960’s.
261Schwarz, Adenauer und Europa, p. 511; Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe, pp. 8-9; Brandt, My
L ife in Politics, pp. 54-35; Adenauer was quite correct; until the construction o f the Berlin Wall, several
hunched o f thousands o f East Germans fled to the West.
269Baring, Im Anfang war Adenauer, pp. 234-236; Grosser, Geschichte Deutschlands, pp.459,461; After
Adenauer’s historic visit to Moscow in 1955, which led to the establishment to diplomatic relation between
both countries, Bonn followed the Hallstein Doctrine which prechided offlcal relation with any country
that recognized East Berlin. The Western Allies supported the West German position for the tune being but
it placed a serious obstacle m over-coming East-West tensions.
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During the I950’s and early 1960's Adenauer followed events in Vietnam, but he
viewed conflict in Indochina prim arily in terms o f its implications for Europe and
Germany. The First Indochina War required a balanced policy o f not openly criticizing
France's position and preventing serious repercussions for West German interests in the
planned European Defense Force (EDF). The EDF would give West Europeans a greater
share in their own defense, but the French overcommitment in Vietnam ultimately
torpedoed the project. Bonn recognized the South Vietnamese regime in I960 but
maintained until the early 1970’s that Saigon represented all o f Vietnam, dismissing the

factual division o f that country.270
After the French defeat in 1954, Adenauer endorsed American support for South
Vietnam based on the need to further secure American protection o f West Germany.
Bonn had to prove its loyalty to the Western allies, but could neither support the French
nor the Americans militarily, due to West German constitutional restriction on the
German military. Official sanction for Western aid to Diem’s Vietnam also demonstrated
that West Germany had cut all ties with its Nazi past, was a reliable partner in the West,
and even a champion o f democracy in the Third World.271 A good will tour by Vicechancellor Erhard to Southeast Asia in 1958 reiterated these goals. His expressions of
sympathy for South Vietnamese independence gained favorable responses in Washington

270Volker Berresheim, 35 Jafare Indnchmanolitik: der Bundesreoublik Deutschland. (Mitteflungen. des
Instituts ftir Asienkunde, Hamburg, 1986), pp. 31-32; the French colonial conflict was not received with
enthusiasm and the German Parliament insisted on strict neutrality in the war. The sole recognition o f
Saigon o f course was a reflection ofBonn’s attitude to represent all o f Germany.
271 IbttL. pp. 14-15; the German Basic Law did not allow any aggressive act by the Federal Republic of
Germany, its army was created out o f completely defensive reasons and German troops could not be
deployed beyond the scope ofNATO. The endorsement o f American policy hr South V ietn am in the
I950’s made any recognition o f Hanoi obviously impossible. In 1955, the GDR recognized North Vietnam,
which allowed an easy way out for Adenauer by following the Hallstein doctrine.
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and Third World countries. Erhard also delineated the future West German position to the
increasing turmoil in South Vietnam: Bonn was unable to send any troops but had a
“moral obligation” to contribute to the victory o f the free world in Southeast Asia.272

A First Strain in U.S.-German Relations: Berlin and the Franco-German Treaty
The erection o f the Berlin Wall in August 1961 resulted in a crisis o f the GermanAmerican relationship. The events leading up to August 1961 revealed the different
perspectives o f both powers regarding the German question and global politics. The crisis
further exposed West German policy limitations and the country’s utter dependence on
the Western Allies. Berlin was a deeply emotional issues for Germany since the Soviet
Blockade o f the city in 1948-49. It was the rem aining spot where Germans from East and
West were not yet separated by barbed wire and mine-fields. In early 1961 Germans
hoped against all odds that the freedom o f the entire city could be secured. They soon
discovered that the three Western Allies were only willing to defend their rights in the
Western sectors o f the former capital.^For Washington, Berlin was only one o f the many
global challenges facing the United States, and the tensions over the city presented a
major obstacle in reaching an arms reduction agreement or detente with the Soviet Union.
The crisis in Europe evoked the demon o f nuclear war, which was neither in the best
interest o f the United States nor the Soviet Union. Washington also linked the issue of

271Berresheim, Indochinapalitik, pp. 102-103.
251Haims JQrgen KQsteis, KonradAdenauer und Willy Brandi in der Berlin-Krise, I958-1963,
Viertelsfahreshefte fUr Zeitgeschfchte. 40, No. 4, Oct. 1992, pp. 491-492; Knichshev's offer o f a separate
peace treaty was unacceptable for Bonn, because ft might be considered as disloyalty to the Western allies,
alluding to another RapaHo. Stalin had tried a similar strategy by offering German unification as Tong as
the country would be “neutraL”
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Berlin to Communist challenges in Southeast Asia. Apparently, the Soviet Union pursued
an aggressive course on Berlin to gain concessions in Indochina.
Kennedy decided that a West German military contribution to NATO and full
integration o f the Federal Republic into Western Europe was more important than
reunification.274Not only was Bonn securely tied to the West but recognition o f the status
quo in Europe would allow for fresh approaches in American-Soviet relations in order to
increase American influence in Latin America and Southeast Asia. Kennedy considered
Soviet pressure on Berlin as a test o f NATO and American determination as well as an
likely attempt to neutralize West Germany. West Germany had to remain securely tied to
the West, but it also had to accept the status quo.275 The shift in American emphasis was
apparent to Adenauer.276 Kennedy was reluctant to address the issue o f Berlin. The
sensitive Germans noticed with some concern that the American president had not
mentioned Berlin in his inaugural address. Kennedy frequently used the term o f “WestBerlin” instead o f Berlin inclusively while the President was unwilling to give up the

274Marc Raskin, Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy, June 1,1961, John F. Kennedy National Security
Files, Western Europe, 1961-1963; Raskin debated the pro and cons o f what to do about West Germany.
The best solution for Berlin would be a unified city under tLN. mandate, but rather unlikely. Washington
even toyed with the idea the exchange West Berlin for East German territory (Magdeburg) near the inner
Germanborder. See also: KQsters, Adenauer und Brandt in der Berlir^Krise, pp. 499-500; In a speech on
June 17,1961, Governing Mayor Willy Brandt decried any attempt to conlude an agreement on Berlin over
the heads o f the German people “as treason against our compatriots, treason against German unity and
freedom,” see: NSF, Western Europe, 1961-1963, JFKL; Vogelsang, Das Geteilte Deutschland, p. 217.
275Arthur M. Schlesmger, Jn, A Thousand Davs: John F. Kennedy in the White House. (Boston, 1965), p.
318; Grosser, Deutsche Geschichte, p. 443; Andreas Wenger, “Der lange Weg zur StabilitSt Kennedy,
Chruschtschow und das gememsame Interesse am Status quo m Europa”, Vtertelsfahreshefte fUr
Zeitgeschtchte. 46 (1998), pp. 69-73; o f course, the US was also keenly aware that it was targeted directly
by Soviet nuclear missiles since the late 1950’s.
276Frank A. Mayer,"Adenauer and Kennedy: An Era ofDistrust in German-Amencan Relations?”, m:
German Studies Review. VoL XVII, No. I, Feb. 1994, p. 83-85; Joachim Arenth, “Die Bewahrungsprobe
der Special Relationship: Washington und Bonn (1961-1969)”, in: Klaus Larres/ Torsten OppeUand (eds.),
Deutschland und die USA im 20. Jahrhundert: Geschichte deroolrttschen Bezfehungen (Darmstadt, 1997),
p. 152; see also: Schlesmger, A ThousandDays, p. 338; JFK and Adenauer were rather apprehensive o f
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rights o f the Western Allies in Berlin. He was also determined to prevent a major war by
refusing to go beyond Western claims to their respective sectors in the city.277
In the summer o f 1961 the question o f Berlin gained further urgency. The Vienna
summit o f June 1961 between Kennedy and Krushchev led to an understanding on Laos,
but no agreement on Germany or Berlin was reached, hi July, President Kennedy
declared that, if necessary the United States would defend West Berlin with force.27*
Kennedy and his advisors concluded that Krushchev deliberately intensified tensions over
the former German capital to gain concessions in other areas o f the world, particularly in
Southeast Asia. The crisis over Berlin was another Soviet attempt to enhance its
bargaining position in the global power struggle between the United States and the Soviet
Union.
Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief o f Naval Operations, felt that Berlin was o f more
symbolic importance to the Soviets and simply a test o f American determination. Despite
Krushchev’s belligerent language, Moscow was not seeking a war over Berlin and might
“envision a relaxation o f the Berlin crisis in exchange for an understanding that the U.S.
would not forcefully resist further Communist expansion in Southeast Asia.”279 Burke
argued that the president should not play into Krushchev’s hand by focusing solely on

each other. Kennedy was during the I950’s more impressed by SPD leader Kurt Schumacher and felt that
the chancellor was a relic o f the Cold War. Adenauer m turn favored Richard Nixon m the 1960 campaign.
m Arenth, Bewahrungsprobe der Special Relationship, pp. 153-154; Konrad Adenauer, Erinnerungen:
1959-1963. (Stuttgart, 1983), pp. 91-93. The first encounter between the two statemen was very friendly
but did not cover German concerns, only possible contigency plans for Berlin.
m Vogelsang, Das Geteilte Deutschland'r pp. 248-249; McGeorgeBundy, Danger and Survival: Choices
About the Bomb m the Fust Fifty Years. (New York, 1988), pp. 361-362; Great Britain and France also
strongly affirmed Western rights and access to the city. During the Vienna meeting Krushchev again
threatened to conclude a unilateral peace-agreement with the GDR, trying to end allied rights for the city as
a whole.
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Berlin , but instead reassure America’s Asian allies that the United States had no

intentions o f disengaging from that region.280
Senator Hubert Humphrey also saw Berlin connected to wider global issues, and
Southeast Asia in particular. He advised Kennedy that:
People needed to be reminded that what happened to Berlin - its division - and what
happened to Germany - its division - has happened to Viet Nam, has happened to
Korea, is happening to Laos, that the Soviet Union is seeking to divide and cut up . . .
[W]e must make it crystal clear. . . that we are not afraid, that our commitments
are real and will be honored.281

American resoLve, insisting on free elections in Berlin as well as German selfdetermination, would also have a positive impact in the Third World where people were
indirect participants in the power straggle between the United States and the Soviet
Union.282
President Kennedy agreed with his advisors to be firm in the question o f Allied
legal rights in and access to West Berlin. In a report to the nation on M y 25, 1961.
Kennedy implicitly recognized the partition o f Berlin by stating that the “endangered
frontier o f freedom runs through a divided Berlin.”283The strain over West Berlin was not
an isolated problem but part o f world-wide Communist aggression:
We free a challenge in Berlin, but there is also a challenge in Southeast Asia, where
the borders are less guarded, the enemy harder to find, and the danger of communism
is less apparent to those who have so little. . .West Berlin. . . has now become —as
never before —the great testing place of Western courage and win, a focal point
OTArleigh Burke, Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs o f StafL 19 June, 1961, John F. Kennedy National
Security Files, Western Europe, 1961-1963. The president should not overextend American forces by
sending additional troops to Berlin unless the conflict intensified.
30 Walt Rostow, Memorandum to the President, July 15,1961, John F. Kennedy National Security Files,
Western Europe, 1961-1963.
m Senator Hubert Humphrey, Memorandum to the President, July 14,1961, John F. Kennedy National
Security Files, Western Europe, 1961-1963.
32 Ibid.
35 Bundy, Danger and Survival* p. 368.
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where our solemn commitments stretching back over the years since 1945, and
Soviet ambitions now meet in basic confrontation.2**

Unlike in Asia, Kennedy accepted the status quo in Europe. West Germany and
the three Western sectors in Berlin would be defended but Kennedy would not go beyond
this commitment285 Adenauer and Governing Mayor o f W est Berlin Willy Brandt were
alarmed by the American guarantees for only the Western sectors o f Berlin. Both hoped
to preserve freedom and self determination for the entire city.286 While German concerns
were duly noted, Washington desired more flexibility in its approach toward Germany
and the Berlin issue. Only then could both the United States and the Soviet Union find
common ground to negotiate over global challenges and arms reductions.287But Adenauer
would not accept an easy American way out o f the problems o f Germany. The entire city
o f Berlin remained the prime domino in Europe that could not fall to Communism.288
On August 13, 1961 the East German government, with approval from Moscow,
began to build the Wall. Most Germans were shocked and angered by Western inaction.

34 Office o f the White House Press Secretary, Text o f the President’s Report to the Nation on the Berlin
Crisis, July 25,1961, John F. K ennedy National Security Files, Western Europe, 1961-1963.
35 Department o f State Polity Planning Council, United States Objectives, July 29,1961, John F. Kennedy
National Security Files, Western Europe, 1961-1963; the American goal was to show Moscow and the
Western allies that it would not abandon its commitment and was “willing to act firmly and faithfully” to
abide by these commitment without further escalation. Washington was “realistic,” according to the
council in understanding German and world problems.
36 Willy Brandt, My Life In Politicsy pp. 3-4; Frank Mayer, Adenauer and Kennedy, p. 88; Arenth,
Bewahrungsprobe der SpecialRelationship, pp. 152-153.
37 Wenger, Der lange fFeg zur Stabilitat, p. 78; Walter Rostow, Memorandum to McGeorge Bundy,
August 7,1961, JFK National Security Files, Western Europe, 1961-1963; JFKL. The U.S. was still not
willing to recognize the GDR [and did so only m 1972] but hoped that inner German contacts might lead to
progress on the “German question”. Washington had accepted the status quo but gave some flexibility to
Bonn. One can just wonder what Washington - or Moscow - would have said to a comprehensive German
understanding. Saigon did not enjoy similar “flexibility” and any real or rumored contact between Saigon
and Hanoi met with strong disapproval in Washington.
31 Memorandum o f Conversation between the Secretary o f State, Rusk, and Chancellor Adenauer, August
10,1961, John F. Kennedy National Security Files, Western Europe, 1961-1963; Adenauer was distressed
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Newspapers ran the headlines: Der Westen Tut Nichts, but nobody knew how to prevent
the obvious. Many Germans felt sold out by the allies and were angered by Chancellor
Adenauer’s lack o f response.2®
9 Washington accepted the division o f Berlin and only
Soviet aggression on the Western half o f the city or the FRG itself would create a casus
belli. While Adenauer blamed the United States for not doing enough, he was too much
o f a pragmatist not to understand the fundamental implications o f the Berlin crisis. But
Kennedy’s recognition o f the status quo in Europe and his attention toward non-European
theaters made the chancellor more distrustful o f the United States.290
In light o f the limited options for West Germany, Adenauer resorted to playing
the European card to regain leverage in Washington. France was the obvious choice. Two
years o f negotiations finally led to an understanding with de Gaulle on close FrancoGerman cooperation. In September 1962, de Gaulle sanctioned an agreement
coordinating French-German policy regarding Berlin, East-West relations, defense, and

by recommendations o f Senators William FoQbright and Mike Miansfield to make Berlin a free city under
UK command.
39 Rasters, Adenauer und Brandt in der Berlin-Krise, pp. 527-530; Only days after the construction o f the
wall, Adenauer met with Soviet Ambassador Smirnov and stated that Bonn would do nothing to harm
German-Soviet relations. Obviously many Germans were appalled by the chancellor's statement and it did
cost him considerable support m the up-coming elections. Bundy, Danger and Survival, p. 370; Bundy
admits that the American reaction to the Wall was slow but stresses that none o f the Western powers and
West Germany included would have been willing to risk war over Berlin. Kennedy, as a gesture both to
West Berlin and the Soviet Union, sent LBJ and General Lucuis D. Clay on a good-will tour to the city as
well as 1500 additional U.S. troops.
30 Wenger, D er lange W egzurStabilitat, pp. 83-84; Mayer, Adenauer and Kennedy, pp. 91-94; Bonn
refused to accept any security arrangement for Central Europe which recognized the status quo and also
insisted on equal status as a KATO member m any negotiations with the Warsaw Pact; see also: The
President's European Trip, West-Gennany-Berlm, Eire, Italy, June 1963, J. F. Kennedy National Security
Files, JFK Library; informing the president on the domestic situation m West Germany it was obvious that
Brandt more than Adenauer was willing to accept a modus vivendiwith the Soviet Union.
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relations with the Third Wod<L De Gaulle shared Adenauer’s skepticism about
policymaking in Washington and was pleased with his new ally.291
The Franco-German Treaty, signed on January 22, 1963 was a mile-stone in
French-German relations. Nevertheless, Washington was shocked and wondered how
German-American relations might be affected. France pursued an increasingly
independent, antagonistic policy toward the United States and now West Germany might
also become more unpredictable following de Gaulle’s lead.292
Adenauer had no intentions o f becoming an capricious partner to the United
States. Rather, it was his growing doubts about American reliability that made the
Franco-German Treaty indispensable. As he told de Gaulle in early 1963:
Lam quite concerned about the United States. I do not know which defense strategy
might be adopted since everything seems to change quickly there.. . The present time
was full of insecurity. One could not predict which defense strategy the United States
would adopt for the future... Germany was immediately facing Russia and France was
directly in line behind Germany. The danger for Western Europe had become very
considerable. In regard to the changing American strategic thinking nobody could be
sure whether the political strategy might change as well, resulting in a possible general
m alaiseJ33

291 Adenauer, Erinnerungen, 1959-1963, pp. 119-121,123-127,138-140. De Gaulle assured Adenauer that
he would oppose any U.S.-Soviet understanding that recognized the GDR. It is obvious that Adenauer's
overtures played nicely into de Gaulle aspiration o f leading Europe and weaken “Anglo-American
dominance.”
291Mayer, Adenauer and Kennedy, p. 95-96; Adenauer, Erinnerungen, 1959-1963, p. 198. Only days
before the Franco-German treaty was signed, de Gaulle vetoed the British entry to the EEC, which
profoundly dismayed MacMillan and also Kennedy, who had hoped for more influence m Europe with the
British membership m the EEC.
293Adenauer, Erinnerungen, 1959-1963, pp. 199-200: Ich bemerkte eingangs, in derjetzigen unsicheren
Zeit komme dem Zusammenstehen Frankreichs und Deutschlands noch groftere Bedeutung zu. Ich set sehr
unruhig wegen der Vereinigten Staaten. Ich wisse nicht. welchen Verteidigungskurs man dort habe, derm
alles anderesich dart sehr schnell
Deutschland stehe in unmittelbarer Beruhrung m it R utland direkt
dahinter komme Frankreich, D ie G efahrjur Westeuropasei sehr graft geworden, Angesichts der
sprunghaften amerikanischen strategischen Auffassungen konne man nie wissen, oh sich nicht auch die
politischen Auffasungen anderten, so daft eine altgemeine M alaise ubrigbliebe. See also: Akten zur
Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (AAPD), 1963, VoL I, Consersadon between Chancellor
Adenauer and President de Gaulle, Paris, January 21,1963, pp. 11 l- l 15.
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Adenauer’s rapprochement with de Gaulle was the evident result o f his frustration with
the policy o f the Kennedy administration. He resorted to the traditional pattern of
European balanced power politics and tried to gain greater leverage in Washington by
more closely allying Bonn with Paris.294 The American response to the Franco-German
treaty revealed that Bonn did not enjoy the same freedom o f action as General de Gaulle.
Kennedy was upset and voiced his opposition to the treaty repeatedly in no
uncertain terms. He felt stabbed in the back by Bonn only days after de Gaulle had again
expressed an “anti-American policy” by vetoing the British entry to the EEC.295 Secretary
o f State Rusk was also worried where Germany was heading. Rusk had no intention o f
forcing Bonn to chose between Washington and Paris but Bonn could not possibly prefer
“fifty French bombs over fifty thousand American missiles.”296
Washington’s message to Bonn was clear. W est Germany’s policy initiatives
remained limited. On the other hand, Adenauer made his point in demonstrating that
West Germany, despite its restrictions, had to be accepted by Washington as a political
force. Since Adenauer left office in October 1963, it is uncertain how he might have
responded to the American escalation in Vietnam as Chancellor. Two years after his
resignation, Adenauer maintained that the American escalation in Vietnam was a grave

34 Adenauer, Erinnerungen, 1959-1963, pp. 206-207; AAPD, pp. 121-123. Adenauer noted that
Americans did have sympathy for Berlin but much less so for the FRG. De Gaulle’s mediation might result
into a far better understanding of German concerns m Washington.
395AAPD, Ambassador Knappstein, Washington to Foreign Secretary SchrOder, January 23,1963, pp. 162165; Mayer, Adenauer and Kennedy, pp. 95-97; Hans-JQrgen SchrOder, Deutsche Aussenpolitek 1963/64:
Die “Aktenzur Auswartigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland", Viertelsiahreshefte filr
Zeitgeschichte. July 1995, p. 525.
36 AAPD, pp. 166-169; to contain the damage m Washington Ambassador Knappstein hurried to explain
that the Franco-German Treaty might actually benefit Washington in that Bonn now had greater influence
on de Gaulle. But Rusk maintained that France already caused enough hardship for NATO, SEATO, and
the United Nations and he would not be pleased by additional capricious endeavors by Bonn. American
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mistake. The war in Vietnam was senseless. Washington should have listened to the
French advice and sought negotiations since the Americans could not win the war in
Southeast Asia.297 In August 1966, Adenauer repeated this assessment to the New York
Times and urged for an American withdrawal from Vietnam. He argued that Europe was
the prime region o f interest for the United States. If Washington neglected Europe, the
Soviet Union might have the opportunity to gain control over West Germany and
France.298 His opinion did not affect Washington and was not shared by his successor
Ludwig Erhard.

n . Ludwig Erhard

Ludwig Erhard regarded the United States as Germany’s principal ally. He was
skeptical o f Adenauer’s advances to de Gaulle and even more suspicious o f the General’s
quest for leadership in Europe. Bonn could not lose the friendship and protection o f the
United States. First and foremost, Bonn had to prove its loyalty to Washington. Then,
Erhard hoped he could win stronger American support for German unification. This easy
equation proved unrealistic. Erhard neglected the second pillar Adenauer saw as
important for German foreign policy-making - the European angle.

Ambassador Dowling repeated the thinly veiled threat to Bonn, see: AAPD, 1963, VoL I, Conversation
Undersecretary Carstens with American Ambassador Dowling, Januray 24,1963, p. 169
37 Horst Osterheld, Aussennoiitik unter Bimdeskanzfer Ludwig Erhard. 1963-1966: Em dokumentarischer
Bericht aus dem Kanzleramt. (DQsseldor£ 1992), p. 274.
FrankfurterAUgemeine Zeitung, August 8,1966; the paper commented that the Erhard government
shared Adenauer’s concern about American neglect ofEuropean security, the SPD strongly rejected
Adenauer’s claim that Kennedy was responsible for the conflict in Vietnam and also complained that
Germans should not constantly distrust the American commitment to Europe.
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Erhard pro-American policy limited the options for Bonn and soured relations
with de Gaulle. The Vietnam conflict complicated Geiman-American understanding,
resulting in American demands to directly aid the U.S. endeavor in Vietnam. The war in
Vietnam also affected the general spirit o f detente with the Soviet Union and
overshadowed East-West relations. The German question no longer topped the
international agenda with both super-powers accepting the status quo in Germany.
Unlike Adenauer, Erhard was far better versed in economics than in the intricacies
o f foreign policymaking. Erhard was bom February 4,1897 in Furth, Bavaria. He served
in the First World War and was seriously wounded in France. He obtained his Ph.D. in
economics and sociology at the University o f Nuremberg. He taught there until 1942
when he was dismissed because o f his refusal to join the NSDAP but quickly found
employment in the private sector. From 1945 to 1947, Erhard worked as advisor to the
allies and also as minister o f economics in the Bavarian government.299^

soon rejoined

the academy as professor o f political economy at the University o f Munich but continued
to work as advisor and then secretary for economics in the combined American and
British zone. In 1948, Adenauer successfully urged Erhard to join the CDU.300 As
Adenauer’s minister o f economics Erhard’s program o f a social-market economy quickly
proved successful. Yet, his relations with Adenauer soured. While Adenauer pursued
European integration based on the core o f German-French understanding, Erhard desired

299Christian Hacke. Wehmacht wider Willen: Die AtiBennolitik der Bundesrepnblik Deutschland.
(Frankfurt a. M_, 1993), p. 110; Grosser, Geschichte Deutschlcmds^ p. 177.
300Grosser, Geschichte Deutschlandsr pp. 256-25S. By 1948 Erhard had fully developed his theory o f a
social-market economy (Sbziale Marfctwirtschaft), combining free market competition with safeguards for
the individual from the excesses o f capitalism.
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to move beyond these limitations and engage all Western European countries. Adenauer
prevailed until 1963 when Erhard replaced him as Chancellor.301

Erhard’s foreign policy: “Courtship with Uncle Sam, Cold Shoulder to Marianne”
Erhard and Foreign Secretary Gerhard Schroder felt that a reevaluation o f German
relations toward Washington and Paris was necessary. Both believed that the GermanFrench Friendship Treaty not only caused resentment within the EEC but affected the
indispensable good-will o f the United States. Only the United States could guarantee
German security. The new chancellor rejected Adenauer’s strategy to gain greater
leverage vis-a-vis Washington by playing the French card. Unlike Adenauer and de
Gaulle, Erhard had no doubts about the reliability o f the American commitment to
Europe. He concluded that German security interests did not conform with those of
France and required a continuously strong bond with the United States. The United States
was also the more promising partner in the quest for German unity. But Bonn needed to
assess the current policy o f detente between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Rapprochement between Washington and Moscow appreciatedly limited the danger o f a
nuclear Armageddon but implicitly recognized the status-quo in Germany. Should Bonn
pursue a more active and original policy to propel the allies toward negotiation over
unification?

301 Hacke, Weltmacht wider Willen, pp. 111-112: Frank R. Pfetsch. Die Aufienpolitik der Bundesrepublilc
Deutschland. 1949-1992: Von der Snaltune zur Veremignng. (Munich 1992), pp. 158-161; Erhard's
success m rebuilding West Germany earned him the nick-name ‘father o f the economic miracle.’ Adenauer
was apprehensive ofErhard’s popularity and felt that Erhard was unqualified to succeed him. Adenauer
still retained considerable influence after he left office and continued to head the CDU.
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Erhard failed to conceive o f new strategies for Germany. He lacked art
understanding o f the larger global picture and the importance o f the European angle to
broaden German options. Unification would not fall into Germany’s lap simply by
reiterating the German desire to overcome division.302 Generally, Erhard’s foreign policy
framework revolved around the Bonn-Washington-Paris triangle, which, to him,
prescribed the boundaries and possible opportunities for West Germany. Erhard soon
discovered that his tenuous balancing act between Washington and Paris was further
complicated by the war in Vietnam.303 During the next years, Erhard tried - ultimately
unsuccessfully - to win the Western powers for new initiatives for German unification.
President Johnson acknowledged the desire for unification, but his Vietnam policy did
not allow for additional complications in the relations with the Soviet Union. Across the
Rhine, de Gaulle repeatedly offered Erhard participation in France’s force de frappe and
greater independence from the whims and demands o f Washington, but Erhard steadfastly
stood with the United States. Erhard’s reliance on Washington eventually resulted in
growing difficulties in his own party, the CDU, which split into factions favoring either
the Atlantic alliance or closer ties to France. This debate increasingly undermined
Erhard’s leadership and contributed to his fall in 1966.301

301For Erhard’s approach toward unification see: Peter Bender, Die “Neue OstDolmk” und ihre Foigen:
Vom Mauerbau zur Wiedervereinigung. (Munich, 1996), pp. 105-106.
303Great Britain was consulted as well on issues o f the Common Market, arms control nuclear sharing, and
the German question; but neither side faced as intense pressure to constantly find common ground as
Erhard experienced m his interactions with Washington and Paris.
301Waldemar Besson, Die AuBenpotitik der BundesreoubBk Deutschland: Erfahruneen und Mafistabe.
(Munich, 1970), pp. 310-314 and329; Hacke, Weltmacht wider Willen^ pp. 114-116; Pfetsch, Aussenpolitik
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, pp. 162-164; for criticism on Erhard’s new course see: Osterheld,
Aussenpolitik unter Erhard, pp. 18-20. Osterheld, head o f the Chancellery, was deeply loyal to Adenauer
and suspicious o f Erhard tLS- policy since according to Osterheld it was a result ofErhard’s ambition and
might place West Germany between a rock and a hard place.
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Within days after his election Erhard outlined his departure from the Adenauer
policy to Dean Acheson and Dean Rusk. While the German-French understanding was
essential to European reconciliation, the German-American cooperation was o f even
greater significance for the security and survival o f Europe.305 Erhard worried that West
German interests might be ignored in the rapprochement between the two world powers.
Despite lessening tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union any solution
o f the German question appeared remote. Also, Erhard was concerned over rumors that
Washington might reduce its troops in Europe. The Americans reassured the chancellor
that Washington was sensitive to German anxieties. But Rusk stressed that Bonn had to
cease viewing world affairs solely from a German perspective.306
A month after Erhard's election South Vietnam made headline-news with the
overthrow and assassination o f Ngo Dinh Diem in November 1963. Bonn hardly took
notice, and the events were not discussed in the cabinet.307 Vietnam was not yet a major
concern for German foreign policy makers but the growing American commitment to that

305AADP, Volume III, October I to December 3 1 ,1963, (Munich, 1994), Erhard conversation with Dean
Acheson, O ct 19,1963, pp.I337-I340; Erhard criticized the current French policy, most notably the de
Gaulle veto against the British entry to the EEC. While he had cautioned against too close relations with
France long before his election as chancellor, obviously he employed his skepticism o f de Gaulle to placate
his visitor from Washington. Foreign Secretary SchrOder painted a similar picture and stressed that the U.S.
commitment was vital to West Germany, see: AAPD, SchrOder conversation with Dean Acheson, Oct. 19,
1963, pp. 1343-1344
306AAPD, Erhard conversation with V S. ambassador McGhee, Oct. 22,1963, pp. 1363-1364; while
assuring McGhee ofhis complete confidence m the V S., Erhard was very much concerned about
suggestions o f members o f Congress and former president Eisenhower to withdraw more G.I.’s from
Europe; see also: AAPD, Erhard conversation with Dean Rusk, Oct. 25,1963, pp. 1385-1386; Erhard once
again reassured Rusk o f German allegiance and loyalty. Rusk pomtedout that the U.S. not only had to
protect Germany but so far had sacrificed more than one hundred thousand men in the struggle against
Communism; AAPD, SchrOder conversation with Dean Rusk, Oct. 26,1963, p. 1392; Rusk complained
that West Germans were extremely sensitive to any rumor about American troop withdrawals while
obviosuly nobody bothered that the French reduced then forces m West Germany.
307Osterheld, Aussenpolitik unter Erhard, pp. 37-41; Osterheld was highly critical o f the American
involvement m Vietnam and its complicity m the overthrow ofDiem. He maintained that coup was a grave
mistake that farther drew the Vnited States in the quagmire o f Vietnam and destroyed a chance for victory.
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Asian country and subsequent French opposition to the American policy in Southeast
Asia increasingly forced Bonn not only to take a stand regarding Vietnam but required
strategies to accom m odate both allies. The German goal o f unification necessitated the
support o f both the United States and France, along with that o f Great Britain.
Additionally, the opposite view o f the former two on Vietnam created problems for Bonn
on how to placate both sides in order to win assistance for any initiative on Germany.
Bonn decided to approve o f the American position in Vietnam, partly to demonstrate its
loyalty, yet also anxious about the repercussions o f a Communist victory in South
Vietnam for American policy in Europe.
In early November 1963, Washington asked Bonn to establish diplomatic
relations with the new government in Saigon of General Duong Van Minh, which was
seconded by a personal request by the Vietnamese general. While the United States
supported the new government, Washington was reluctant to recognize Minh as the first
Western country to preclude any suspicion of American involvement in the coup against
Diem. Hence, Washington desired that Bonn take the lead and endorse Minh.308Bonn was
on the spot but complied with the American request mainly because Minh enjoyed
American backing. But Bonn also worried that a lack o f Western support might aggravate
the situation m South Vietnam and perhaps even tempt Saigon to negotiate with Hanoi,
leading to even greater chaos in the region. Despite justified doubts about the legitimacy

AAPD, Memorandum of Undersecretary Alexander BSker, Nov. 7,1963, pp. 1415-16: BOker points
out: “Die Amerikaner haben den Wiinsch ausgesprochen, das neue Regime moglichst bald anzuerkennen.
Sie mOchtenjedoch nicht die ersten sem, die erne solche Anerkennung aussprechen, da dies ihre
Verantwortlichkeit fOr den Umsturz, der durch den Mord an Diem und Nhu befleckt ist, unterstreichen
wflrde."
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and viability o f new regime the situation in South Vietnam required that Bonn
immediately recognized the Minh government.305
Saigon soon demanded more from Bonn. West Germany, according to General
Minh, should not only increase its financial contribution to South Vietnam but use its
influence on Paris to prevent de Gaulle from interfering in Vietnamese affairs. Bonn sent

more money but remained apprehensive about the viability o f the Minh government.
General M inh lashed out against de Gaulle’s plan to neutralize Vietnam and demanded
greater European support in general. The U.S.-French disagreement over policy in
Vietnam further underm ined his struggle against Communist aggression. He pleaded with
Bonn to apply its influence as closest ally to France by urging Paris to end its detrimental
policy o f neutralization.310
The Vietnamese request troubled German Ambassador to Saigon Wendland. He
was uncertain about American aims in Vietnam and even more confused o f what to make
o f French contacts with the People’s Republic o f China, aiming at diplomatic recognition.
Wendland opposed any German interference in the French-American debate over the
possible neutralisation o f Vietnam. Circumstances in South Vietnam might actually

Great B ritain, like the U.S. was reluctant to regognize the new regime. France refused to
acknowledge any government coming to power illegally but France would maintain its already established
ties with South Vietnam .
309AAPD, Memorandum, Nov. 7,1963, p. 1417; Bfiker feared that any negotiation between Saigon and
Hanoi might lead to the same chaos that already existed m Laos and Cambodia, and fully accepted the
American domino theory for Southeast As o l
3,0 AAPD, Ambassador York Alexander von Wendland to Foreign Ministry, Dec. 16,1963, p. 1647.
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require neutralization to save Saigon unless significant progress could be made in the
coming months. The other alternative was further escalation and major war.311
Obviously Bonn had doubts about the American role in Vietnam, but chose to
pursue the course o f most loyal ally and back Washington. The French refusal to endorse
the American commitment created a stir o f anger in Washington. Yet, as the German
ambassador to Washington, Karl Heinrich Knappstein, observed France enjoyed
substantial latitude in the United States. Franco-phile President Kennedy was more than
willing to reconcile the differing views based on a “certain understanding o f de Gaulle’s
position.”

Bonn could only benefit by improving in U.S.-French relations.312 The

German-French Treaty had shocked Washington but the Americans increasingly
appreciated the advantages o f Franco-German reconciliation and they believed that Bonn
now was in the position to influence French foreign policy making. However, Bonn still
had to earn complete trust by the Americans.313The problem for Bonn was how to change
the de Gaulle’s mind and deliver what Washington expected.

Bonn’s “China Card”
The Erhard government was aware o f its limits vis-a-vis Washington, but the
question remained whether Bonn could pursue other venues to further German self-

m AAPD, Wendland to Foreign Ministry, Dec. 16,1963, p. 1648. West Germany gave a S 15 million
credit to Saigon; Wendland remained ambiguous in his advice to Bonn - he leaned toward de Gaulle’s idea
o f neutralization but feared a Communist sweep over Southeast Asia.
Jn AAPD, Ambassador Knappstein to Foreign Ministry, Nov. 19,1963, p. 1453.
10 AAPD, 1964, Vol. I, Knappstein to Foreign Ministry, Jan. 22, 1964, pp. 110-112; Knappstein further
elaborated on the different status ofFrance and West Germany in the United States. France's aid to
American independence and alliances o f two world wars gave Paris a freedom of action that Bonn could
only dream o f Accordingly, France could be “unfaithful” from tim e to time but Germany did not enjoy
such tolerance, see: IbitL. pp. 112-114.
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interest The Sino-Soviet conflict presented such a window o f opportunity. French
overtures to Beijing offered new prospects for the Federal Republic as well. Following
French reasoning, Bonn hoped that friendly relation with the People’s Republic o f China
(PRC) might add to its bargaining position with the Soviet Union regarding German
unification and the recognition o f West Berlin as part o f the FRG. But the conflict in
Vietnam was a major obstacle o f any bi-lateral understanding with the PRC. Washington
considered China as the source o f Communist aggression in that region. In addition,
taking sides in the Sino-Soviet conflict might appear as meddling in a “family conflict”
and could back-fire.
The only feasible course for Bonn was to establish economic ties with the PRC.
Direct diplomatic relations were impossible for two reasons. First, diplomatic relations
with Beijing not only confirmed the division o f China but might undermine Bonn’s claim
o f sole representation o f the German people. Second, and more importantly, an
understanding with Beijing might be unacceptable to the United States.314 Yet, the China
angle was too promising to dismiss.
The PRC also desired further recognition in the W est The broader the support for
the PRC in the West the better were the chances to be accepted into the United Nations,
despite American opposition. In May 1964, Beijing officials conveyed their interest in
contacts with the Federal Republic. The Chinese proposed a trade and cultural agreement
along with discussion o f other pertinent questions and accepted confidential talks. While

AAPD, Wickert Memorandum: Relations between the FRG and die PRC, Dec. I I , 1963, pp. 1617-1619;
Wickert pointed out that Washington should be informed by any German approach, to Beijing and even
economic relations could be voided by Washington, given its concern about Chinese military support of
Hanoi.
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a trade agreement was promising, Bonn remained reluctant to the exchange o f officials.315
Bonn was dodging the question o f any German recognition o f the PRC, but further talks
with the Chinese could be advantageous to Bonn's overall goals. Bonn could probe the
Chinese view on the German question and possibly use the Sino-Soviet conflict to pursue
negotiations on unification:
W e should not miss any opportunity to assess how the Sino-Soviet conflict might
be utilized for the solution o f the Germany and Berlin question. This o f even greater
importance now since our W estern allies realized that a new approach [i.e.on Germany]
has no chance o f success m M oscow. Every opportunity to gain greater room to
maneuver has to be pursued. M ost o f all, we have to explore w hether and how for
Beijing m ight be willing to downplay o r even reassess its relations with the Soviet
Occupied Zone.316

While Bonn was hoping to win the Chinese for its position, the Foreign ministry
was concerned about American objections to any German-Chinese understanding.
Therefore, Bonn developed a ‘defense strategy* toward Washington. Five NATO
members, including Great Britain and France, maintained diplomatic ties with the PRC
while Bonn was only considering trade relations. More importantly, the West could not
miss the opportunity given by the Sino-Soviet tensions. Also, Western Europe could
assume the role o f mediator with Beijing in lessening global tensions. For West Germany,
in particular, contacts with the PRC served the purpose to explore additional venues on
the German question. Lastly, the American ambassador to Warsaw, John Cabot, had
maintained close but ultimately unsuccessful contacts with PRC ambassador Wang Pingnan. Accordingly, the United States to could not object to any exploratory German
consultations with Beijing.317

Jt5 AAPD, 1964, Memorandum o f Senior Official Krapf Foreign Ministry, May 19,1964, pp. 542-543.
m I6id, p. 543.
}tTIbid, pp. 545-547-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The Chinese were certainly interested in negotiation with Bonn as a first secret
meeting in Bern revealed. Tsui Chi-yuan, head o f the PRC delegation in Switzerland, was
eager for a trade agreement and quite disappointed to learn that Bonn had not yet made a
final decision. Tsui emphasized that his government conducted its own independent
policy to foster world peace, implicitly referring to Sino-Soviet relations, and Beijing was
solely guided by the concerns o f its own people. German consul in Switzerland, Nieis
Hansen, was delighted by the Chinese position and pushed hard for the recognition that
Bonn represented all o f Berlin internationally. Tsui remained reluctant, though he
regarded the German division as abnormal. Beijing favored unification through
negotiations between the two ‘parts’ o f Germany, which made perfect sense since the
PRC hoped for a similar solution with Taiwan. Beijing saw no reason to break diplomatic
relations with the GDR but promised to refrain from interfering in inner-German affairs
provided that Bonn followed the same policy o f non-interference in the conflict with the
Soviet Union.3t8Senior official Krapf recommended that Washington be informed about
the recent talks. He did not foresee any American opposition regarding a trade agreement
since contacts with Beijing were helpful toward a solution o f the German question and
did not damage American interests.315
In July 1964 Hansen again met with Tsui m Bern. Hansen was worried about
press reports on Sino-German contacts and suggested further meetings should be held at a
secure place. Tsui was quite displeased with recent statements by Chancellor Erhard
rejecting closer ties to the PRC. Tsui feared that Bonn, like the United States, had

111AAPD, Memorandum o f Senior Official K rapf Mai 30,1964, pp.585-588.
319Ibid-p. 589.
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adopted a hostile course toward Beijing. Thus further Sino-German negotiations appeared
futile. Hansen replied that Bonn was still interested in a trade agreement, downplaying
the press reports along with Erhard’s comments, and Tsui accepted to continue talks in
secrecy.320 The talks went nowhere because Erhard lacked the political courage to
continue the China angle. He rejected any approach that endangered the precious
relationship with the United States. Since Erhard did not pursue the China angle to its
fullest it is hard to predict what might have happened in terms o f an American response to
this German initiative. The conflict in Vietnam, along with Erhard’s deference to
Washington ended the German rapprochement with Beijing.

Bonn -Washington-Paris and the problem o f Vietnam, 1964-1965
The short-lasted Chinese interlude demonstrated that Erhard’s policy making was
self-restricted to the overriding need o f a solid friendship with the United States. Erhard’s
courtship o f Washington increasingly alienated de Gaulle. The French president had
placed high hopes on comprehensive relations with West Germany and a more
independent Europe under his own leadership. Consequently, de Gaulle was thoroughly
disappointed Erhard’s new course. De Gaulle even labeled Erhard as subservient to the
United States. Erhard was deeply offended, but he insisted that his pro-American course
was the best way to serve West German interest. The first encounter with Lyndon
Johnson in Texas seemed to prove Erhard correct.

120AAPO, Memorandum ofNiels Hansen, Consol m Bern, July 21, L964; the Japanese government was
also worried about Sino-German contacts. Bonn downplayed the issue by stating it was only interested in
better trade condition. See: AAPD, Message o f Undersecretary Carstens to the Embassy in Tokyo, July IS,
1964, pp. 863-864.
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Meeting on the LBJ ranch shortly after Christmas 1963. both leaders started o ff
well. Erhard reaffirmed his complete trust in the United States and pledged his
unequivocal support to the president.321 Johnson was primarily concerned with domestic
problems and relations with the Soviet Union. The president promised to closely consult
Erhard on any questions o f detente with the East.322 The chancellor worried that an
improvement in East-West relations might result in diminished American interest in
German unification and lead to the recognition o f the status-quo. Johnson assured Erhard
that Germany like any other nation enjoyed the right of self-determination and should
stand firm in pursuing the goal o f reunification.323 This first encounter established a
pattern that would continue during the following years. Erhard eagerly assured his loyalty
to the United States, hoping to gain concessions and backing on vital German concerns.
Johnson was pleased to find an encouraging voice in Erhard but German issues were and
remained secondary on Johnson’s foreign policy agenda. Erhard received kind words
instead o f substance but believed that he had an impact on Johnson.
Events in Asia, soon, preoccupied the Americans and the French and increasingly
affected Bonn. In early 1964, France established diplomatic relations with the PRC. Bonn
opposed this move because it run counter Bonn’s agenda. Any recognition o f the Chinese
division might undermine Bonn’s claim to solely represent the German people and, more

521AAPD, Conversation Erhard with Lyndon Johnson, Stonewall, Texas, D ec.28,1963, pp. 1672-1674.
122AAPD, Memorandum, o f Undersecretary Carstens, Dec. 30,1963, pp. 1712-13; Osterheld, Aussenpolitik
unter Erhard, pp. 44-48. The Germans were quite happy about the good start at LBJ ranch and felt that
both leaders had established a agreable relationship. Obviously, Bonn, did place much greater emphasis on
the encounter than the American side.
m AAPD 1964 VoL I, Memorandum o f Foreign Minister SchrOder, Jan. 6,1964, pp. 15-18; SchrOder
reminded the German ambassadors that they had to continue pressing arguments for German unification.
Although some countries grew tired o f and oblivious to this German concern, the diplomats had to keep the
issue alive.
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importantly, the French decision intensified tensions between Paris and Washington.32*De
Gaulle justified the recognition to Erhard by pointing to the possible benefits both for
V ietnam and Western Europe. On Vietnam, de Gaulle repeated the position previously

expressed to Washington; the conflict could only be solved through negotiations.325
Erhard disagreed with de Gaulle. The Germ an leader accused Beijing o f actively
promoting aggression and Communist expansion in Southeast Asia. Erhard considered
the French recognition o f the PRC as premature. He was concerned with the possibility of
Beijing and Moscow ending their disagreements once they realized that the W est was
exploiting the split o f the Communist world. After all, Communism threatened free
countries around the globe and Erhard concurred with the American position that the free
world could only stand up to aggression if it fought the enemy jointly.326 Erhard was less
concerned about the actual motives o f the Chinese, with whom Bonn was negotiating as
well, than the negative repercussion of the French recognition o f the PRC for West
Germany.
De Gaulle dismissed Erhard’s repetition o f the American point o f view. He
refused to placate Washington merely to present an unanimous front within the NATO
alliance. While Paris was open to debate, it also reserved the right to express and pursue
its self-interest within NATO or elsewhere. Bonn could not refute this argument because

AAPD, Memmoradum o f Undersecretary Carstens, Jan. 15,1964, pp. 42-45; Paris o f course hoped that
Washington would eventually recognize the validity o f the French course both toward Vietnam and China.
125AAPD, Conversation Erhard - de Gaulle, Feb. 14,1964, pp.208,211-212. De Gaulle m aintaine d that
while the U.S. was unwilling to disengage from South Vietnam, it could not possibly succeed with its
current strategy. Since Washington rejected all out war against North Vietnam and China, the U.S. could
only sink deeper into a quagmire. Given the domestic problems m China, Beijing might be willing to
accept a settlement over Vietnam.
325AAPD, Conversation Erhard—de Gaulle, Feb. 14,1964, pp. 213-214; Osterfaeld, Aussenpolitik unter
Erhardy pp. 64-68.
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West Herm ans also hoped for a more influential role within NATO. A t the same time,
Erhard could not officially endorse the French position regarding the PRC and Vietnam
given his own policy goals to secure the protection and good will o f the United States.327
By early 1964 Vietnam had become another issue on which France and the
Federal Republic agreed to disagree, mainly because Bonn felt the necessity to prove its
unqu alified allegiance to its prime protector, the United States. Interestingly, Bonn and

Paris, at least unofficially, were not completely at odds over Vietnam and China. The
German ambassador to Saigon doubted that an American victory in South Vietnam was
achievable and in secret Bonn was also seeking closer ties to Beijing. Nevertheless,
Erhard felt compelled to be the most loyal and trustworthy ally to Washington.28 Despite
his differences with Paris, Erhard was acutely aware that he had to maintain a
constructive dialogue with de Gaulle because further deterioration in French-German
relations might torpedo chances for progress toward unification.
To Bonn the French diplomatic recognition of the PRC and its fallout for the
Atlantic Alliance put West Germany on the spot.329 What could Bonn do to facilitate
French-American relations? Bonn found de Gaulle’s “grand design," a Europe from the

327Fora more m depth, debate about Franco-German difference over the recognition o f the PRC and
Vietnam see: AAPD, SchrCder - de MurvHIe, Feb. 14,1964, pp. 224-225; Murville blamed the United
States for the crisis within the alliance and stated that Paris was willing to openly discuss the problems in
Southeast Asia, with other NATO members. Both secretaries agreed that bi-lateral talks were m fact quite
helpful to resolve thorny issue and current divergence o f opinion on Vietnam between Bonn and Paris.
53 AAPD, Erhard conversation with U.S. Ambassador McGhee, Feb. IS, 1964, pp. 257-259. Erhard
restaged his recent encounter with de Gaulle for the American ambassador. This time it was Erhard who
lectured his French counterparts on the pitfalls o f neutralization hr Vietnam and strongly denounced die
PRC as the true aggressor m the region. De Gaulle was trying to play the “angel o f peace” undermining
American effort. Erhard, o f course, fully supported the American commitment to Vietnam.
339AAPD, Ambassador Klaiber, Paris, to Foreign Ministry, March 6,1964, pp. 316-320; Klaiber argued
that the cause o f French-American tensions was o f course de Gaulle, who since 1958 did everything
possible to increase the independence o f France vis-h-vis the United States. De Gaulle disregarded allied
concerns and inewrf relished the role o f defender o f the Third World.
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Atlantic to the Ural, appealing but this unified Europe might result in an isolationist
policy in Washington. West Germany policy goals depended both on American and
French cooperation. Bonn had to work for reconciliation between Paris and Washington:
Nut wenn war Washington und Paris auf unserer Seite haben, konnen wir unseren
Interessen zum Durchbruch verhelfen Unsere Atrfgabe muB es seinjeder weiteren
Verschlechterang des Verhaltnisses Frankreichs zu Amerika mit all unseren KrSften
Emhalt zu gebieten. Wir werden weder de Gaulle passiv einfach gewahren lassen noch
aktiv fur die USA Partei nehmen durfen. Mit der ersten Alternative wurden wir das
Verhaltnis mit den USA fiber Gebuhr strapazieren, mit der zweiten Alternative dem
Vertrag fiber die deutsch-franzfisische Zusammenarbeit praktisch die Grundlage
entziehen.330
West Germany was and could not be in a position to chose only one o f its Western
partners if unification was to become reality, but the French-American antagonism over
Southeast Asia undermined Bonn’s own “grand-design.” .
Bonn also realized that the German question was currently o f only marginal
importance to American foreign policymakers, Washington was more interested in
solving Cold War conflicts outside o f Europe and, perhaps later, might address the thorny
issue o f German unity.331 For Erhard unification remained the prime goal and he hoped
for a more active American approach regarding Germany. In return, the chancellor
completely accepted Johnson’s position on Vietnam.332 Soon Erhard realized that his

330AAPD, Klaiber to Foreign Ministry, March 6,1964, p. 323: “Only if we have both Washington and
Paris on our side, can we attain our objectives.. . We have to prevent with ail means possible any further
deterioration in Franco-American relations. We cannot remain passive to de Gaulle’s actions nor can. we
actively take sides with the Americans. The first alternative would cause extensive harm to GermanAmerican relations while the second would de facto nullify the Franco-German treaty”
331AAPD, Conference o f Ambassadors, April21,1964, pp. 467-469; Undersecretary Carstens wondered
why the United States did not take advantage o f the current economic problems within the Soviet Union
and external difficulties resulting out o f the Smo-Soviet split. The ambassadors argued that Washington
was unwilling to adopt “classical power-poIMcs” and hoped for evolutionary changes within the Eastern
bloc to improve the situation m Europe. The West Germans were unwilling to realize and accept that
Washington, at least for the present, was not interested to challenge the status-quo in Europe.
332AAPD, Erhard letter to Johnson, May g, 1964, p. 517; Bonn adopted a “Deutschland-Initiative” m
January 1964 that prescribed several steps for the reunification o f Germany, which was debated w ith no
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endorsement not only covered American ‘technical’ support to Vietnam but possible U.S.
airstrikes on industrial targets North Vietnam. The other alternative to those air-attacks
was U.S. military intervention to prevent the collapse o f South Vietnam.333
Erhard wrote to Johnson that he fully backed the United States’ policy m
Vietnam The Federal Republic would do everything within its constitutional means to
support the United States in the endeavor to preserve the freedom of South Vietnam
Bonn promised to continue its political, economic, and cultural aid to Saigon.334Johnson
was contented but demanded a public statement in which Erhard denounced
neutralisatio n for Vietnam. Bonn refused to do so because such a declaration would only

increase Franco-German tensions without changing anything in South Vietnam Bonn
found a middle way instead. Erhard assured Ambassador Nguyen Qui Anh, representing
the new government of General Khanh, that West Germany endorsed the American
position in Vietnam, but refused to directly criticize the French plan o f neutralization.335
The French were angered by the German attitude and the intense debate over
Vietnam between both government continued. Bonn maintained that the conflict in
Vietnam was another chapter in the straggle o f the free world against Communist

results. In 1964 Erhard regarded the initiative as a first hopeful sign that the Western allies were willing to
work harder for a solution regarding Germany.
m AAPD, Erhard tetter to Johnson, May 5,1964, p. SIS; Ambassador von Wendland, Saigon, to Erhard,
Wendland’s assessment is documented as footnote to Erhard’s letter which includes a report by ambassador
to Washington, Knappstein, describing the determination o f Johnson to prevent the fait o f South Vietnam
at all costs.
514AAPD, Erhard letter to Johnson, May S, 1964, pp. 515-516; Erhard maintained that South Vietnam was
a symbol for Western determination against the Communist threat. He also subscribed to the “domino
theory", fearing that the fall of Saigon would have serious repercussion for all o f Southeast Asia.
Neutralization would only accelerate a Communist take-over.
m AAPD, SchrOder to Erhard, Mai 17,1964, pp. 541-542; Erhard expressed his sympathy with and
admiration for the “heroic struggle" o f the South Vietnamese against Communist aggression. He hoped that
General Khanh remained font to save his country's independence, which was m the best interest not only
o f Southeast Asia but the world.
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aggression, implicitly acknowledging its own dependence on Washington. The French
disagreed. The crisis in Indochina resulted out o f an indigenous struggle for selfdetermination but was further complicated fay U.S.-Chinese antagonism.336Paris also
criticized the German notion o f solidarity with the United States on Vietnam,
condemning it as uncritical and shortsighted. De Gaulle argued that Western solidarity
could be best achieved when any member o f NATO was at liberty to express its honest
opinions on that matter.337
French criticism o f Bonn was an obvious consequence o f de Gaulle’s own foreign
policy agenda. The basic component for French influence in the world was its leadership
in Europe. The Franco-German treaty promised close cooperation, and a shared policy for
Europe. But Erhard rejected the path taken by Adenauer. Erhard proved reluctant to
accept French guidance and oscillated into the American sphere. While firm in its
comm itm ent to the United States, Bonn endeavored to maintain a basic understanding

with Paris in order to preserve its chances for eventual unification. It was difficult for the
West Germans to reject the French view on Vietnam outrightly, given the lack o f German
expertise in Southeast Asia. Although de Gaulle was unable to fully convince Erhard o f
his point o f view, the General’s argument in favor o f negotiations did impress the
chancellor and his advisors.
Erhard made a tentative attempt to affect American thinking on Vietnam during
an encounter with Rusk in the summer of 1964. The chancellor wondered whether

236See for example: AAPD, Conversation. SchrSder - Couve de Murvflle, June 8,1964, pp. 622-623:
MurvOIe presented to Bonn the same argument the French used m Washington: The war m Vietnam was a
civil war, and m order to prevent further escalation the U.S. should reach an understanding with the PRC.
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Beijing could be persuaded to end its interference in Southeast Asian affairs. Rusk’s
response was a straight no. The secretary regarded China as the major threat for Southeast
Asia as well as Korea and India. A liberal policy toward Beijing would only provoke
further C om m unist offensives. If Beijing insisted on its current course it might lead to
another war in Asia. With Americans dying in South Vietnam, Washington contemplated
escalation, unless Hanoi and Beijing realized that aggression was futile.138 Rusk’s
assertion was revealing to Erhard and left no doubt that Washington would not back
down over V ietnam . Erhard hurried to ascertain that the Federal Republic was not all
considering diplomatic relations with the PRC but was merely interested to expand trade
relations. Erhard even doubted whether contacts with the PRC could lead to any new
approach on the German question.339Facing American pressure, the chancellor caved in
and retreated from his government’s earlier assessment on China and surrendered to the
American point o f view.340
Meeting Erhard m July 1964, Johnson expressed his appreciation over German
support, especially since the other European allies did nothing to help the United States in
Vietnam. German aid was also beneficial in Johnson’s efforts to rally Congress and
public opinion behind his Vietnam policy. Nevertheless, the president still faced difficult

For Vietnam, the best solution was the return to the Geneva Settlement o f 1954 by neutralizing the entire
country.
537AAPD, Conversation SchrSder- Murville, June 8,1964, p. 624.
AAPD, Conversation Erhard - Rusk, June 12,1964, pp. 646-648.
229AAPD, Conversation Erhard - Rusk, June 12,1964, p. 648; Erhard clearly told Rusk a different story
than his own advisors assessment on possible contacts with Beijing; he discarded the China card to placate
Washington.
340AAPD, Conversation Erhard - Johnson, June 12,1964, pp. 653-654; LBJ scorned those countries that
did have diplomatic ties with the PRC since it undermined the U.S. effort m South Vietnam. Erhard did not
even attempt to discuss possible German-PRC relations and hinted that Bonn was working to send a
hospital ship, the Helgolandrtto relieve the suffering o f the South Vietnamese.
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decisions on Ms country's future course in Vietnam.341 Erhard cherished Johnson's trust
and friendship. As another sign o f German good-wili Erhard promised to settle the
question o f off-set contribution to ease the financial burden for American troops in WestGennany.342 Once more Erhard believed Ms strategy o f unconditional support o f
Washington correct He failed to realize that Johnson was mainly interested in European
endorsement o f his Vietnam policy and had no intentions to embark on a campaign for
German unification. German and American perceptions o f global issues and national selfinterest were miles apart
While Erhard received some approval from Johnson, the chancellor was scorned
by de Gaulle during their next encounter in July 1964. De Gaulle used threats as well as
the bait o f unification to win Erhard to Ms side. The general accused Erhard o f being a
deferential vassal to Washington, but then invited Bonn to join not only Ms force de
frappe. and work for a European solution for the German question. De Gaulle depicted
himself as champion o f German unity and maintained that Washington was not at all
interested in tMs vital German issue.343 Neither intimidations nor promises worked.

m AAPD, Erhard - Johnson, June 12,1964, pp. 655-657; Johnson complained about domestic pressure on
Vietnam, with Republicans urging him to do more while the left was against further engagement. The lack
o f European support made it even more difficult for Johnson to justify his policy at home and obtain the
needed financial support from Congress. LBJ also hinted at the far-reaching decisions he still had to make
on Vietnam, which would have repercussions beyond the United States. While he did not provide details,
he was refering to the possible deployment o f ground troops.
342Ibid.. pp. 658-659; The offset payments would come to haunt Erhard two years later, when West
Germany caught m an economic crisis had difficulties to comply American demands. Erhard was affected
by Johnson's somber mood and the president’s anxieties over Vietnam; see also: Osterheld, Aussenpolitik
unter Erhard\ p. 91.
341AAPD, conversation Erhard - de Gaulle, July 3,1964, pp. 714-716; though de Gaulle would also be a
“friend” o f the U.S., he made it abundantly clear to Erhard that he was not willing to conduct his foreign
policy m mere deference to American wishes. For participation in the force de frappe see: AAPD,
conversation Undersecretary o f State Carstens with de Gaulle, July 4.1964; de Gaulle told Carstens that
the MLF would not give Germany control over atomic weapons and offered a German participation m the
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Erhard desired a stronger European voice in global affairs but the current crisis in
Vietnam required the undivided moral support o f the United States.3*4
But Erhard’s defiance o f de Gaulle only intensified the German dilemma. Bonn
needed both the United States and France to sanction German campaigns toward
unification. But how could Bonn please both allies when they were at odds over Vietnam
and China? Erhard was unable to envision an alternative to his current balancing act
between Washington and Paris. The chancellor also harbored serious doubts whether the
General’s vision o f a united Europe could ever be achieved. Europe was far from the
unity, while the protection and commitment o f the United States was already
reality.M5Washington remained the most important ally because only Washington could
completely guarantee the viability o f the Federal Republic even if that meant unification
was postponed.
With France’s increasing pressure on Bonn to support its policies, Erhard again
turned to Washington in search for reassurance believing that only through close
cooperation with the United States could unification become reality.3*6 Erhard would
remain unfailing in his support o f the United States in Vietnam in return for a more
productive American effort towards German interest. Washington was more keen on
German assistance in South Vietnam. Johnson hoped that Bonn publicly endorsed

force de frappe [ de Gaulle: Warum gehen Sie niche mit uns zusammen? Wir haben die Bombe auch. Bei
uns kOnnen Sie etnen weft grOBeren Anted erfaalten]
w AAPD, Erhard-de Gaulle, July 3,1963, pp. 718-721; Erhard refused to accept de Gaulle’s position on
NATO, China, and Southeast Asia.
** AAPD, Erhard-de Gaulle, July 3,1963, pp. 774-775.
***On continuous French pressure on Germany to follow de Gaulle’s lead see: AAPD, conversation
SchrOder- Couve de Murville, July4,1964, pp. 762-764; AAPD, conversation Erhard - U S. ambassador
McGhee. July 6,1964, p. 788; Erhard bitterly resented thatde Gaulle called him a “mere vassal” o f the
United States, probably hoping for American sympathy.
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Washington’s policy, while he was less forthcoming on the German question.347 By
supporting the American Vietnam policy, Bonn invested heavily in the relationship with
Washington, simply based on the hope to obtain further support for unification, yet this
hope became more and more unrealistic.348
The resulting quandary for Erhard was that, while he made the decision to stand
by the United States, he still had to placate Paris to prevent a complete rift with de
Gaulle. But the growing disparity in American and French foreign policy aims, placed
Erhard an untenable situation. Against all odds he kept on trying to procure some benefit
for West Germany. He simply could not lose the support o f either Washington or Paris.
Undersecretary Carstens defined the German strategy that required good relations with all
three Western allies as imperative for any chance toward German unity:
Unser oberstes Ziel, die Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands, konnen wir nur erreichen,
wenn wir mit unseren drei westlichen Partners zusammengehen. Durch eine deutschfranzosische Union allein, ohne oder gegen die USA, ist es nicht erreichbar. Es mag sein,
dafi die aktive UnterstQtzung unserer Wiedervereinigungspolitik durch die USA zu
wOnschen Qbrig IaBt. Insbesondere sind die USA zur Zeit ofFenbar nicht bereit, Druck
auf die Sowjetunion auszuflben. Das Sndert nichts daran, da0 erne Deutschland-Politik
ohne oder gar gegen sie hoffhungslos ist. Wir mQssen daher auf die USA immer wieder
emwirken, um sie zu einer aktiveren Unterstutzung unseres Standpunktes zu bewegen.
Dazu mQssen wir unser bisheriges enges Verhaltnis zu Omen erhalten.349

147AAPD, Erhard - McGhee, July 6,1964, pp. 794-795; McGhee promptly presented Erhard with a list o f
projects in Sooth Vietnam that required foreign aid. He also assured Erhard that Washington would never
regard de Gaulle as the sole voice o f the Europeans.
** Osterheid, Aussenpolitik unter Erhard, pp. 101-102; Osterheld was dismayed that Erhard refused to
participate in theforce defrappe, but Erhard had made Ms choice m favor o f the United States. But he
encountered increasing criticism by Adenauer and other members of Ms party.
349AAPD, Memorandum o f Undersecretary Carstens, July 27,1964, pp. 887-888: “Our supreme goal, the
unification o f Germany, can only be obtained if we join wih our three western allies. A Franco-German
union, without or even against the United States will not lead to unification. Actually, the United States
could do more to actively support our unification policy. A t the present, the United States & not willing to
exert pressure on the Soviet Union which however does not change the fact that a German policy without
or even against the United States would be completely hopeless. Hence we have to continue encouraging
the United States to e n g a g e in a more active support o f our policy, h t order to g a m that support we have to
maintain our currently close relations.”
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The goal o f unification trapped Bonn. It could neither embrace de Gaulle’s views on
NATO and Vietnam. De Gaulle, whether right or not on global affairs, lacked the
capability to guarantee West German security. Situated on the front-line between East
and West, West Germany more than France needed the military protection o f the United
States. De Gaulle’s idea o f a Franco-German political union could do more damage than
good. It would not lead any closer to European unity and, far worse, might alienate the
United States. De Gaulle might find forgiveness for his action in Washington, while Bonn
could not expect the same tolerance.350
Carstens did agree with the French position in regard to China and Vietnam.
Germany should improve relations with the PRC to entice Beijing to a more productive
attitude toward the German question. Regarding Vietnam, Carstens concurred with the
French assessment that chances o f an American victory there were dim.351 Although Paris
and Bonn were not that far apart in their assessment on the PRC and the discouraging
prospect in Vietnam, Bonn believed that it simply could not permit a possible strain in
German-American relation by criticizing the American policy in Southeast Asia.

III. America’s Vietnam and the resulting Quagmire for Erhard

In December 1964 Bonn received disturbing news from Washington. Johnson was
contemplating a further escalation o f American involvement in Vietnam. Bonn hoped to

350AAPD, Memorandum Undersecretary Carstens, July 27,1964, pp. 888-889.
351 Ibid, pp. 891-893; Carstens was also worried that de Gaulle might adopt an openly unfriendly course
toward Bonn and recommended that his government refrain from any public criticism o f de Gaulle.
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prevent an escalation o f the conflict552 Regardless o f repeated German declarations
supporting the American role in Vietnam as vital to the survival o f the free world, to
Bonn the conflict in the Far East presented an undesired impediment in the pursuit o f
German unity. American escalation in Vietnam would move German interests farther
down the list o f top priorities in Washington. Erhard tried his best to be a loyal ally while

American military strikes against North Vietnam after the Pleiku attack in
February 1965 increased German apprehension despite assurances that the United States
did not intend to escalate the conflict.555InteIligence gathered by German diplomats
stationed in Asia reaffirmed the French view that the chance o f an American victory in
Vietnam was discouraging. But an American defeat in Vietnam might result in the
collapse o f Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand, affecting the entire Pacific rim. The French
plan o f neutralization was also not very promising since it might quickly lead to a
Communist take-over o f South Vietnam.354 More importantly for Bonn, an American
withdrawal from Southeast Asia might weaken American determination to defend the
Western world, which touched at the core o f German security concerns. Bonn was
concerned mostly about a possible reduction o f U.S. troops in West Germany and, more
generally, whether Washington might lose interest in Europe.555 Erhard saw no other

352AAPD, Ambassador Knappstein to the Foreign Ministry, December30,1964, pp. IS7I and 1573.
30 AAPD, 1965, Conversation Erhard - Ambassador McGhee; February 8,1965, p .274.
354AAPD, Conversation Schrdder with General Secretary ofNATO, Manlio Brosio, March 2 5 ,1965, p.
617; see footnote 20 about ambassador conference.
155AAPD, Conversation Schrdder- Rusk, May 13,1965, p. 823,831-834; Rusk, as well as McNamara
assured Bonn that despite the growing number o f ground troops m Vietnam no forces would be withdrawn
from Germany. Rusk also downplayed the German concern that Beijing might intervene. He suggested that
die situation m Vietnam would come to a conclusion more quickly if “the other side engaged in large scale
military action”, which remained puzzling to Schrdder.
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choice than to support Washington’s policy. Not unlike the Johnson administration, Bonn
could not envision a viable alternative to the current American Vietnam policy.356
Deployment o f American ground troops to Vietnam in March 1965 was barely
noticed in Bonn due to a brewing crisis in the Near East over West German arms
deliveries to Israel.357 Soon, the increasing number o f U.S. forces in Vietnam elevated
German public awareness and concerns about the conflict Foreign Secretary Schroder
sought American advice on how to justify the bloodshed in Vietnam to his constituency
at home. He expected that Washington would inform Bonn in detail about the progress in
Vietnam, allowing him to give the German people an objective account o f American
goals in Southeast Asia. Rusk proved understanding but complained about a lack o f allied
support for the United States in Vietnam. Rusk stressed that the West had to appreciate
the gravity o f the situation in Vietnam and demanded that America’s allies be more
forthcoming in their support.35* Schrdder confirmed German loyalty and his country’s
willingness to contribute financially to American projects along the Mekong river and the
founding o f an Asian Development Bank.359National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy
demanded even more forcefully an greater German effort in Vietnam. Washington was
determined to succeed in Southeast Asia despite possible obstacles ahead.360 Bonn was

356AAPD, Conversation Schrdder- Brosio, March 25,1965, p. 617.
357Osteiheld, Aussenpolitifc unter Erhard, pp. 149-157,168-173,188-189; The crisis in the Near East grew
more complicated by the visit of East German head o f state, Walter Ulbricht. West Germany had provided
military equipment to Israel m secret, albeit sanctioned by Washington. The exports o f weaponry were a
very sensitive matter both m terms o f constitutional restriction in West Germany and the delicate relations
to Israel as a result o f the Holocaust. The crisis eventually led to diplomatic relations with Israel and the
cessation o f ties with Egypt and other Arab countries.
“ * AAPD, Conversation Schrdder-Rusk, June2,1965, pp. 922-928; Neither Moscow, Beijing, or Hanoi
were willing to engage in a constructive dialogue. Rusk admitted that Hanoi profitted from the struggle
between Moscow and Beijing and continued its policy o f infiltration.
35» Ibid, d p . 927-928
340AAPD, Conversation Schrdder and National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, June 3,1965, p. 942.
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forewarned that Washington had made its decision to seek victory in Vietnam, even if it
required taking a long arduous road to get there.361 Secretary o f Defense McNamara also
focused on Vietnam in a meeting with the Chancellor intimating his expectation that
Bonn contribute its share by complying folly with offset payments for U.S. troops in
Germany.362
The Vietnam war was no longer an issue that Bonn could disregard. It touched not
only the German need for American protection but exposed a decreasing American
willingness to explore new opportunities in the German situation. McNamara proposed
increase o f U.S. troops in Vietnam was disconcerting. While Erhard did not see any
alternative but to sanction American escalation in Vietnam, he did worry whether the
conflict might lead to U.S. troop withdrawals from West Germany. Hopefully, a
sufficient number o f G .I/s would remain to protect the Federal Republic, but would they
remain if the war in Vietnam turned badly, as de Gaulle predicted? How could Erhard
work for unification if the Cold War intensified over the Vietnam issue. Lastly, Bonn
faced increasing demands by Washington to further contribute to the conflict in Vietnam.
What else could Bonn offer if economic and hum anitarian aid was not sufficient in the
eyes o f Washington. France would object to an even stronger German endorsement to the
American war effort in Vietnam. Bonn was more and more trapped diplomatically by the
conflict in Vietnam. The war strained relations with France, increased doubts about the

Mt AAPD, June 3,1965, p. 943; though Bundy gave the usual reaasurance that Washington was working to
solve the German question, he was much more worried about the French opposition to the American role m
Vietnam and hoped that Bonn could influence de Gaulle.
341IbirL. pp. 945-946; AAPD, Conversation Erhard with Secretary o f Defense McNamara, June4,1965,
pp. 947-953; France and her obstinate policy toward NATO was also discussed in depth. McNamara,
bombared Erhard with the number game on Vietnam. Erhard was concerned about Soviet intervention in
Vietnam but to McNamara replied such scenario was very unlikely unless the PRC was directly attacked.
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U.S. commitment to West Germany and, most o f all, removed the issue o f German,
unification from the international agenda. Despite the troubling outlook for his own
policy goals, Erhard chose to hold fast in his commitment to Washington.
During a subsequent summit with Johnson in June 1965, Erhard repeated the
German litany o f loyalty regarding Vietnam. The chancellor hoped that Johnson would
show* the same commitm ent regarding the German question as the president demonstrated
in his Vietnam policy. Erhard grew more anxious over the implications o f Vietnam
conflict. He was concerned whether the United States would stand by its commitment to
West German security. An American withdrawal from Southeast Asia, on the other hand,
might cause further apprehension among West Germans whether the United States was
truly a reliable ally. Erhard discussed these concerns with General de Gaulle and
explained that he could perceive no other path than reassuring Washington o f Germany’s
confidence and loyalty.363
De Gaulle sympathized with the German predicament yet deeply regretted the
American policy in South Vietnam. But de Gaulle could do nothing to alleviate German
fears since, to him, the American effort in Vietnam was doomed.364 By painting a worst case scenario, de Gaulle again tried pulling West Germany into his orbit. He masterfully
used the conflict in Vietnam as demonstration to Erhard that Germany was vulnerable in
its present reliance on Washington- Bonn would be far better o ff to follow the general’s

153AAPD, Conversation Erhard - de Gaulle, June 11,1965, pp. 1002-1005.
364 Ibid. pp. 1007-1008; De Gaulle felt that events in Vietnam proved his continuous warning to
Washington as correct. De Gaulle also regarded the possibility o f a political solution as more than dim,
because the U S. had missed the chance to do so and “it was now too late." He also suggested that failure in
Vietnam might induce the U.S. to adopt an isolationist position and abandon Western Europe as welL See
also: AAPD, Second Conversation Erhard - de Gaulle, June II, 1965, p. 1018; De Gaulle proposed
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leadership. Erhard wanted reassurance that German concerns mattered and had no
intention to exchange his reliance on Washington with an open endorsement to de Gaulle.
365

h i July 1965, Averill Harriman informed Erhard that President Johnson would
increase the number o f Americans troops in South Vietnam. Harriman assured Bonn that
no U.S. troops would be withdrawn from Europe.366The ambassador also delivered a
request by Johnson asking for additional political, psychological, and economic support
in Vietnam. Washington was urging Western unity regarding Moscow, Beijing, and
Hanoi:
[Soviet Premier} Kossygin is a hardened Communist and believes that Communism
will be victorious also through wars of liberation. This conviction could be dampened if
a revolutionary war, tike in Vietnam, could not succeed. The war in Vietnam has to
be won. The United States have to demonstrate that Mao Tse-dong and Giap were
wrong. The Soviet Union will then focus more on its internal development and hence be
less dangerous. Vietnam is the key to this new direction.367
Harriman skillfully reversed de Gaulle’s argument on the best course in Vietnam. The
ambassador maintained that the American commitment in Vietnam did not endanger the
security o f West Germany. Instead, victory in Vietnam would further strengthened the
Free World against Communism.368

modifications of the NATO obligations, which would require mutual assistance in case o f Soviet
aggression, but did not apply in case of a Chinese or North Vietnamese attack on the U S.
345Moscow also showed no interest in negotiations with Bonn; East Berlin caused further headaches by
impeding East-West transit and killing refugees at the inner German border. See: AAPD, Ambassador
Knappstein to the Foreign Ministry, reporting on bilateral talks on prospects o f German unification, June
17,1965, p. 1055; Rusk met with Erich Mende, Minister for Inner German Affairs and both were
concerned about the renewed intransigent attitude m Moscow on the German question. Rusk admitted that
the American role m Vietnam, clearly strained U.S.-Soviet relations. AAPD, Ambassador Blankenhom to
the Foreign Ministry, reporting from the meeting o f the West European Union (WEU) m Luxembourg,
June 30,1965, p. 1097.
366AAPD, Conversation Erhard with Ambassador Harriman, July 24,1965, pp. I250-I25I.
367Ibid, p. 1251.
348Ibid.: see also Osterheld, Aussenpolitkvnter Erhard, pp. 217-219; Osterfield commented on the
remarkable skills o f persuasion m Harrimanrs delivery. The American eloquently praised German support
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In August 1965 Bonn, for the first time, had the opportunity to discuss the
Vietnam situation with London. The meeting revealed the British to be optimistic about
the chances o f an American victory in Vietnam. Undersecretary Alexander Boker was
informed about recent British diplomatic initiatives to establish contacts with Ho Chi
Minhj which had unfortunately faded. The British were skeptical about the viability of
the Saigon regime and maintained some reservations about American strategy, but
refused to openly criticize Washington. London, at least publicly, did fully support
America’s Vietnam policy. The Foreign Office deplored the Soviet refusal to cooperate
with Britain as co-chair in Geneva, further impeding peace talks. According to the
British, Beijing profited from the Vietnam conflict but would not intervene unless
directly attacked by the United States. Boker was confused about the contradictory
assessments o f his British colleagues and felt that London lacked any clearly defined plan
for future negotiations.369
Based on this short discussion, Bonn assumed that the Anglo-American side was
generally in agreement over Vietnam policy. The gloomy French scenario on Vietnam
left its mark on Bonn, and British optimism about American chances there came
somewhat as a surprise. Bonn was obviously not aware that London, too, had profound

for Vietnam, which even surpassed that o f the British. In Britain, the ruling Labour party was tom. about
the conflict in Vietnam. The “special ally” fell short o f the endorsement Washington received from Bonn.
Erhard quickly assured Harriman o f continuous German support and expressed his deep empathy with the
South Vietnamese.
569AAPD, Memorandum o f Senior official BOker, German-British consultation on problems m Africa, the
Near and Middle East, and South and Southeast Asm, August 18,1965, pp. 1372-1373; Baker was clearly
surprised by the British response that the U.S. could win the war m Vietnam. His surprise reflects the
doubts o f the Erhard government that Washington indeed could succeed in Southeast Asia. The documents
o f the AAPD to the end o f 1966 include no other evidence on German-British consulation over the
Vietnam conflict. The British, like the Americans, insisted on greater financial contribution for the up-keep
o f them troops in Germany.
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doubts about the American Vietnam strategy but chose to keep these concerns secret.
Although the diplomatic approach seemed proper for British interest, it deprived Western
Europe, and Bonn in particular, o f a mediating voice. With British backing, Bonn might
have a greater impact on Washington regarding Vietnam. But Erhard did not seek further
discussion on Vietnam with London. He was left in his own quagmire trying to plot a
course that brought some progress for unity while Paris and Washington were drifting
further apart on Vietnam.
During his election campaign in late summer o f 1965, Erhard pledged that he
would continue economic and humanitarian aid to Saigon. Although most Germans
empathized with the plight o f the Vietnamese, many became weary o f Erhard’s overall
direction in international affairs. The opposition, media, and even members o f the CDU
accused Erhard o f lacking in leadership and undermining Bonn’s influence in world
affairs.370 Paris blamed the Vietnam conflict as being the major reason for increased
international tensions and urged a more assertive stance by the European countries. The
United States, disregarding European advice, increased its commitment in Vietnam.371
Facing British reluctance toward and outright French opposition against American
policy in Vietnam, Washington increasingly focused on what the Federal Republic could
do to aid the American effort in Vietnam.372 Rusk asked Schroder for German aid to
Saigon in form o f technical engineers, medical personnel, and even police units and also

310Osterheld, Aussenpolitik unter Erhard, pp. 220-227,237-238; Adenauer reproached Erhard for not
cooperating closer with de Gaulle; the CDU was increasingly polarized as well between the Adenauer and
Erhard camp by favoring either Washington or Paris as the principal ally.
m AAPD, Conversation Schrdder - Couve de Murville, November 12,1965, p. L7Q4.
McNamara pressured European NATO allies to do more m Vietnam and threatened the redeployment of
U.S. troops m Europe. He met with no success. No country volunteered to send forces to Vietnam. See:
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encourage the private sector to do business in South Vietnam. Otherwise Congress might
reconsider the American commitment to Europe because o f growing costs in
Vietnam.373Srhrnrier was hesitant to comply, pointing to the difficult legal situation in
deploying any German nation als beyond the scope o f the Western alliance. He had
already discussed Vietnam with several aid organizations, and most doctors and the Red
Cross were reluctant to get involved in the Vietnam conflict.374But German constitutional
intricacies did not interest Washington. As with Britain, Johnson expected a public
gesture o f support from Bonn. Johnson was determined to exert additional pressure to
receive the desired backing from West Germany.
Vietnam completely overshadowed the state visit o f Erhard to Washington from
December 19 to 22, 1965 which turned out to be one o f the most tough and eye-opening
encounters during Erhard’s tenure as chancellor. The treatment Erhard received was a
well organized display o f pressure, cajoling, and thinly veiled threats. The bottom-line
was that Johnson insisted on a greater German contribution in Vietnam, not only in the
form o f money but by deploying German troops.375 Erhard countered by pointing to
current German aid to South Vietnam and his record o f moral support to Washington.376
But Washington wanted more. McNamara stated frankly that it was unacceptable that the

Foreign Relations o fth e United States, 1964-1968, VoL XIII, Western Europe Region, Telegram From the
Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department o f State, December 18,1965, p. 287.
m AAPD, Conversation SchrCder- Rusk during NATO Conference m Paris, December 15,1965, pp.
1899-1900; Rusk explained to the German that he and McNamara were doing their best to prevent troops
withdrawals horn Europe, but Congress demanded greater contributions from the NATO partners.
m AAPD, Conversation SchrOder-Rusk, December 15,1965, p. 1900.
375AAPD, Conversation Erhard-Rusk and McNamara, December20,1965,pp. 1915-1917.
576AAPD, Erhard - Rusk and McNamara, Dec. 20,1965, pp. l9I7-I9l8;Ruskpom ted out that Johnson
was deeply worried how the Vietnam conflict would affect his domestic program. Johnson had his heart
and soul set on his “Great Society" while he felt damned by whatever choice he made m Vietnam. Erhard
as well should follow through his commitment.
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United States sacrifice so much for the defense o f the free world while the allies hardly
did anything. Bonn had to comply m full with the off-set purchases to cover the costs o f
American troops in West Germany, and any additional help very welcome.577
Johnson demanded German acquisitions o f American weaponry as off-set
payment for the expenses o f American troops in Germany. The president directly asked
for Germ an military contributions in Vietnam. Erhard responded that according the
Germ an constitution he could not sent any troops or even any engineering or medical

corps to Vietnam. Johnson was not ready to concede, and his “good Mend” Erhard
received the full Johnson treatment o f threats and sweet-talk. The president reminded
Erhard o f all America had done for West Germany during the last decades and it was now
time for Germany to pay back its dues. The United States needed concrete and feasible
help in Vietnam and Bonn had to provide whatever it couId.378Erhard left the meeting
deeply shaken and near despair and his counsel was simply bewildered. They had some
idea that Johnson was a passionate “full-blooded” politician but nobody expected that he
would confront Erhard in such a brutal fashion and ask for the impossible. The depressed

177AAPD, Conversation Erhard - Rusk and McNamara, Dec. 20,1965, pp. 1918-1919. McNamara relayed
that 200,000 American, would be m South. Vietnam by the end o f 1965, with more to be deployed hi 1966.
The war already costS 10 bOIIon per year, which would further increase. McNamara's indicated that the
U.S. reached the end o f the line in its duty to Western freedom, while its allies remained complacent.
Erhard’s first encounter with Johnson appeared a short relief from Vietnam. LBJ showed interest in
Erhard’s desire to have greater access to nuclear weaponry. See: AAPD, Conversation Erhard - Johnson,
December20,1965, pp. 1920-1925.
m Osterheld, Aussenpolitik unter Erhard, pp. 268-270; AAPD, German-American government
consultation, December20,1965, pp. 1929-1931; Rusk and McNamara made it abundantly clear that the
U S. would stand by South Vietnam. Hanoi was unwilling to negotiate and hence the bombing ofNorth
Vietnam would continue until it broke them will to fight. McNamara admitted that success could not be
achieved quickly, since North Vietnam was basically an agricultural country. To Erhard it was clear that
Vietnam would be on the agenda for a long time, which made life quite difficult for him.
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Erhard soon left for bed while his team spent the rest o f the night deliberating how they
could escape “partly unharmed from this crazy situation.”379
The visit was a debacle for German leader. Johnson was adamant concerning the
off-set payments despite German pleas to consider their current economic difficulties.
The president even threatened that American troops might be reduced in Germany if
Bonn was not more forthcoming. Most disturbing was the American demand for German
troops. McNamara repeated the American request for a construction battalion and a
medical company to South Vietnam in January 1966. hi addition, Washington badly
needed the presence o f German military units in Vietnam which went even beyond the
demands made by Johnson.380
Erhard was willing to provide more financial aid, and even convened a special
government commission to evaluate the conflict in Vietnam, but could not send armed
forces. His reasoning was based on constitutional stipulations that the Bundeswehr was
created solely for defensive purposes. Even more disconcerting for Bonn was that
German soldiers in Vietnam would seriously undermine the carefully nurtured image o f a
peaceful and ‘rehabilitated* Germany. Only twenty years after the Second World War, a
German military mission, however Justifiable, would cause consternation among Western
Europeans and most likely Soviet hostility. The West Germans were disinclined to

119Osterheld, Aussenpolitik unter Erhard, p. 270.
3,0AAPD, 1956, Ambassador Knappstein to Foreign Ministry, January 11,1966, p. 7-9; Knappstein
commented on McNamara’s request for German troops that the secretary was under political pressure to
find allied support for Vietnam. Knappstein asked for further guidance from Bonn how to respond to the
question o fa German military contribution to Vietnam. For Erhard’s public statement see footnote ffl o f
Knappstein document. U.S. ambassador McGhee also asked for a G erm an contribution m every way
possible. See: AAPD, Conversation SchrSder - McGhee, January 1 4 , 1966, pp. 21-22; SchrOder m aintained
that Bonn was already doing more than most Western allies. As another sign o f support Bonn sent the
hospital ship Helgoland to South Vietnam.
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support such a decision by Erhard. Consequently, German-American friendship on which
Erhard had placed so much faith was less amenable than he had thought. For Erhard’s
advisors and the CDU debate on whom to trust more, Washington or Paris, became more
relevant than ever.381 Even worse, none o f the allies was interested in German
unification.382
By the end o f January 1966 Bonn decided that military deployments to Vietnam
were impossible because o f legal and political concerns. Any G om an military
engagement in Vietnam would be detrimental for both the Federal Republic and the cause
in Southeast Asia. A German military contribution in Vietnam endangered the security o f
Berlin and would probably not be welcomed by any Western European country, much
less by the majority o f West Germans.383
Neither Washington nor Paris appreciated the German position. While the United
States was eager that Bonn provide additional assistance to Saigon, de Gaulle grew
increasingly gloomy over Vietnam and urged Bonn to follow his lead.384 The Germans
worried about their own security which might be undermined by further escalation in
Southeast Asia, leading to withdrawal of American troops from Europe. In addition,

m AAPD, Conversation Erhard - Johnson, December20,1965, pp. 1938-1942; Osterheld, Aussenpolitik
unter Erhard, pp. 271-272.
3,2 AAPD, Memorandum o f Undersecretary Carstens, January 27,1966, pp. 77-78,80,93. All German
allies were preoccupied with problems they deemed more important than German u n ificatio n . Vietnam
forced the Moscow to adopt a more aggressive policy against the U S. because ofVietnam. But the Soviets
had not intentions to intervene militarily. For Bonn, this new ice-age crushed any possibility to even begin
meaningful discussions on unification
30 AAPD, Senior offical Krapfto Ambassador Knappstein, Washington, January 28,1966, pp. 111-112.
Krapf pointed to the past difficulties to even establish the Bundeswehr and argued that any military rote m
Southeast Asia,would leave the FRG more vulnerable to Soviet pressure.
m Osterheld, Aussenpolitik unter Erhard* P- 286; McNamara in particular became the black sheep for
German policy-makers; AAPD, Conversation SchrCder - Couve de Murville, Feb. 7,1966, p. 159; Murville
maintained that the war m Vietnam was far more complicated than the Americans perceived and he was
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Bonn was also apprehensive o f anti-European reactions by the American public and
Congress which could result in a reduced American commitment in Western Europe.385
Vietnam represented a messy situation to Bonn. The Americans wanted greater German
aid for a dangerous, and probably unsuccessful war. European and German interest was
not served by contributing to that conflict but Bonn needed American goodwill. Tom
between Washington and Paris, Bonn hoped to placate either ally by providing only
“moral” support to South Vietnam.
A meeting o f Erhard’s special cabinet commission for Vietnam in February 1966
revealed that Bonn had no intentions o f increasing current aid to Saigon. The most
important members o f the commission, the foreign secretary and secretary o f defense,
were absent. Instead, the secretaries of economic cooperation, finances, health, urban
development, Walter Scheel, Rolf Dahlgrun, Elizabeth Schwaizhaupt, and Paul Lucke,
respectively, attended the meeting. Only Lucke favored a deployment o f personnel to
Vietnam. His colleagues emphatically disagreed. Secretary Scheel (FDP) urged that Bonn
distance itself from the war in Vietnam. The dispatch o f the hospital ship H elgoland
sufficed completely in showing West German support o f the United States in Vietnam
while reaffirm in g the solely humanitarian character of German aid. They agreed that
Bonn should definitely refrain from any action which might be interpreted as being either
military o r political support for the Saigon regime.386

still concerned about Chinese interference. It was American intransigence than prevented a peaceful
settlement in Vietnam. Only negotiations could prevent further deterioration.
>%sAAPD, Conversation SchrOder-Murville, Feb. 7,1966, pp. I6I-I64.
m AAPD, Memorandum o f Senior official Thierfelder, head o f the legal division o f the Foreign Ministry,
Cabinet commision on aid to South Vietnam, Feb. 14,1965, pp. 187-188; RudolfThierfelder, head o f the
legal division o f the Foreign Ministry arrived [ate for the meeting in did not participate m the discussion.
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The commission was mostly concerned about the increased financial burden
additional aid to Saigon might pose. German business was reluctant to send
representatives to Vietnam. Private charity organ ization further complicated matters for
Bonn. The relief organizations insisted that any assistance be provided equally to both
South and North Vietnam, which of course would send the wrong signal to the United
States. If volunteers were to be recruited, Bonn had to guarantee financial security and
that o f their families in case the volunteers were killed in Vietnam. Lucke had a meeting
later that day with a representative o f German business which, although not promising,
was considered a positive gesture in itseIf.387With the exception o f Lucke, nobody proved
willing to provide more than financial aid to Vietnam, apparently also reflecting the
opinion of Germans in general.
Despite official statements that Americans were fighting in Vietnam for German
freedom as well, the American policy failed to win unqualified enthusiasm in Germany.
Certainly, many Germans emphasized with the hardship and suffering o f the Vietnamese
people. As in the States, the war entered German living-rooms every night dining
newshour. Body counts, pictures o f bombed landscapes, and napalm victims brought
back buried memories o f the past world war and, with it, a sentiment o f solidarity toward
the Vietnamese people and growing skepticism about American goals and conduct in the
region.3®
8 A possible deployment of German troops might encounter criticism and

387AAPD, Memorandum o f Senior Official Thierfelder, Feb. 14,1964. pp. 188-189; all ministerswere
worried about insufficient and unseasoned personnel at the German embassy m Saigon and were happy to
hear that with Wilhelm Kropf a exprienced diplomat was taking over. Further discussion o f the topic was
postponed and immediate responsibility handed over to their department heads.
50 See: Arenth, Bewahrungsprobe der Special Relationship, p. 163; personal reflections o f my parents and
them generation affirm Arenth*s observation; while the appreciation o f American aid and support after the
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opposition at home. The conservative Frankfurter AUgemeine Zeitung opposed a Rusk
proposal o f military contributions by Western Europe and rejected any German military
role in Southeast Asia. The burden o f German history would not make German military
aid a success but could only undermine the Western effort in Vietnam:
Die Lage Deutschlands, die sowohi auf Hypotheken der Vergangenheit beruht wie auf
seiner gegenwartigen Exponiertheit, braucht kaum im einzelnen dargestellt zu werden.
Brachten wirkliche militariscne Hflfeieistungen unter solchen Umstanden der
amerikanisch-westlichen Seite einen moralischen Vorteil? Ware es nicht zu befurchten,
dafi die damh einhergehenden Nachteile uberwiegen? Es gibt sicberlich andere Mittel
urn eine zu billige moralische UnterstQtzung materiall zu unterbauen.389
German constitutional restriction, thus provided the Erhard government with the easiest
way to reject American demands for military contributions in Southeast Asia.390
Pressure from Washington continued. Several senators demanded German
military deployment and in a secret Senate hearing Secretary McNamara again indicated
that West Germany might also contribute militarily.391An official statement of the State
Department, however, denied that Washington was urging Bonn to send soldiers.392Not

war remained very strong among the great majority of West Germans, the pictures coming from Vietnam
were disturbing and evoked feelings o f empathy towards the Vietnamese.
389Frankfurter AUgemeine Zeitung, Jan. 25,1966, p. I.
190For the constitutional restraints o f the FRG see: AAPD, Memorandum, Luitpold Werz, head of cultural
affairs section, Foreign Ministry, to embassy m Washington, April 18,1966, pp. 506-510; Werz presented
a lengthy memorandum discussing the clauses o f the Basic Law; Article 26 condemned aggressive actions
and made them a punishable offense, which o f course could be used by Washington. Nevertheless, the
overall intent o f the Basic Law, along with the fact that no branch government even could declare a state o f
war, made it abundantly clear that Bonn could not deploy German troops beyond the narrowly and purely
defensively defined scope ofNATO.
391AAPD, Ambassador Knappstein to Undersecretary Carstens, Feb. 21,1966, pp. 204-205; Knappstein
was deeply concerned about statements ofDemocratic Senators Stennfs and Russell in favor o f a West
German military contribution to Vietnam. The Baltimore Post claimed that McNamara had made the same
proposal m a Senate hearing, which sent Knappstein on a frantic search to fe d out what McNamara had
actually told the committee. While the actual statement was classified, the ambassador finally received a
shortened version that acknowledged the constitutional restriction preventing Bonn from deploying
military units. However, McNamara expressed his hope to convince Bonn “to come in” and contribute
more m Vietnam.
391IbicL. pp.205-206; Knappstein was told that only a few senators were actually demanding a German
military contribution. The entire affairs made Knappstein quite apprehesensrve and he hoped that a
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surprisingly, news indicating possible negotiations with Hanoi was greeted with relief by
the Erhard cabinet393 The chancellor also rejoiced over Washington’s acceptance that no
German military units should be employed in Vietnam.394Yet this success was shortlasted.

The O ffset payments and the Fall o f Erhard
Although Johnson no longer demanded a German military contribution to
Vietnam, Bonn had to assist financially. The offset payments were the means to increase
German aid in Vietnam. Washington adamantly insisted that Bonn fulfill its obligation.
Erhard, though willing, was unable to meet American demands. He faced an economic
crisis, resulting in a German budget deficit. American persistence that Erhard pay
intensified domestic criticism o f the Chancellor. His efforts to find a compromise with
Washington failed because o f American intransigence, hastening Erhard’s fall. The offset
payments became the principal issue o f contention between Bonn and Washington in
1966. Since Erhard could not comply, he had no options left to placate
Washington.395Erhard’s difficulties with Washington threatened the first pillar of

meeting with McNamara could better clear the air. Bonn hoped that further discussions would be held m
secret m order to avoid an anti-American backlach hr Germany.
m AAPD, Erhard letter to President Johnson, Feb. 25,1966, p. 225; the FrankfurterAUgemeine Zeitung
followed the American initiative closely and was anxious about a failure. Then the dice were cast and the
conflict would rage more viciously and dangerously than before; see for example: FAZ, Jan. 3,1966, p. I.
Feb. 14,1966, p. I.
m AAPD, Conversation Carstens - Alfred Puhan, March L4,1966, pp. 298-299.
59SHubert Zinin ermann. * ... they have got to put something in theJamifypot’: The Burden-Sharing
Problem in German-American Relations, 1960-1967, German History. VoL 14, No. 3, pp. 329-332; Until
1955, West Germany covered the cost ofU-S. troops as part o f the occupation payment. From 1955
onward, Washington covered all cost but money spent by GX’s led to a dollar glut hr Europe. This
situation was further worsened by the economic recovery ofEurope, reversing the trade balance to
Europe's favor.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

188
Adenauer’s foreign policy paradigm - mutually good relations with the United States.
Erhard found him selfnot only at odds with Paris but also with Washington.
American demands that Bonn contribute to the costs o f U.S. military com m itm en t
in Germany was not a new issue. Since 1960, Bonn faced growing American pressure to
financially contribute to the up-keep o f U.S. personnel in West Germany, hi 1961, and
again 1963, Bonn agreed to purchase large quantities o f military equipment from the
United States.396 But Bonn remained apprehensive about the potential correlation between
American protection and West German offset-payments. In 1964, Washington’s budget
was strained by the intensifying war in Vietnam, and Congress insisted on larger financial
contribution o f the Europeans to the Atlantic AlIiance.397Bonn agreed to a new off-set
settlement in May 1964 that provided for annual weapons purchases o f $ 675 million.
This agreement did not include the safeguard o f former understandings with Kennedy,
which made German purchases dependent on a balanced budget in West Germany.
Shortly afterwards West Germany experienced a recession accompanied by inflation
which led to difficulties in balancing the federal budget. Erhard’s desire to find consensus
in Washington quickly vanished during his fateful December 1965 visit to Washington.

m Znnmermann, Burden-Sharing, pp. 352-338; In I960, Bonn refused a monetary settlement, arguing it
would be regarded by Germans as occupation costs. In Ggbt o f the construction o f the Berlin Wall, Bonn
was more malleable to the American demands and, m October 1961, Bonn agreed to order military
equipment for S 1,425 billion during the next two years, which covered the foreign exchange of U.S.
troops; at that tune the BxaidesvK.hr needed the ordered materiel and the agreement was renewed for two
more years m 1963.
m Ibid. pp. 337-338; de Gaulle's decision to cash m American dollars held in gold caused hardship in
Washington, which was further intensified by the weakness o f the British pound. West German financial
contributions hence became even more important
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Johnson insisted on. an immediate o ffset payment o f $ 100 million and additional S 50
million for the war in V ietnam . This was not what Erhard had hoped for.398
In the spring o f 1966 McNamara posed an ultimatum: either Bonn would stand by
Its financial obligations or face a reduction o f U.S. troops m Germany. Bonn was
disturbed by the unveiled threat and pointed to NATO stipulations which did not make
European security dependent on monetary contributions.399 But Washington remained
adamant. Rusk was angered by constant European pleas for American protections while
the Europeans were unwilling to increase then contributions to Europe’s defense. Unless
European attitude changed, the United States was forced to cut its expenses in Europe. In
Bonn, there was no doubt that American intransigence on the off-set question was a result
o f the Vietnam war.400
The off-set payments issue became a burden to the chancellor attracting media
attention in both countries. Diplomatic exchanges between Bonn and Washington grew
more tense. The armories o f the Btmdeswehr were over-flowing with American weapons,
yet Washington would not accept any delay in recompense and offered Bonn the
opportunity to acquire American technology in other areas - as long as the money kept
coming. By May 1966, Bonn was S 660 million behind in payments but pledged it would

Zimmermann, Burden-Sharing, p. 338; Osterheld, Aussenpolitik unter Erhard, p. 271.
399AAPD, Ambassador Knappstem, Washington, to the Foreign Ministry, May 2 4 ,1966, p. 680.
400AAPO, BCnappstem to Foreign. Ministry, May24,1966, pp. 681-682; Congress was openly disgusted
with European failure to play then part. Some congressmen charged that the European had forgotten the
hardships o f the previous World Wars and focused sorely on then self-interest, which, made then “fat and
lazy.” British demands for a greater German contribution for then army o f the Rhine made matters worse
for Erhard. He refused to pay more to Britain but McNamara would not tolerate the same approach. See:
AAPD, Conversation Erhard - British Chancellor o f the Treasury, James Callaghan, May24,1966, pp.
683-685.
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fulfill its obligations as soon as possible. Washington did not accept further German
shortcomings.401
In June 1966 Rusk asked Erhard for a pre-payment of DM I billion which was
urgently needed to contribute to the expanding American, budget over Vietnam. Erhard
was baffled by the enormous sum and could not comply.402McNamara repeatedly singled
out Germany in his demand for greater monetary compensation:
I think we can say to the Germans, as we have, that over a reasonable period of time
either we must have collective defense of the free world or we are not going to have
any defense at all because this country is not going to continue to bear a
disproportionate burden of the defense of the free world and we certainly aren’t going to
defend it alone.403

The Vietnam crisis was now deeply affecting Bonn. McNamara was not interested
in German security issues or unification. The war in Vietnam had become his overriding
concern and Bonn must contribute financially.4<MGerman-American relations reached a
historic low. Generally, the German media and public were apprehensive about U.S.
troop withdrawals but angered by American financial pressure.405Johnson was also not in
the mood for compromise in the off-set question. To Rainer Barzel, head o f the
CDU/CSU parliamentary representatives, Johnson repeated his uncompromising stand.

401 Zimmerman, Burden-Sharing, pp. 338-339; AAPD, Ambassador Knappstem, Washington, to SchrOder,
June 2,1966, pp. 744-746.
401AAPD, Conversation Erhard - Rusk, June 9,1966, pp. 785-786.
4(0 AAPD, Ambassador Knappstem, Washington, to SchrSder, June 10,1966, pp. 802-808; Congress also
demanded greater financial contributions by the Europeans to cover American global commitments.
404Frankfurter Aligemeine Zeitung, July 29,1966; accordingly, West Germany was increasingly isolated in
NATO council in its insistence on the Soviet threat. McNamara adopted the position that a Soviet attack
was unlikely and announced that two reserve divisions would be no longer available for Europe and
redeployed to South Vietnam.
405AAPD, Ambassador Knappstem, Washington, to Schrfider, June 10,1966, p. 80S. Knappstem suggested
that Bonn worked on alternatives for the possible withdrawal o f GJ.*s. He was also deeply concerned that
the frequent leaks from Washington to the American media, on the offset question which would severely
damage the image o f the U S. m West Germany.
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The United States was stretched to its lim its due to the war in Vietnam and, unless the
Europeans assisted Washington, his country might turn to isolationism and leave the
Europeans to the Soviets.406
The American message to Bonn was unmistaken: support us, pay us, or we might
abandon you. Was Johnson completely sincere? O f course, he had no intentions o f
relinquishing the American role and predominance in the Western World. He successfully
employed the same strategy o f scare tactics during Erhard’s visit in December 1965.
Johnson’s advisors further debated this approach to Germany during the summer o f 1966,
and they were divided on how much pressure to exert. Ultimately McNamara prevailed.
His strategy o f a “tough stand” was aimed at maneuvering Bonn into asking Washington
to “cut troops” and “invite us out.”407 McNamara insisted on “100% weapons-offset,
regardless o f German politics” and stressed that the message had to be delivered instantly,
since otherwise the German budget might simply not allow any payments in full for the
coming years. While Johnson remained reluctant to issue an ultimatum, it was obvious
further confrontation with Bonn was still to come.408
McNamara’s argument was interesting and revealing. Was Washington so
obsessed with Vietnam to risk a loss o f influence in Europe by forcing Bonn to ask the
United States to abandon Germany? The answer is simple: Washington could pressure
Bonn to fall in line. With France pursuing grandeur by defying Washington, and London

** AAPD, Conversation Rainer Barzel with Lyndon Johnson, Washington, June 16,1966, pp. 825-826;
Johnson pointed out that die US had lost more than 2000 Americans in Vietnam. I f America behaved as
selfish as the Europeans and simply quit Europe; it would mean war in Europe, Africa, and Latin America.
407FRUS, 1964-1968, Western European Region, Vol. XIII, Memorandum from the President's Deputy
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) to President Johnson, August 11 ,1966, pp. 444-445.
Ball and McGhee cautioned against too much pressure on Erhard or risk the collapse of his government.
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working for a diplomatic settlement on its own, Germany was unable to use the European
card in its relations with the United States. Erhard’s course had led nowhere in the
international arena. Washington demanded money and not kind words o f moral support.
Erhard’s agony was intensified by domestic criticism on both his foreign and
economic policies. The chancellor was blamed for a CDU loss in July 1966 to the SPD in
state elections in North-Rhine Westphalia.409 The press attacked Erhard’s failure in
maintaining good relations with Washington and Paris. Many journalists and politicians
now endorsed Adenauer’s close cooperation with Paris, concluding that Bonn, when at
odds with France, was always seen with less respect in the United States. Erhard
remained defiant and hoped that his up-coming September visit to Washington would
bring positive results and a way out o f the domestic dilemma.410
However, Erhard would travel to the States empty handed. He lacked the fiscal
means to pay the German dues to Washington for 1966 and I967.4tl McNamara
continued his media attacks on West Germany. Rumors o f U.S. troop reductions also did
not end.4,2In the middle o f this growing storm Bonn reaffirmed its support for the

40* FRUS, 1964-1968, Western European Region, Memorandum from President's Deputy Special
Assistant, Bator, to Johnson, August I I , 1966, pp. 446-447.
** Adenauer certainly did not spare Erhard either, h i August 1966, the former chancellor embarked on
public campaign criticizing his successor. Adenauer recommended the American withdrawal from
Vietnam, and urged Erhard to improve French-German relations. Many CDU-CSU members agreed and
the CSU (the Bavarian faction o f the CDU) officially endorsed Adenauer's criticism o f the U.S.; see:
FrankfurterAllgemeine Zeitung, August, I I , 1966.
4,0 Osterheld, Aussenpolitik unter Erhard, pp. 337-339; the press speculated about changes in the cabinet
and demanded a new course. Public opinion polls regarded the international situation o f the Federal
Republic worse than ever. The SPD and some members o f the coalition partner FDP demanded Erhard's
resignation.
4tt AAPD, Memorandum Undersecretary Carstens, July 22,1966, pp. 977-978; Germany would pay its
nationals working on American bases, provide free storage facilities, and free maintainance o f U S . training
facilities.
4tz Ibid.. pp. 979-981; Knappstem complained to Rusk that McNamara's press campaign seriously
undermined German-American understanding Rusk assured the ambassador that the U S. had no intention
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A m erican role in Vietnam. A German delegation visited South Vietnam during the

summer o f 1966 and was deeply shocked by the hardship and suffering witnessed there,
promising additional hum anitarian aicL4t3WhiIe this show o f good-will pleased Saigon, it
did not change anything for Bonn with the Americans. More urgently than before,
Washington needed any possible kind o f Western support since it increasingly faced
domestic criticism over the war in Vietnam.414
September 1966 turned out to be one o f worst months for Erhard as chancellor.
His trusted advisor Ludger Westrick resigned, leading media and politicians alike to
demand changes in the cabinet including the office o f chancellor. Struggling at home,
several advisors cautioned against the scheduled visit to Washington. But Erhard believed
the trip might result in a badly needed foreign policy success, allowing him to regain the
confidence o f the public and party skeptics. His hope was unrealistic given the bad news
he had to convey regarding the off-set payment. Bonn was fifty percent behind in the
scheduled contributions and would be unable to close the gap in the next year.415
In Washington, Erhard promised to pay German dues but indicated that he could
not meet the 1967 deadline. He planned to increase the defense budget to prevent similar

o f reducing troops in West Germany, but also pointed to congressional pressure to receive German offset
payments in full. McNamara amd his British colleague Denis Healey threatened substantial troop
withdrawals unless Bonn met its financial obligations. See: AAPD, Memorandum o f Senior Official Ruete,
August S, 1966, pp. 1039-1040
■*IJ AAPD, Conversation between Westrick and General Nguyen Huu Co, August 12,1966, pp. 1061-1063;
Erhard reaffirmed his support for the American policy m a meeting with Swedish Prune Minister Tage
Erlander. Unlike Eriander, Erhard was against any negotiations on Vietnam at the present tune. The U.S.
fought m South Vietnam because o f contractual obligation, and Bonn relied on a similar American
commitment for its viability. See: AAPD, German-Swedish Government Consultation, September2,1966,
pp. II27-II2S, 1131.
4,4 AAPD, Memorandum Undersecretary Carstens on conversation with Ambassador McGhee for
upcoming visit in Washington, August25,1966; Arenth, Bewahrungsprobe der Special Relationship, pp.
163-164; Osterheld, Aussenpolitik unter Erhard, p. 346.
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calamities in the future.416 Erhard reminded Johnson o f the American security guarantees
for Europe and pointed to anxieties possible U.S. troop reductions caused in Germany. As
his last resort, Erhard played the French card. He told Johnson that many Germans,
including a growing number o f delegates in the Bundestag, preferred closer ties with
France. While he was against any bilateral agreement with de Gaulle, Erhard added that
he “hoped the President would not misunderstand him but he wanted to say that a
different German Government that might succeed his Government might not show the
same loyalty and determination to cultivate close ties with the United States." The
chancellor hoped that Johnson appreciated his current predicament and that the offset
problem could be settled in a manner satisfying both sides.417
Johnson fired back that he faced even more serious difficulties and it was not
“clear to him what the essence o f the chancellor’s remarks was.” The president continued
that during the past years he had always relied on the “German word,” and if they could
not fulfill then commitment, it would “put them in a very serious and disconcerting
position” by nullifying the existing offset agreement. Johnson refused to accept any
alteration in the current payment schedule and accused Erhard o f dishonesty. The
chancellor left the meeting near despair, empty handed and shamed.418

4,5 Osterheld, Aussenpolitik unter Erhard, p. 350; AAPD, Memorandum o f Section in A4, Offsetpayments, September21,1966, pp. 1234-1235.
415AAPD, Conversation Erhard - Rusk, Washington, September 26,1966, pp. 1237-1238; Rusk was
relatively understanding but obviously it was left to Johnson to forcefully debate the issue.
417FR.US, Western European Region, 1964-1968, Vol. XIII, Memorandum o f Conversation, Washington,
September26,1966, pp.47I-473; AAPD, Conversation Erhard - Johnson, Washington, September26,
1966, pp. 1242-1245.
4t* FRUS, pp. 476-477; Osterheld, Aussenpolitik unter Erhard, p. 354. LBJ was obviously determined to
force Erhard to pay. The chancellor swallowed the verbal abuse and invited LBJ to visit Germany. Erhard
also agreed to tripartite (U.SJU.K. FRG) negotiations on offset payments.
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Erhard’s vision o f a strong American-German friendship, eventually opening the
path for German un ification, was torpedoed by the American engagement in Vietnam.
Erhard remained the loyal soldier by assuring Johnson that the United States was doing
the right th in g in Vietnam.4I9McNamara remained “hard like Shylock” and did not give
an inch toward a compromise in the offset question. The final communique at least
allowed E rhard to save face by promising to do his best to comply with the scheduled
contributions for American troops in Germany.420
The visit to Washington only intensified the growing clouds hanging over
Erhard’s political future in Germany. The budget calamities remained unresolved and
measures to consolidate government spending, including higher taxes, were strongly
criticized by the media and by the coalition partner FDP. On October 27, 1966 the FDP
ended the coalition and its ministers resigned from the cabinet. On November 2, Erhard’s
own party, the CDU, urged him to step down. In the Bundestag the SPD and FDP
intensified their pressure to force Erhard’s resignation and, on November 10, the CDU
decided to select a successor for Erhard and nominated Kurt Georg Kiesinger. On
November 30, 1966 Ludwig Erhard finally resigned and Kiesinger was elected
Chancellor the next day, heading the Great Coalition between the CDU/CSU and the
SPD. Foreign Secretary Gerhard Schroder was replaced by W illy Brandt.421

AAPD, Conversation Erhard - Johnson, Washington, September27,1966, pp. 1266-1267; the record o f
the meetmg.onIy gives a. hint o f Erhard’s desperation. Johnson’s attack on Erhard’s good word and honor
must have been very difficult to swallow. Perhaps the Federal Archives ofW est Germany will shed more
insight on the encounter.
420 Osterheld, Aussenpolitik unter Erhard, pp.356-358; mostly critical o f Erhard, Osterfeld had to give him
credit for gaining a little more time m the offset payments and not breaking under pressure.
421 Vogelsang, Das Geteilte Deutschland, pp. 279-280; Grosser, Geschichte Deutschlands, pp. 178-179.
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Erhard’s inability to forcefully convey his concerns to Washington, and the
increasing American pressure on his government to assist in the Vietnam war, contributed
to his fall. The conflict in Southeast Asia demolished Erhard’s foreign policy agenda. The
more South Vietnam preoccupied policy-making in Washington, the more the German
question became o f only secondary importance. Washington was unwilling to risk
additional tensions in Europe by challenging the status quo. Kennedy had accepted the
division o f Germany during the Berlin Crisis in 1961, and Johnson did not change this
course. Upon assuming office in late 1963, Erhard sincerely believed that German loyalty
to the United States would bring greater benefits for the Federal Republic. He pursued
this policy partly because he distrusted de Gaulle’s ambitions in Europe. Although
Erhard’s concern about de Gaulle was not unfounded, the chancellor further limited his
foreign policy options by refusing to play the European card in negotiations with
Washington. During his last encounter with Johnson, Erhard finally used the European
angle, but it was far too late.
Unlike Adenauer, Erhard ultimately failed to understand the motivations and selfinterest that shape international relations. Erhard also rejected Adenauer’s paradigm that a
successful German policy had to be build on both good relations with Washington and a
solid grounding in Europe. Undoubtedly, both Adenauer and Erhard put German interests
first, but they differed profoundly in their respective approaches. Adenauer was a
politician o f the old school o f balanced power. Erhard was more o f a idealist, hoping that
his loyalty to Washington would be some day rewarded. In hindsight, the limitations
placed on German foreign policy-making make Erhard’s course understandable. The
Federal Republic depended on American protection and, unlike France, which even after
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its withdrawal from NATO command enjoyed a “free-rider^ position simply because o f
its geographical location, Bonn could not afford to alienate the United States.
Perhaps the only opportunity for a more promising German impact on American
thinking was a concerted European policy, but Erhard did not even consider this option
because he regarded good relations with Washington as paramount for his policy goals of
West German security and progress on unification. While Bonn, London, and Paris were
doubtful and apprehensive about the growing American commitment in Southeast Asia,
they never discussed the possibility o f a joint initiative to make their voice heard in
Washington. Bonn and Paris repeatedly discussed the Vietnam conflict, but did so with
their own (not common) interests in mind. Erhard, the “eager ally,” supported the
American role in Vietnam because he believed it would help his own political agenda. It
did not Instead, he faced increasing American pressure to contribute to the war. Johnson
needed European support, but with a defiant France, and a reluctant Great Britain, West
Germany was the ideal ally to contribute to the effort in Vietnam, regardless o f the
domestic costs to Erhard.
Action taken by both Kennedy and Johnson reminded West Germany of its
limitations in foreign policy and, in the process, dampened German expectations of what
the United States could, and would, do for them. In West Germany, the Vietnam War
caused a more skeptical attitude toward the United States. While Germany’s “silent
majority” still strongly appreciated the values and protection o f the United States,
younger Germans grew more critical o f America. The Willy Brandt government learned
from the lessons o f German-American relations during the 1960’s and successfully
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expanded on Adenauer’s European angle in pursuing new approaches on the German
question by engaging the Cold War opponent - the Warsaw Pact.
West Germany was the most eager but also weakest ally in transatlantic relations.
Unlike, B ritain and France, the Federal Republic refrained from telling Washington what
to do in Vietnam although the “Vietnam question” hurt German self-interest. The
question that rem ains to be answered is why Washington refused to respond to profound
concerns over Vietnam by its major European allies.
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I d on't think i t ’s worth fightingfor and I don 't think we can 't get out. And it's the
biggest damn mess. . . What the hell is Vietnam worth t o m e .. What is it worth
to this country?
Lyndon Johnson on Vietnam, May 1964.

The United States did not follow European advice regarding the American
involvement in Vietnam for several key reasons. Ideological differences, American public
opinion, and the unequal status of the Western Europeans in their relationship with
Washington all contributed to the lack o f response by American policymakers to
European concerns. John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson perceived foreign policy
based on the ideological conflict with Communism. Propelled to the leadership role o f the
Free World since the Second World War, American policy-makers sought to contain
Communism and prevent further encroachment by the Soviet Union in Third World
countries. Fear o f Communism also pervaded domestic opinion. Communism was the
antithesis to everything the United States represented, such as freedom, democracy, and a
free market system. The American public and media fully endorsed the country’s role as
defender o f freedom and democracy around the globe. Vietnam was one o f the global
trouble spots where Communist forces were advancing against the West. Following
Truman’s containment policy, since 1954 South Vietnam was directly linked to American
security interests. The possible fall of the Southeast Asian country would have serious
repercussions for the region and might even endanger the freedom o f the entire Pacific
rim.
The Western Europeans did not regard Southeast Asia as being o f prune
importance for Western security. As both the British and French knew well, the region
was difficicult territory for any Western military intervention. Washington disagreed and
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believed that it could hi feet meet the Communist challenge in Vietnam on both moral
and material grounds. As leader o f the West during the Cold War, America had the
obligation o f protecting Western interests around the globe. This global responsibility
differed, at least in the eyes o f Washington, from the parochial and selfcentered policy o f
the Europeans.
The United States vastly contributed to the reconstruction o f Western Europe after
the Second World War while also guaranteeing its security. In return for aid and
protection, Washington expected unqualified support from its European allies. While
Great Britain, France, and West Germany in varying degrees tried to influence American
policy-making they were delegated to the position o f “junior partner" and their political
influence on American foreign policymaking was limited.

The origins o f America’s engagement in Vietnam were based on guidelines
defined by the National Security Council Resolution (NSC) 68 written in 1950. NSC 68
furthered the Truman Doctrine by postulating American reaction to even limited
expansion o f Communism. During the previous years, Washington remained officially
neutral in the French Indochina War, but with the victory o f Mao Zedong in China in
1949, Southeast Asia became a major focus o f American foreign-policy making. The
Korean w ar further validated American suspicions that the Soviet Union and Communist
China intended to conquer and dominate Asia, and therefore American aid to the French
was increased. President Eisenhower continued Truman’s commitment to the French
effort to defeat Communist guerrillas in Indochina. Although Eisenhower refused direct
American military intervention or the use o f nuclear weapons to save the French in
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Indochina, he nevertheless restated the importance o f the region for American security
interests.
Following the Geneva Settlement in 1954, Eisenhower was unwilling to renounce
American influence in Southeast Asia and hoped that the newly created Southeast Asian
Treaty Organization (SEATO) and indirect American support to the government o f Ngo
Dinh Diem would be sufficient to secure the viability of South Vietnam.’’22Washington
consequently embarked on a “nation-building” policy in South Vietnam, which centered
around President Diem. This policy worked quite well until 1959. By then domestic
opposition against the repressive Diem regime intensified, leading to the formation o f the
National Liberation Front (NLF) in I960.423 Progress in South Vietnam proved rather
precarious, but Eisenhower remained committed to Saigon based on the conviction that
Communism had to be contained. Accordingly, American security interests were at stake
in Vietnam. If South Vietnam fell, so would the rest o f Southeast Asia, endangering the
entire Pacific Rim and the United States.
John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson inherited the foreign policy paradigms
o f their predecessors. Although the situation in South Vietnam deteriorated, both
presidents were determined not to lose that Asian country. American interference in
Greece, Iran, and the D om inican Republic, for example, proved that victory over antiWestern forces was certainly possible. Following the neutralization o f Laos in 1962, the

42 The origins of the American involvement in Vietnam have been discussed m detail m numerous
scholarly works. See for example: George C. Herring, America's Longest Wan The United States and
Vietnam. 1950-1975. Second Edition, (New York, 1986), pp. 3-30; Marilyn B. Young. The Vietnam Wars.
1945-1990. (New York, 1991), pp. 1-59; David L. Anderson, Trapped Bv Success: The Eisenhower
Administration and Vietnam. 1953-1961. (New York, 1991), pp.21-35,68-75,85-90; Larry Berman,
Planning A Tragedy: The Americanization o f the War in Vietnam. (New York, 1982), pp. 11-16.
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stakes in Vietnam were even higher. Kennedy initiated American escalation by sending
more advisors and materiel responding to crisis after crisis in South Vietnam. Yet,
American aid proved little more than a band-aid solution and, while he would not commit
ground troops, he also refused to disengage despite better knowledge that the current
policy was anything but successful.

T. John F. Kennedy

In December I960, President-elect John F. Kennedy was briefed by President
Eisenhower on global challenges facing the United States. In Southeast Asia, Laos was o f
immediate concern. Kennedy decided against U.S. military intervention and appointed
Averill Harriman to find a political solution.424 In 1962 another Geneva Conference,
under the co-chairmanship o f Great Britain and the Soviet Union, neutralized Laos. But
repeated violations o f the agreement by North Vietnam left a sour taste in Kennedy's
mouth and also raised concerns for the safety o f South Vietnam. Kennedy’s Republican
opponent, Richard Nixon, called the Laotian settlement an “unqualified disaster.”

43 Herring, Longest War, pp. 50-64; Young, Vietnam Wars, 52-59; for the last year of Eisenhower policy
m Vietnam see also: Anderson, Trapped by Success, pp. 175-197.
424Two differing accounts exists on Eisenhower’s recommendations. Rusk understood that Ike would favor
unilateral intervention if necessary. McNamara remembered that Ike was “deeply uncertain” about what
action to take. See: Dean Rusk, As I Saw It. (New York, 1990), p .428; Rusk's report was confirmed by
notes taken by Eisenhower; see: William Conrad Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam Wan
Executive and Legislative Roles and R elatihnshths. Part II; I96I-I964, (Princeton, NT, 1986), p. 4; Robert
S. McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons ofVietnam. (New York, 1995), p. 36; see also:
Richard Reeves. President Kennedy: Profile m Power. (New York. 1993), pp. 31-32; for Clark Clifford’s
memorandum on the meeting see: Berman, Planning A Tragedy, pp. 16-17.
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Following the Bay o f Pigs debacle in 1961, Kennedy politically could not afford a similar
failure in South Vietnam.425
As Congressman, Kennedy favored American support for South Vietnam. He was
intensely critical o f the French during the First Indochina War, but quickly endorsed the
new leader o f South Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem. Interestingly, his comments on French
policy in Indochina were right on the mark for the future American role as well - but
perhaps as president Kennedy did overlook his own assessment o f April 1954. At the
time, Kennedy could not possibly foresee a French victory because the French pursued an
outdated policy based on colonial interests and failed to promote a “strong native nonCommunist sentiment” which was the basis for any success in Vietnam. Unless the
Vietnamese were willing to fight for their independence a “military victory, even with
American support,. . . is difficult, if not impossible, o f achievement.”426
Where the French failed, Americans could do better. In 1953, Kennedy met Diem
and was immediately impressed with the South Vietnamese politician. As a founding
member o f the American Friends o f Vietnam Kennedy fervently defended Eisenhower's
commitment to South Vietnam. To Kennedy, that country was the “cornerstone of the
Free World in Southeast Asia” and a “proving ground for democracy.” The United States
was the “godparent” o f South Vietnam and had a moral obligation to stand by Saigon.

425Richard Nixon, The Memoirs o f Richard Nixon. (New York, 1990), pp. 232-235. Nixon, obviously
unhappy with Kennedy's foreign, policy wanted to give a critical speech, o f the president's actions but the
Bay o f Pigs debacle intervened. Nixon, however, m aintained that more should be done in Laos.
426Congressional Record - Senate, April 6,1954, p. 4673.
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Failure to do so would profoundly blemish: the American image in ah of Asia and also
hurt American strategic interests.427
By 1961, South Vietnam was neither on the road to democracy nor was its
survival assured. Days after his inauguration, Kennedy received an alarming report from
General Edward G. Lansdale who, as a CIA agent played a major part in the
implementation o f American policy in South Vietnam from 1954 to 1956. According to
his information, Communist insurgency was growing in numbers and many Vietnamese
were disgruntled with Diem’s authoritarian leadership, partly a result o f the unconditional
American support for the South Vietnamese leader. Lansdale recommended American
“emergency treatment” Otherwise Saigon could do no better than “postpone eventual
defeat” Kennedy immediately approved $ 42 million in aid for South Vietnam.428 The
president also adopted a counterinsurgency plan for Vietnam already under discussion
during the last year o f the Eisenhower administration. National Security Action
Memorandum on Vietnam (NSAM 2) authorized infiltration and harassment operations
against Viet Cong guerrillas, even in North Vietnamese territory. A special task force o f
the Army - the Green Berets - was created and trained in counterinsurgency. Kennedy
further increased the number o f American “advisors” to South Vietnam beyond the
officially allowed limit o f 685 under the 1954 Geneva Agreement.429 While Kennedy did
not want another war in Asia, he was also resolved not to lose in South Vietnam.

427Gibbons, UiS, Government, pp. 5-6; Herring, Longest War, p. 43; Lawrence J. Bassett and Stephen. E.
Pelz, “The Failed Search for Victory: Vietnam and the Politics o f War”, in: Thomas G. Paterson,
Kennedy’s Onest for Victory: American Foreign Policy. I96I-I963. (New York, 1989), p226.
m Gibbons, UJL Government, pp. II-I2 ; Herring, Longest War, p. 76.
429Herring, Longest War, pp. 78-79; Berman, Planning a Tragedy, pp. 19-20.
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How important was Vietnam to Washington? French president Charles de Gaulle
called it a “rotten country” and warned Kennedy in May 1961 not to make the same
mistakes as the French. British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan also urged against
further involvement, while the West Germans pleaded for American help to maintain the
freedom o f Berlin. But for Washington, Berlin and South Vietnam had become symbols
that demonstrated American determination to draw the line against Communist
aggression. As vice-president Lyndon Johnson put it after he returned from his first visit
to Saigon:
We must decide whether to help these countries to the best of our ability or throw back
the towel in the arena and pull back our defenses to San Francisco and a ‘Fortress
America’ concept. More important, we should say to the world in this case that we don’t
live up to treaties and don’t stand by our friends. This is not my concept. I recommend
that we move forward promptly with a major effort to help these countries defend
themselves.430
Kennedy’s own campaign propaganda accused Eisenhower o f softness against
Communism and he evoked the infamous “missile gap” by stating that the United States
was foiling behind in the aims race against the Soviet Union.43tAbandoning South
Vietnam would most likely backfire politically at home.
Republican opponents were also closely watching Kennedy’s moves. In May
1961, Nixon gave a speech, on foreign policy issues in Chicago that indirectly addressed
Vietnam, once again reminding Kennedy not to be or appear weak on Communism:
Whenever American prestige is to be committed on a major scale we must be willing to
commit enough power to obtain our objective even if all our intelligence estimates prove

430Johnson’s comment is quoted in Gibbons, K £ Government, p. 45. Johnson was sent to South Vietnam
to reassure Diem of the continuous commitment ofthe United States. Johnson relished m the alignment,
while otherwise so much overlooked by Kennedy. What he saw obviously impressed the Vice-president
and he even haded Diem as the Winston Churchill o f Southeast Asia.
4,1 James N. Gielio. The Presidency o f John F. Kennedy. (Lawrence, KS, 1991), p. 17.
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wrong. Putting it bluntly, we should not start things in the world unless we are prepared
to finish them.432
Whatever farsighted advice de Gaulle and Macmillan had to offer, Kennedy had to follow
through with what he had promised as a presidential candidate. He had to maintain the
image o f being a determined warrior against Communist encroachment, thereby
preempting possible criticism by the Republican Party and hard-line Democrats. The
majority* o f Kennedy^ advisors also recommended expanding the American effort in
South Vietnam. Admiral Maxwell Taylor and presidential advisor Walter Rostow visited
Vietnam in the fall o f 1961 and judged the situation as serious. Diem was increasingly
losing support and the morale among the South Vietnamese was dismal. They concluded
that more American aid, including the deployment o f eight-thousand American ground
troops, might turn the tide in Vietnam. Like Eisenhower, Kennedy rejected the idea of
sending American troops but, at the same time, refused a negotiated settlement.
Negotiations over Vietnam would obviously evoke a storm o f protest from the
Republicans and hawks within the Democratic Party. Given this domestic situation, the
president favored a middle course o f providing more financial assistance and advisors to
South Vietnam.433
With these measures, Kennedy took the first steps along an increasingly slippery
road in Vietnam. As de Gaulle had predicted, Washington soon discovered that American
assistance to Saigon was not sufficient to subdue the insurgents. Diem’s autocratic rule
facilitated the appeal of the Viet Cong. Kennedy, however, continued his support of Diem

'*K Nixon, Memoirs, p .236.
40 Herring, Longest War, pp. 80-84; Gibbons, U S. Government, pp. 72-84,96-99; American dollars
further built up the ARVN, Green Berets and U.S. pilots instructed South Vietnamese military and also

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

208
and in November 1961, affirmed that the United States would not tolerate Communist
aggression in South Vietnam.4S*By the end o f 1962, the number o f America military
advisors in South Vietnam had increased from 3,200 to 11,500 with more than one
hundred killed or wounded. Kennedy held fast on his approach o f limited response,
though victory in South Vietnam was remote. The Viet Cong modified their strategy to
respond better to superior American-South Vietnamese weaponry and Diem himself
became a growing obstacle to American success. To make things worse for Kennedy the
American media increasingly focused on the failures o f the South Vietnamese leader and
whose behavior gave them ample opportunity for criticism.435

American voices o f dissent: C hester Bowles, John Kenneth G albraith, Mike
M ansfield, and George Ball
The press was not the first to question the American policy in Vietnam. Some o f
Kennedy's advisors came to similar conclusions as had de Gaulle and Macmillan urging a
rethinking o f the U.S. commitment in South Vietnam. Chester Bowles, John Kenneth
Galbraith, Mike Mansfield, and George Ball moved beyond the paradigm o f containment
and falling dominoes. They provided a realistic assessment o f the strategic importance o f
South Vietnam for the United States and regarded the current American policy there as
being futile and misguided. All four urged an American disengagement and supported the
political solution o f neutralizing Vietnam.

participated in raids against the VC. Lastly, strategic hamlets and economic programs for Vietnamese
peasants was aimed to turn the tide m the country-side; Berman, Planning a Tragedyr pp. 20-23.
434Herring, Longest War, p. 83: Giglio, Kennedy, p. 243.
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As early as February 1961, then Undersecretary o f State Chester Bowles
suggested neutrality as a possible solution for all o f Southeast Asia. 435A nonaligned
Southeast Asia would allow the United States to move beyond the rigid confines o f the
SEATO treaty by enlisting broader international support for Washington’s policy in
Vietnam and preventing Ho Chi Minh from interfering in South Vietnamese affairs.437
The proposal to neutralize Vietnam fell on deaf ears. Some members o f the State
Department even indicated that Bowles’ proposition played into the hands o f the
Communists.438
After the Taylor-Rostow mission to Vietnam o f October 1961, Bowles again
introduced his idea o f neutralization. According to Bowles, a deployment o f U.S. ground
troops would only result in “a full-blown war o f unpredictable dimensions.” The White
House responded negatively to Bowles’ suggestions.439 Soon Bowles found himself
removed from the inner-circle o f Kennedy’s advisors through his “promotion” as special
presidential representative for Asian, African, and Latin American affairs.440 In this new
capacity, Bowles continuously kept a close eye on Vietnam and, during 1962, disagreed
even more vociferously with the administration’s policy. Bowles was convinced that Ho
Chi Minh was primarily driven by nationalistic goals and that his version of Communism

435 Gibbons, U.S, Government, pp. 15-17, 39-42; Herring, Longest War, pp. 87-92; Giglio, Kennedy, pp.
246-247.
436Giglio, Kenneefy, pp. 88-89.
437Chester Bowles, Promises To Keep: My Years in Pabiic Life. 1941-1969. (New York, 1971); pp. 407408; Southeast Asian neutrality should be guaranteed by the U.S., Britain, France^ the Soviet Union, India,
and Japan. By engaging the Soviets the U.S. could utilize the Chinese-Soviet rift to its advantage.
Obviously Moscow was not keen to accept Chinese expansion into Southeast Asia.
431Ibid. p. 408.
439 Ibid.. p. 409; Bassett and Pelz; Failed Searchfor Victory, pp. 237-238.
440 Giglio, The Presidency o f Kennedy, pp. 93-94; Bowles publicly criticized the Kennedy decision to give
a green light to the Cuban expedition, that Ted to the debacle at the Bay ofPigs. His “treason” drew heavy
fire from Robert Kennedy and Dean Rusk and Bowles was replaced by George Ball.
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was as independent from Moscow as that o f Marshal Tito’s in Yugoslavia, Bowles
pointed, out that Vietnam had struggled for centuries against the Chinese, and Ho now
cleverly used the Sino-Soviet antagonism to get weapons from both sides but did not
welcome any direct Chinese interference in his country.441 Bowles urged his superiors to
appreciate the complexity o f the Vietnam situation and reassess U.S. policy in Vietnam.
Bowles wrote to Kennedy in May 1962 after another visit to Southeast Asia:
If there ever was a need for an ‘ngonizing reappraisal’, it is here and now. This
reappraisal must look far beyond counterguerrilla tactics and fortified townships
to the political factors which in the long run prove decisive. American history is
replete with tragedies bom of our failure to relate our military efforts to
political objectives.442

In order to restore peace, South Vietnam had to become truly independent, prosper
economically, and respect the cultural, political, and religious differences o f its peoples.443
American support o f South Vietnamese self-determination would make the U.S. presence
in that country not only permissible but assured the nations o f Asia that the United States
entertained no hegemonic ambitions in the area. This approach might facilitate an
understanding with the Soviet Union on securing the neutrality o f Southeast Asia, while
also precluding any intervention in the region by the PRC.444
This time the White House and Rusk responded favorably to Bowles’ proposal.
Bowles refined his ideas for a “Peace Charter for Southeast Asia” in the summer o f 1962.

4*t Bowles, Promises to Keept pp. 409-410; Bowles attacked Rusk's strategy m particular. It was silly to try
and teach the Communists a lesson when Communism varied horn country to country - a point Rusk
obviously missed. Hence Rusk prevented a more effective approach m dealing individually with the Soviet
Union, the PRC, and North Vietnam.
IbtcL. p. 410.
*° Ibid.. pp. 410-411; Bowles maintained that his suggestions for Vietnam was actually the implementation
o f a policy first envisioned by Franklin Roosevelt and that the promise of hue independence clearly had
not lost any o f its appeal m Southeast Asia almost twenty years later.
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He concluded that fighting must cease immediately and that the entice region should then
be neutralized under United Nations’ supervision, including the withdrawal o f all foreign
forces. Neutrality and territorial sovereignty should be guaranteed the United States,
Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, China, India, Pakistan and perhaps Japan, who
were also to provide further economic and political aid to Southeast Asia.445Bowles’
proposal reflected the basic British and French point o f view and they might have
endorsed i t But the Charter was soon dismissed by the State Department, which judged
his initiative as being “unrealistic, impractical and premature.”446 Deeply disappointed,
Bowles commented:
Our present course of action within a rigid political and military framework dominated
by Diem is very likely to fail, and for this failure we may eventually be called upon to
pay a heavy price, both in Asia and here at home.447

Kennedy was unwilling to consider neutralization because it might lead to the
unification o f Vietnam under a coalition government, which he equated with the loss o f
South Vietnam to the Com m unists . Washington could not perceive that a neutralized and,
perhaps socialist Vietnam might not affect the Cold War balance. Most importantly,
Kennedy might have to face serious repercussions at home if he agreed to a negotiated
settlement on Vietnam in adhering to the 1954 Geneva Agreement.
John Kenneth Galbraith, who succeeded Chester Bowies as ambassador to India
in 1961, also regarded the growing American involvement in Vietnam as ineffective and

444Bowles, Promises to Keep, p. 411.
445 Ibid. d p . 412-413.
446 Ibid. p. 414; the State Department argued that Hanoi had renounce and cease all aggression first before
a political solution could be found Though Kennedy initially favored a Bowles fact-finding tour to
Southeast Asia, it was postponed (hie to the Cuban Missiles Crisis and then lack of interest.
447Ibid. dp. 416-417.
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self-defeating. The Harvard economist was chosen to facilitate better U.S. relations with
India and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. From Delhi Galbraith counseled Kennedy on
economic questions, but the ambassador also expressed his views, sometimes on request
by the president, on events in South Vietnam.44* Galbraith viewed Vietnam with profound
concern and maintained that President Diem had alienated his people “to a far greater
extent than we allow ourselves to know.” He argued that Washington's view was
distorted because American policymakers only listened to the “ruler's account” and that
o f the American officials committed to Diem.449
Galbraith experienced conditions first hand during a visit to South Vietnam in
November 1961. Although Saigon appeared lively and bustling to Galbraith, it was a city
“in a modified state o f siege.” American personnel were constantly accompanied by well
armed bodyguards and most o f United States Operations Mission (USOM) members were
stuck in Saigon proper. The military briefings disclosed an intriguing numbers game to
the economics professor. About 15,000 opposition forces controlled many areas around
Saigon, facing 250,000 ARVN troops. Even more astonishing was the claim by an
American officer that the Vietcong had suffered 17,000 casualties in 1961. When
questioned, the U.S. advisors could not account for these discrepancies. To Galbraith, the

448John Kenneth Galbraith, Ambassador's Journal: A Personal Accotmt o f the Kennedy Years. (Boston,
1969), pp. xiv-xv; Kennedy desired the friendship with India as a counter-balance to C om m unist Ch in a but
was not very successful in gaining a closer relationship with Nehru and the state visit ofNehra was a
“disaster” as Kennedy put it.
*” IbfcL. p. 154; Galbraith maintained that this was not the first time that the U.S. snnpfy went by the rulers
account and he feared that in South Vietnam this “old mistake” resulted m “one more government which,
on present form, no one will support.”
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military briefing appeared clearly “as a clue to the state o f things.”*30 Kennedy should use
caution in interpreting the military’s statistics from Vietnam.
Politically, South Vietnam was “certainly a can o f snakes” and the major cause
was President Diem. Galbraith maintained that the Vietnamese leader was far more
concerned with preventing a coup against him than protecting his people from the
Vietcong. The incompetence o f local administrators, in addition to the lack o f centralized
control over the ARVN and insufficient knowledge about the moves o f the opponent,
made the situation even worse.451
Like Bowles, Galbraith’s assessment was disregarded. Nevertheless, the
ambassador urged Kennedy to reconsider current U.S. policy toward South Vietnam:
We are increasingly replacing the French as the colonial military force and will
increasingly arouse the resentments associated therewith. Moreover, while I don’t
think the Russians are clever enough to fix it that way, we are surely playing their
game. They couldn’t be more pleased than to have us spend our billions in these
distantjungles where it does us no good and them no harm. Incidentally, who is the
man in your administration who decides what countries are strategic? . . . What
strength do we gain from alliance with an incompetent government and a people who
are so largely indifferent to their own salvation?. . . But it is the political poison that
is really at Issue. The Korean War killed us in the early 50’s; this involvement could
kill us now.452

Galbraith recommended that Kennedy resist demands to commit American
combat forces to Vietnam. Even a small deployment would lead to further engagement,

450Galbraith, Ambassador's Journal, pp. 260-262. Galbraith commented that the briefing was “geared to
the mentality o f an idiot, or, more likely, a backwoods congressman.” The briefing officer excused the
discrepancy m VC losses and ARVN forces by referring first to jungle conditions and then stated that
several ARVN divisions might not have been actually there.
451 IbicL. pp. 266-268; Galbraith expressed his confidence m Ambassador Frederick Noltmg and
complained that Noltmg had to learn about the recent Taylor-Maxwell mission through the radio and thus
had no impact on the actual report to the president. Galbraith hoped that Kennedy would clarify the entire
issue with the State Department.
452Ibid.. p. 311; Galbraith was aware that he was “sadly out o f step with the Establishment’ but hoped that
Kennedy was willing to listen to an outsider’s advice.
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while many South Vietnamese would eventually go “back to their farms,” leaving the
actual fighting to the Americans. Kennedy should also uphold civilian control in Saigon
and most importantly “keep the door wide open for any kind o f political settlement.” If
Hanoi was giving “any indication to settle, we should jump at the chance.”453 Galbraith
acknowledged that a negotiated solution for Vietnam might result in strong criticism by
American conservatives and their press, but the alternative o f a growing involvement was
far more disconcerting.454 According to Galbraith, the only feasible solution to Vietnam
was an international conference that enforced the Geneva Accords o f 1954. Otherwise the
United States would find itself in a “major, long drawn-out, indecisive military
involvement.” Washington supported a weak, ineffectual government in Vietnam and was
in danger o f replacing the French as “the colonial force and bleed as the French did”.455
Like Bowles, Galbraith was unable to convince the president toward seeking a
political solution in South Vietnam. In response to the Galbraith memorandum the Joint
Chiefs completely rejected the idea o f negotiations because the United States had already
made “a well-known commitment to take a forthright stand against Communism in
Southeast Asia.” A reversal of American policy would have “disastrous effects” not only
in Southeast Asia, but for American credibility around the globe. The voices o f dissent

451Galbraith, Ambassador's Journal, pp. 311-312; Galbraith was also worried about too much influence o f
the American military on decision over Vietnam. He referred to current differences o f opinion between
Ambassador Noltmg and General Paul Harkins over the best course for South Vietnam. Galbraith reminded
Kennedy o f the challenge General Douglas MacArthur posed to President Truman in the Korean War.
454Ibid.. p. 312; Galbraith also suggested that Kennedy look for a replacement for Diem.
455 Ibid.. pp. 342 344; Galbraith was also apprehensive that the present commitment to South Vietnam
might lead to “a major political outburst about the new Korea and the new war the Democrats as so often
before have precipitated us.” Galbraith also pointed out that the Strategic Hamlet Program was doing more
damage than good. He maintained that the Soviet Union actually had no intentions to become involved m
Southeast Asia but that the growing American military involvement was driving Hanoi into the a rm s o f
Beijing. American support of Diem also required reappraisal, Galbraith felt that the U S . would be better
offwith another civilian leader.
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were not completely without impact, h i 1962 Kennedy authorized Averell Harriman to
talk privately with the North Vietnamese foreign secretary during the Laos conference in
Geneva, but Harriman received no positive feedback. Since North Vietnam was not
interested in a negotiated settlement, Kennedy sided again with the majority view o f his
advisors to pursue the military campaign against Communism in Vietnam.456
Another voice o f caution was that of Senator Mike Mansfield. As a member of
both the House and subsequently the Senate, Mansfield established him self as an expert
on Asia. In 1953, Mansfield and Kennedy were invited to meet fellow Catholic and
promising leader Ngo Dinh Diem. Both Senators were impressed by the Vietnamese
politician. Like Kennedy, Mansfield endorsed Eisenhower’s Indochina policy.457 The
French defeat at Dien Bien Phu dismayed Mansfield and he partly blamed the
indecisiveness o f Eisenhower in providing additional support to the French as one o f the
reasons for their defeat.458
Mansfield drew a different conclusion from the French loss than most o f
Washington’s policy-makers. He believed that freedom in Southeast Asia could only be
preserved by the effort and determination of its peoples. The United States should not
perpetuate colonialism by any power but support indigenous governments that truly
represented their people. Any military alliance for Southeast Asia should be primarily

456Gibbons, C/.SL Government, pp. I20-I2I.
457Gregory Allen Olsen, Mansfield and Vietnam: A Studv in Rhetorical Adaptation. (East Lansing, Mich.,
1995), pp. 7-27. Mansfield made several trips to the region, increasing his understanding o f local
conditions.
4SSCongressionalRecord - Senate, July 8, 1954, pp. 9998-10000. Mansfield called for a “reappraisal" of
American foreign policy and charged that Eisenhower, both at Dien Bien Phu and the Conference table,
had committed serious blunders, leading to a diplomatic humiliation. However, the French too had made
serious mistakes, but American lack ofsupport left the French and Vietnamese resistance to the Viet Minft
“exposed, undercut, and ready for collapse.”
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composed o f Asian, not Western nations. Conflicts in Southeast Asia, Mansfield
m aintained, needed to be solved by the United Nations and not the United States.459

Mansfield’s assessment in 1954 defined the core o f the Senator’s view on
Southeast Asia for the next twenty years. He persistently abided by his own
recommendation o f 1954, the exception being his vote for the Tonkin G ulf Resolution ten
years later. In 1954, and later, Mansfield opposed American intervention in Southeast
Asia because it might lead to another major, even world wan
I was never in favor of intervention; and I am opposed to it now. I think it would be
suicidal. I think the worst think that could happen to the United States would be to have
our forces intervene in Indochina and then bog down in the jungles there, for in case we
think there would be no war in Indochina, but also war in Korea, and a third world war
would commence in Asia, and no doubt would involve the countries of Europe.460

Until I960, Mansfield strongly supported Diem, whom he regarded as saviour of
his country offering an Asian solution to the problems at hand. But the Senator
increasingly disagreed with the American strategy in South Vietnam and conveyed his
concerns to Kennedy in September 1961. Instead o f increasing military assistance or even
deploying U.S. combat troops, Mansfield suggested that Washington win the goodwill o f
the Vietnamese people. He argued that the difficulties in South Vietnam were a result o f
the severe lack o f morale o f its people, hence Washington needed to foster greater unity
and purpose in the fight against Communism.46lUnlike Bowles and Galbraith, the Senator

459Congressional Record—Senate, July 8,1954, pp. 10001-10002.
460 Ibid-p. 10007.
461Gibbons, U.S. Government, p. 85; Olsen, Mansfield and Vietnam, p. 97; Olsen criticized Gibbons for
accusing Mansfield o f applying “American values and practices in Vietnam”. Olsen defended Mansfield’s
recommendation by stating that Diem had successfully used Western campaign methods earlier. As
Frances FitzGerald’s insightful book on Vietnam, Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in
Vietnam,(New York, 1972), demonstrates Western ways may indeed backfire in a traditional Confuciaa
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was not yet ready to write South Vietnam off. However, the South Vietnamese had not
only to prove their determination to stand up to the Communists, but also needed to do
the actual fighting:
While Vietnam is very important, we cannot hope to substitute armed power for the kind
of political, economic, and social changes that offer the best resistance to Communism.
If die necessary reforms have not been forthcoming over the past seven years to stop
communist subversion and rebellion, then I do not see how Americans combat troops
can do it today. I wholeheartedly favor, if necessary and feasible, a substantial increase
of American military and economic aid to Vietnam, but leave the responsibility of
carrying the physical burden o f meeting communist infiltration, subversion, and attack
on the shoulders of the South Vietnamese, whose country it is and whose future is their
chief responsibility.462

Mansfield was the original proponent o f “Vietnamization.” This was not
America’s war to fight. In a commencement address at Michigan State in 1962 Mansfield
deplored that Washington’s move toward a broader, more dangerous commitment in
Vietnam. American ground troops might only lead to a prolonged and costly conflict.
Mansfield maintained that the United States should employ the services o f the United
Nations and also engage SEATO to find a diplomatic solution for Vietnam.463
With numerous reports o f progress in South Vietnam during 1962 reaching the
United States, it was politically unwise for Mansfield and other Democratic skeptics of
America’s Vietnam policy in Congress to mount any opposition to Kennedy’s course.
Nevertheless, they maintained doubts about the constitutionality o f a growing
involvement in Southeast Asia. Ultimately, Mansfield and his colleagues deferred any

society as Vietnam. While Mansfield displayed far greater empathy with Vietnam than many in
Washington, he too represented the cultural gap between both civilizations.
462Gibbons. KSL Government, pp. 84-85.
40 Olsen, M ansfieldand Vietnam, pp. 99-100.
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action because they accepted the executive’s prime authority in foreign policy.46*
Challenging the president on Vietnam would backfire politically and, given the crises
over Berlin and Cuba, the great majority o f Americans probably would not understand,
even less follow, the suggestions o f a handful o f senators.
ha late 1962, at Kennedy’s request, Mansfield visited Vietnam for the third time.
In country, his doubts about actual progress against the Viet Cong and on Diem’s
leadership ability were confirmed. On arrival he was briefed by Ambassador Frederick
Noltmg, who depicted the situation as improving and maintained that the United States
provided sufficient means to facilitate an ARVN victory against the Communists. But
Mansfield was looking for other opinions as well, and found them in American reporters
stationed in Saigon. The journalists gave Mansfield a far less optimistic briefing on the
realities in South Vietnam explaining that victory was more illusive than ever.
Upon his return to Washington, Mansfield filed two reports; one for the public
and a private one for the president. The public report criticized Diem’s leadership, but
reaffirmed the American commitment to the country.466The confidential assessment was
much more pessimistic. Mansfield disagreed with official estimates that the rural
Vietnamese could be won over within a year through a strategic hamlet program. It would

464Gibbons, U.S. Government, pp. 126-130; The deference to executive authority by Congress was evident
in the adoption o f the Cuba and Berlin resolutions m the fall of 1962, setting a precedent for the Tonkin
Gulf Resolution two years later. The 1962 resolutions authorized the president to do whatever he deemed
necessary, including the use o f force, to prevent the spread o f Communism. Other Vietnam skeptics
included Wayne Morse, AI Gore Sn, and William FuIIbright.
465Olsen, M ansfieldand Vietnam, pp. 106-107; Gibbons, CJ1S. Government, p. 131; Ambassador Noltmg
was dismayed by Mansfield’s contacts with Americanjournalists. Noltmg was currently fighting a cold war
with the U.S. press, which was depicting events in South Vietnam far too negatively according to the
ambassador’s assessment. See: Frederick Noltxng, From Trust to Tragedy: The PoIMcal Memoirs o f
Frederick Nolting. Kennedy’s Ambassador to Diem’s Vietnam. (New York, 1988), pp. 85-89; David
Halberstam. The Best and the Brightest. (New York. 1992), Twentieth Anniversary Edition, pp. 207-208.
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take additional American aid, responsive Vietnamese leadership, and years o f patient
work to stifle Viet Cong support in the country-side. While Diem still possessed
leadership potential, his abilities were increasingly undermined by the influence o f his
power-hungry brother, Ngo Diem Nhu. Despite these difficulties, the senator saw a good
chance for success with Kennedy’s Vietnam program, provided the situation in Vietnam
did not change dramatically.
Mansfield adamantly opposed a larger American military commitment and argued
that the United States should continue its support but not go beyond the position of
helping the Vietnamese to help themselves:
To ignore that reality w ill not only be immensely costly in term s o f American lives
and resources but also might draw us inexorably into some variation o f the unenviable
position in Vietnam which was form erly occupied by the French. We are not, o f course,
a t that point a t this tim e. But the great increase in American commitment this year
has tended to pint us in that general direction and we may w ell begin to slide rapidly
tow ard it if any o f the present rem edies begin to falter in practice.4*6

Kennedy discussed the report with Mansfield, and while displeased with the senator’s
assessment, the president in fact shared the senator’s concerns. Yet, a diplomatic solution
as recommended by Mansfield was not an option. Neutralization o f Vietnam would only
facilitate a Communist take-over. Moreover, another fact-finding mission by Roger
Hilsman and Mike Forrestal convinced Kennedy that his policy was effective.
In August o f 1963 Mansfield tried one more time to warn the president against
further escalation in Vietnam. The senator was wary o f the dangers o f U.S. involvement
and believed that Kennedy was coming closer to a point o f no return which m ight result
in a conflict o f at least Korean proportions. Like Bowles and Galbraith, Mansfield argued

466Gibbons, U.SL Government; p. 133.
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that Washington needed to re-evaluate its vital security and global interests. He argued
that the importance o f Vietnam had been overemphasized in the past, placing it at the
core o f American foreign policymaking, while, in fact, it was only o f peripheral
significance to the United States.4*7 Therefore, any unilateral engagement in South
Vietnam was self-defeating and might only do more damage than good. Again, the
senator’s concerns were not fully heeded by the president4**
Mansfield was shocked by Diem’s assassination and even more so when Kennedy
suffered the same fate three weeks later. The death o f Diem and the growing American
involvement in the quagmire o f Vietnam reinforced Mansfield’s conviction that the
United States was pursuing a policy that was not only futile and costly, but damaging to
the country’s essential interests. He remained a voice o f reason and caution during the
following decade.
Undersecretary o f State, George Ball, was not an expert on Southeast Asia as he
had focused for most o f his life on foreign policy in Europe, particularly France. In
Europe, he became a close friend o f Jean Monnet, the inspirational force behind European
integration, and learned to appreciate the French point o f view on international politics
which influenced Ball’s thinking on Vietnam.4*9 Ball was initially uncertain about
Kennedy’s views on foreign policy. He soon appreciated the president’s intelligence and
pragmatism but noted that Kennedy often lacked a long term vision o f a particular

467Olsen, Mcmspeld and Vietnam, p. 115. Mansfield also criticized the narrow outlook: o f many American
officials in Vietnam who lacked greater perspective.
461Ibid. pp. 115-117; a unilateral engagement would over-extent American forces and hurt American
prestige in other nations m Asia.
465David L. DiLeo, George Ball. Vietnam, and the Rethinking o f Containment- (Chapel Hill, 1991), pp. 2627; George BalL The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs. (New York, 1983), pp. 99-102.
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policy.470ln the fall o f 1961 Ball replaced Chester Bowles as Under Secretary o f State and
hence had to expand his field o f expertise. Vietnam was one o f the problems placed on
Ball’s desk.471As a result o f both the Korean W ar and the French debacle in Indochina
Ball concluded that the United States should “rigorously avoid land wars in Asia.” He
advised Kennedy along these lines on Laos and urged the president not to overcommit
American forces in needless conflicts in Asia.472
In South Vietnam, according to Ball, the situation was both serious and hopeless.
Ball was rather bewildered by his colleagues’ views on Vietnam because they lacked any
profound historical knowledge about that country. Their estimates echoed what he had
heard in France ten years earlier, a better coordinated effort, additional money, and more
troops, would eventually pay off.473 Ball was dismayed by the findings o f the 1961
Taylor-Rostow mission and completely disagreed with their recommendations. He
expressed his concerns to Secretary o f Defense Robert McNamara pointing out that
committing combat forces would lead to a “protracted conflict more serious than Korea”
for the United States. The French had learned the hard way about the toughness o f the
Viet Cong, and unlike Korea, the task in Vietnam was not one o f simply repelling an
invasion but defusing a revolutionary situation in which any Western involvement might
be equated to some form o f colonialism. McNamara did not share Ball’s point o f view
and endorsed the Taylor-Rostow report.

470Ball, OralHistory Interview, April 12,1965, John F. Kennedy Library, pp. 22-23.
471 Bah, The Past HasAnother Pattern, pp. 171-173,182-183.
471IbicL. pp. 361-363.
m Ibid- pp. 363-366.
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A few days later, McNamara changed his mind about troop deployments and
partly concurred with Ball’s position. To send U.S. forces without a greater Vietnamese
effort was unwise, as American soldiers obviously “could not accomplish their mission in
the midst o f an apathetic or hostile population.”474 Ball conveyed his misgivings about the
American Vietnam strategy to Kennedy indicating that any deployment of U.S. combat
troops would be a “tragic error.” Once troops were committed, the process could not be
reversed and might lead to a futile and costly wan
Within five years we’ll have three hundred thousand men in the paddies andJungles and
never find them again. That was the French experience. Vietnam is the worst possible
terrain both from a physical and political point of view.475
Kennedy did not appreciate Ball’s argument, calling it “crazy.” The predicted escalation
was simply not “going to happen.” Perhaps the president was impressed by Ball’s
argument after all, since he decided against combat deployments a few days later.476
The rebuke by Kennedy signaled to Ball that his advice was neither heeded nor
desired, and he focused on policy matters where he could make his “influence effectively
felt” He probably remembered the fate o f his predecessor, Chester Bowles. While
harboring doubts in private, Ball remained loyal to the president in public. In an April
1962 speech Ball completely endorsed America’s course in Vietnam, calling a potential
loss of South Vietnam an event o f“tragic significance” for the W est in Asia. He furthered

***Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern, p. 366; McNamara, In Retrospect, pp. 38-39; while McNamara did
not mention Ball, he confessed that he, as other advisors, knew little about Vietnam and lacked experience
to deal with crisis. As his own probings into the complexity ofVietnam showed, the United States were
already facing a dilemma o f a no-win situation in 1961. Though McNamara rejected combat forces for the
tune being, he did not rule out greater American intervention m the future.
m Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern, p. 366.
'r7s Gibbons, The American Government, pp. 88-92; Gibbons quotes William Bundy who stated that BalTs
argument had some impact on the president; Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern, pp. 366-368; Ball was
uncertain how to interpret Kennedy's response; either the president simply could not imagine a worst case
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that failure to assist South. Vietnam would have severe repercussions around the world
and sa v e only to further encourage Communist aggression:
How we act in Viet-Nam will have its impact on Communist actions in Europe, in Africa
and in Latin America. Far from easing tensions, our unwillingness to meet our
commitments in one tension area will simply encourage the Communists to bestir one in
another.
The struggle in Vietnam could not be solved overnight and it would take years o f effort
but it was a “task that we must stay until it is concluded.”477 When some o f the press
interpreted the speech as an irrevocable commitment to Vietnam, the White House was
enraged. Ball had gone from one extreme to the other.47*
Ball also played an important role in sanctioning the coup against Diem by
endorsing two telegrams by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge recommending the
replacement o f Diem. Ball was certainly not the final authority to give a green light to the
overthrow o f Diem but he as his superiors did share responsibility in American
acquiescence to in the coup against the South. Vietnamese leader.479 The Vietnamese
generals finally acted on November 1, 1963. Ball denied any responsibility for the
military putsch and maintained that the August telegram had not triggered the overthrow
o f Diem. He regarded the events of early November as being an entirely Vietnamese
operation.480 The facts proved otherwise. Nevertheless, BalTs account serves as an

scenario requiring combat troops or he actually shared some'ofBall’s concerns and was determined to
prevent further escalation.
477Gibbons, The American Government, p. 122.
■"* Ibid.. p. 123. The April 1962 speech m Detroit is to no surprise not mentioned m Ball’s memoirs and
serves as additional proofto the personal dilemma o f many government officials who doubted privately the
policy m Vietnam but out o f a number o f reasons were unable to stand up to them beliefs in public.
479Ball, The Past HasAnother Pattern, pp.371-374; Ball after clearance with his superior gave a green
light to Lodge to end American support to Diem unless the Vietnamese leader adopted a more Liberal
policy. A second request by Lodge to convey U.S. misgivings about Diem to Vietnamese generals opposed
to them head o f state was also authorized by BalL
w Ibid. p. 374.
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important example o f the way he and other officials tried to reconcile their profound
concerns about developments in Vietnam during a time when “’dominoes” and
“containment” dominated American thinking. Ball was much more outspoken against the
American policy in Vietnam during the Johnson administration and more willing to
confront that president than others. But, then too, he found it difficult to balance his
personal convictions on Vietnam with his loyalty to the president Ball’s ambition to play
an important role in American foreign politics further complicated his convictions.
The voices of dissent reinforced and reflected the concerns Kennedy heard from
Paris and London. While the Europeans advice might be discarded because o f their
colonial past or parochial views, the unwillingness o f Kennedy to consider the opinions
o f skeptics within his own administration indicates that the president was troubled about
any domestic fall out from Vietnam and trusted his immediate counsel that the American
strategy in Vietnam would succeed.

Continuous Commitment to Vietnam
The coup against Diem was turning point in American policymaking on Vietnam.
The U.S. decision to sanction the coup manifested the failure o f previous efforts at
improving the situation in Saigon. The Buddhist crisis o f summer 1963 revealed the
bankruptcy o f the Diem regime and brought South Vietnam into the lime-light o f both the
American and European media. Diem remained unyielding to demands o f religious
freedom and claimed that Buddhist protest was sparked by the Viet Cong. In June, the
self-immolation o f a Buddhist monk in Saigon, and the subsequent suppression o f
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Buddhist rallies by Diem, aroused world opinion and unified opposition to Diem in South
Vietnam.481
Kennedy warned Diem that the treatment o f the Buddhists was unacceptable and,
unless the situation improved, the United States would dissociate itself from Diem.
Kennedy authorized American personnel in Saigon to talk to dissident South Vietnamese
military leaders. Between late August and September 1963, American pressure mounted
on Diem to dispose o f his brother and adopt a program o f political reform.4GThough the
administration had second thoughts about a possible coup, the president and most o f his
counsel remained determined not to pull out o f Vietnam since a withdrawal ultimately
would result in a Communist take-over in Southeast Asia. Kennedy publicly confirmed
his belief in the “domino theory” during a NBC television interview in September:
I think the struggle is close enough. China is so large, looms so high just beyond
the frontier, that if South Vietnam went, it would not only give them an
improved geographic position fora guerrilla assault on Malaya, but would give
the impression that the wave of the future in Southeast Asia was China and
the Communists.483

A week earlier, the president explained in a CBS interview that the Vietnamese were the
“ones who have to win it or lose i t ” Yet, he immediately contradicted this statement by

m Herring, Longest War, pp. 95-97; see for example: Newsweek, June 24,1963, Fiery Protest: the
magazine printed photos o f the self-immolations and reported that if Diem “wants to remain m power and
unify his people against the tortuous struggle against the Communist Viet Cong, he needs the cooperation
of the Buddhists”, p. 63. Time followed the events closely as well and made the protest its cover story hi
August and strongly attacked Mine Nhu, the queen bee, because she recommended the complete crack
down on the Buddhists. Her ridicule of the immolations as “Vietnamese barbecues” appalled Western
observers.
4X1Gibbons, US. Government, pp. 144-159; Herring, Longest War, pp. 97-99; Giglio, John F. Kennedy, pp.
248-250; Berman, Planning a Tragedy, pp. 24-27. In August 1963, undersecretary Roger Hifcman sent a
telegram to new U S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge alluding that ifDiem remained “obdurate” the U.S.
would consider his replacement. HQsman suggested that Lodge inform South Vietnamese military leaders
o f the American point o f view and asked the ambassador to search for political alternatives to Diem.
413Gibbons, U.S. Government, p. 163.
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pointing out that it would be a “great mistake” for the United States to withdraw, and
hinted that a change in “policy, and perhaps with personnel” might increase the chances
o f success in South Vietnam, signaling to Diem that time was running out.4**
A fact fin ding mission by Taylor and McNamara indicated that further military
progress had been made against the Viet Cong, but regarded Diem as the major obstacle
in political reform.485While Kennedy opposed a coup for the tune being, events in Saigon
progressed precisely toward that end. The American ultimatum on Diem was interpreted
as a sign o f support for Vietnamese military leaders to go ahead with their plans to oust
Diem. Neither Washington, the embassy, nor the CIA team in Saigon made any moves to
thwart such action.486 On November I, 1963, Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother Nhu were
overthrown in a military coup and killed the next day. Kennedy was dismayed and deeply
shocked when he heard about Diem’s murder although he was fully aware o f a planned
coup.487 “To bear any burden, pay any price” had come to a tragic first conclusion in
South Vietnam. Only three weeks later Kennedy too paid the ultimate price.
Why did John F. Kennedy disregard the advice o f both foreign leaders and
members o f his administration, as well as his own assessment o f the challenges in
Vietnam o f almost a decade earlier? First o f all, there is Kennedy’s view that by backing

***Giglio, Kennedy, p.25I.
4.5 Robert McNamara, In Retrospect, pp. 75-SI; Taylor and McNamara recommended withotdmg
American aid from Diem unless he complied with U S. demands.
4.6 Gibbons, U.R. Government, pp. 188-191,197; Washington cabled to Lodge that it would not actively
endorse a coup but the ambassador should convey to potential new leaders that the U.S. would not interfere
and clearly continue its economic and financial assistance to a new government m Saigon. In October, JFK
learned that a coup was imminent, but he was more concerned about political repercussion for the U.S. in
case o f failure.
4X7McNamara, In Retrospect, pp. 85-85; Giglio, Kennedy, pp.252-253; Gibbons, CLSLGovernment, pp.
200-202; for a detailed account on the coup against Diem see also: Stanley Kamow, Vietnam: A History.
The First Complete Account ofVIetnam at War. (New York. 1983), pp. 304-311.
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Diem he was helping a government that offered a real alternative to Communism and,
with American assistance, would succeed in the process o f nation-building.43* Robert
Kennedy later admitted that this faith in both Diem and the American ability to build a
viable government in South Vietnam was misguided. The younger Kennedy
acknowledged his initial support o f the policy in Vietnam during his brothers presidency.
But shortly before his own death in 1968, he wrote that it was perhaps “never reaEy
possible to bring all the people o f South Vietnam under the rule o f the successive
governments we supported.”*89
Second, Kennedy’s own campaign proposal to stand firm against Communism
might have trapped him in the growing Vietnam quagmire. He had accused the
Eisenhower administration of not doing enough to contain Communism. Kennedy
pointed to the Toss o f China’ as American failure to prevent Communist victory leading
to even more dangers in the global struggle to secure freedom. As president, Kennedy
was unwilling to risk similar domestic criticism and refused to disengage from South
Vietnam. In addition, the neutralization o f Laos made it necessary in the eyes o f the
administration to hold firm in South Vietnam to prevent further Communist successes in
Southeast Asia. Although Kennedy was determined to hold South Vietnam, he
persistently rejected a major commitment o f U.S. ground troops.490
Finally, Kennedy’s Vietnam policy was affected by an inability to completely and
realistically assess the situation in Saigon. As Robert McNamara pointed out, the

■***Bassett and Pelz; Failed Searchfo r Victory, p. 250; see also: Schlesmger, A Thousand Days, p. 982.
■*” Robert F. Kennedy, To Seek a Newer World. (New York, 1967), pp. 162-163.
450seer Bassett and Pelz, Faded Searchfor Victory, pp.250-252; Gfglio, Presidency o f John F. Kennedy,
pp. 253-254; Dean Rusk, A s I Saw ft, p. 430; Sorenson, Kennedy, pp. 648-649-
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administration was seldomly satisfied with, information, received from Vietnam which led
to frequent fact-finding mission and consultations w ith senior officials in Saigon. Even
these missions resulted in an overly optimistic assessment on the progress made in South
*

Vietnam. Part o f the blame rested with the South Vietnamese who gave inaccurate
information to the Americans, hoping that their reports depicted what the U.S.
government wished to hear. On the American side, military commanders and many
politicians alike misunderstood the nature of the conflict by viewing it solely in terms o f
the Cold War, the containment o f Communism, and the resulting global commitments o f
the United States.491
The luxury o f hindsight and the views o f those critical to the American
engagement in Vietnam during 1961 to 1963 offered alternative approaches, particularly
negotiation with the Viet Cong, or even Hanoi. But throughout his presidency Kennedy
rejected both negotiations and a reduced commitment because he believed that American
assistance could actually tip the balance in favor o f the W est Political pressure at home
made it nearly impossible to abandon South Vietnam.492
Public opinion polls and the media generally supported the president’s view.
Soviet gains in space technology, the alleged missile gap, and Communist activities in the
Third World created a sentiment affirming the global American commitment to resist
Communist aggression. Up to the second half o f the I960’s, most Americans favored an
interventionist role by the United States although the great majority was rather

491 McNamara. In Retrospect, pp. 43-48.
491Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men: See Friends and the World Thev Made. (New York,
1986), p. 640; Kennedy told an advisor in the fall o f1963 that if he tried to “pull out completely now from
Vietnam, we would have another Joe McCarthy Redscare on our hands." see also Herring, Longest War,
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uninformed about the war in Vietnam.495 With few exceptions, the media also regarded
V ietnam in the context o f the larger Cold War struggle against Communism. Most

journalists condoned the coup against Diem and focused on the general relief expressed
by most Vietnamese over the “fell o f the House o f Ngo.”494 Journalists revealed that
pressure from W ashington, despite official disclaimer o f any responsibility, “had
effectively encouraged the overthrow of the Diem regime.” The overall tenor of the press
reaction to the coup was not shock about the death o f Diem, but rather whether
Communism could be defeated in Vietnam:
In the last analysis, though, the success or failure of U.S. policy toward South Viet Nam
will have to be judged on pragmatic grounds. The aim of that policy is to speed a
successful end to the war against the Communists. To achieve that, the U.S. is now
clearly committed to back General Minh with even more money, and if necessary even
more American lives. If it works, if Minh does manage better than Diem, if the U.S. is
thereby enabled to pull out of Vietnam sooner, then the policy will be a triumph. But
these are a lot o f ifs. And if they turn sour, the outcome could affect the cold war balance
and U.S. political life for a long while to come.495

Senator Mansfield and a number o f journalists believed that Kennedy was
preparing to change course in Vietnam, or was at least doubtful about current strategy,
and that he might have accepted a negotiated settlement after the 1964 presidential
elections.496 Information coming from Saigon and the critical assessments of De Gaulle,
Macmillan, and various American advisors might have caused considerable doubt about

pp. 106-107; Herring m aintains that Kennedy accepted the “assumption that a non-Communist Vietnam
was vital to American global interest.”
4*J Benjamin L Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public: Fifty Years o f Trends in Americans*
Foreign Policy Preferences. (Chicago, 1992), pp. 226-227; John E. Mueller, “Trends m Popular Support
for the Wars m Korea and Vietnam,”-tn: Allen R. Wilcox (ed.) Public Opinion and Political Attitudes (New
York, 1974), pp. 26-28.
^Newsweek, November I I , 1963,pp. 27-31.
491TimSyNovember 8,1963, pp. 21-22.
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the American commitment to South Vietnam. Kennedy, however, made no effort to
modify American policy. He never seriously considered a withdrawal from South
Vietnam, but continued to pursue the avowed objective o f training the South Vietnamese
to defend themselves against Communist aggression. Dean Rusk summarized Kennedy’s
position:
We took for granted that the United States had a treaty commitment to South Vietnam
and that South Vietnam’s security was important to the security of the United States. We
also took for granted that if we failed “ to take steps to meet the common danger,” our
network of collective security treaties throughout the world might erode through a
judgment made by the Communists that these treaties were a bluff. At no time did we
say to ourselves, “We will put in X number of men but no more. If the other side
continues to escalate, then we’ll just pull out.” At no time did we think that the
American people would not
support an effort to prevent Southeast Asia from going
Communist.497

II. Lvndon B. Johnson

Vietnam undoubtedly was a troubling issue for Kennedy, but the conflict was far
from consuming all o f Kennedy’s attention. The struggle in Southeast Asia, while
unexpected and clearly unwanted, would become the overriding concern for Lyndon
Johnson. He was less interested than Kennedy in the intricacies o f foreign policymaking.

496Bassett and Pelz, Failed Searchfo r Victory, p. 251; Giglio, Presidency o f John F. Kennedy, pp. 244249; Schlesinger, A ThousandDays, pp. 984-986; Olsen, M ansfieldand Vietnam, p. 117; Halberstam, Best
and Brightest, pp. 209,299-301.
497Rusk, As I Saw It, p. 434,442. Rusk maintains that JFK had no intentions to end the commitment to
South. Vietnam and that Kennedy was determined to stand up to Communism m that country.
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Johnson’s (beam was the “Great Society” that guaranteed civil rights, social security,
welfare, health care, and education to ail Americans.498
Johnson’s experience in foreign policy was rather limited but, like Kennedy, he
firmly believed that American could not give in to Communist aggression. He argued that
the United States had to remain vigilant and faithful to its commitments. Otherwise, the
free world might experience another “Munich” by caving in to dictators. Johnson
maintained that Third World countries, aided by American tutelage and assistance, could
learn to appreciate the benefits o f Western democracy and become partners in the conflict
against Communist totaIitarianism.499To Johnson’s dismay, the South Vietnamese proved
unwilling to fully accept Western democracy and way o f life because they had their own
long tradition and history which they cherished over the American imposed model.
More important for Washington was domestic pressure not to surrender another
country to Communist rule. Kennedy feared that a withdrawal from Vietnam would lead
to “another Joe McCarthy Redscare” but Johnson’s dilemma was even more profound.
He deeply wanted to achieve domestic reform but could not afford losing South Vietnam:
I knew from the start that I was bound to be crucified either way I moved. If I left the
woman I really loved - the Great Society - in order to get involved with that bitch of war
on the other side of the world, then I would lose everything at home. All my programs.
All my hopes to feed the hungry and shelter the homeless. All my dreams to provide
education and medical care to the browns and blacks and the lame and the poor. But if I
left that war and let the Communist take over South Vietnam then I would be seen as a

4S* For Lyndon Johnson’s background see: Doris Kearns, Lvndon Johnson and the American Dream. (New
York, 1976); Johnson authorized Keams, a former White House mtem, to write his biography and granted
numerous, often very personal interviews. Kearns’ hook is a both a historical and psychoanalytical
explanation o f Johnson’s life and while the analysis o f Johnson’s motivations is insightful and revealing
her approach seems also too biased and simplistic hi other instances. As a good comparison between JFK
and LBJ see also: Tom Wicker, JFK and LBJ: The Influence o f Personality noon Politics. (New York,
196S); fbrthe Johnson presidency, LBJ’s own account is a valuable source: Lyndon Barnes Johnson, The
Vantage Point: Perspectives on the Presidency. 1963-1969. (New York, 1971).
499Wicker, JFK and LBJt pp. 195-197.
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cow ard and m y nation seen as an appeaser, and we would both find it im possible to
accom plish anything for anybody around the globe.500

Johnson quickly despised the conflict in Vietnam, but trapped himself with his
commitment to pursue his slain predecessor’s policies. Instead o f securing domestic
harmony, his decision to escalate the war in Vietnam divided the country to a degree not
experienced since the Civil War. One of the casualties was Johnson’s own career. In
March 1968, he announced that he would not run for reelection and declared a bombing
halt on North Vietnam. 50lBy then, Kennedy’s limited commitment o f more than 16,000
advisors to South Vietnam had grown into a large scale war with more than half a million
U.S. troops deployed and thousands killed or injured. Despite the massive fire-power o f
the United States, no end o f the fighting was in sight.
The Background: LBJ
Bom to the hill-country o f southwestern Texas, in 1908, as the oldest o f five
children, Johnson came from a very different background than the affluent and nine-years
younger Kennedy. O f lower middle class background, Johnson was encouraged by his
mother to attend Southwest Texas State Teachers College. There he quickly enjoyed
college politics. In 1928, he headed for nine months a predominantly Mexican-American
elementary school in Cotulla, Texas, and finished college in 1930. For a short time he
taught highschool in Houston, but jumped at the first chance to enter politics, hi 1931, he
left for Washington as a congressional aide for Representative Richard Kleberg and ably
used this position to study the intricacies o f Congress. Four years later he became Texas’
director o f the National Youth Administration in 1935. In 1937, Johnson was elected to

500quoted m: Kamow, Vietnam, p. 320.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

233
the House o f Representatives and, after an unsuccessful first attempt in 1941, he was
fin ally elected to the Senate in 1949.502Following Pearl Harbor, Johnson served for a year

in the Navy, earning a Silver Star, before being called back to Washington by Franklin
Roosevelt.
As Senator, Johnson rapidly rose through, the ranks. He was elected party whip in
1951, minority leader in 1953 and majority leader in 1955. In the Senate, Johnson proved
his talent as a consummate politician, earning him national recognition as one o f the most
effective and powerful leaders in the Senate’s history. Johnson was instrumental in
bringing down Senator Joseph McCarthy and he was also the driving force behind the
passage o f the civil rights bills o f 1957 and I960. He generally supported the Eisenhower
administration in foreign policy issues, but opposed American air-strikes to help the
French at Dienbienphu in 1954. Overall, Johnson prodded his Democratic senators to
pursue a responsible and constructive course during the Eisenhower years503.
Johnson’s status and achievements made him a potential candidate for the
presidency in I960.504 But Johnson started late in the presidential race and eventually
settled for number two - becoming vice-president, with the election o f John F. Kennedy.
Johnson hoped that he could play a substantial role as vice-president, yet was never fully
part o f the Kennedy inner circle.505 Johnson attended both Cabinet and National Security

501Johnson, Vantage Point, p. 435.
501Kearns, Lyndon Johnson* pp. 48-93.
501Wicker, JFK and LBJ, p. 154-155 and Kearns, Lyndon Johnson* p. 144.
“ * Keams, Lyndon Johnson, pp. 102-158; Blum, Years o f Discord* p.I40.
505Tom. Wicker* JFK and LBJ, p. 153; Robert Dallek. Flawed Gfantr Lvnrfnn Johnson and His Tunes.
I96I-I973. (New York, 1998), p. 12; George Ball recounted Johnson deplored his lack o f influence as
vice-president. See: Oral History Interview with George Ball, July 8,1971, for the Lyndon Johnson
Library, Part I* p. 2.
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Council meetings and represented his country abroad. Hence, he was well informed about
foreign policy issues, such as Vietnam, which he had visited in 196L506

E arly Decisions: November 1963-March 1964
The first business o f the Johnson administration dealing with the aftermath o f
Dallas, was to assure a smooth transition and bring Kennedy's domestic program to
fruition. Johnson kept the entire Kennedy cabinet and many o f Kennedy's advisors,
assuring the country that he would continue his predecessor's course. In foreign policy
issues, he relied heavily on the advice o f Kennedy's men.307 Vietnam, like most foreign
policy issues dropped in the background for the time being - o f foremost importance was
Kennedy’s domestic agenda, which was approved in the following months by Congress.
Soon Vietnam required Johnson’s attention. At the end o f 1963, North Vietnam
intensified its infiltration into the South, also deploying regular military units. The
National Liberation Front (NFL) stepped up its political and military operations and
received better arms and equipment from the North.508Johnson was unwilling to let South
Vietnam fall to the Communist North. He felt obligated to continue Kennedy’s policy and
stand firm against Communist aggression because it was America's duty as leader o f the
free world. But he was also concerned about his image at home.509

506Oral History Interview with Dean Rusk. September2 6 ,I969,LBJL,p. 1; LBJ had an officer of the State
Department serving on his staff, who provided hfm with duly report from Saigon.
507Ball, Oral History, July 8 ,197I,LBJL,p.I0.
308Frank E. Vandiver, Shadows o f Vietnam: Lvndon Johnson’s Wars. (College Station, Texas, 1997), pp.
15-16.
509Herring Longest War, pp. I08-110; Kearns, Lyndon Johnson, pp.251-253 and McNamara, In
Retrospect, p. 102; Johnson, Vantage Point, p. 42; LBJ vowed to devote every hour to achieving
Kennedy's goats. For Vietnam that meant “seeing thing through.”
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Within days o f assuming office, Johnson had to make his first decision on
Vietnam. On November 24, 1963, Johnson met with Secretaries o f State and Defense,
Rusk and McNamara, as well as Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, to discuss the situation
in Vietnam and received mixed answers. The president made it abundantly clear that he
was determined to win in South Vietnam and would not allow that country to become
another China. He demanded that his generals and officials get the job done, and give him
breathing space for his domestic program.*10 While he expected positive results, Johnson
had no intentions to go beyond the current American role in Vietnam.
The discussion resulted with the approval o f Johnson’s first National Security
Action Memoranda on Vietnam (NSAM 273) on November 26, 1963. It stated that the
central objective o f the United States in South Vietnam was “to assist the people and
Government o f that country to win their contest against the externally directed and
supported Communist conspiracy”.5" Johnson was aware that Diem’s assassination had
not solved the domestic problems in South Vietnam and that the new government lacked
in competency. Despite these odds, McNamara and the president hoped to turn the tide,
ending the American commitment by 1965.512 NSAM 273 also proposed covert
operations, already suggested in May 1963, in which South Vietnam was to perform “hitand-run” attacks against North Vietnam, with secret American military assistance (Oplan
34-A).5B The Memorandum was clearly not a change o f previous American policy. It

510Dallek, Flawed Giant, pp. 99-100.
511Johnson, Vantage Point, p. 43; McNamara, In Retrospect, pp. 102-103.
sc Johnson, Vantaze Point. pp. 45-46: The Senator Gravel Edition. The Pentagon Papers: The Defense
Department History o f United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam. VoL m , (Boston,), p. 18; American
officials were expected to achieve better communication with them Sooth. Vietnamese counterparts
allowing for a more effective approach against the Communist insurgents.
sa Gibbons, HSL Government^ p. 210, 212.
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promised continuous support for the new South Vietnamese government, led by General
Minh, but at the same tune, reaffirmed that the war could only be won by the South
Vietnamese themselves, assuming that there was no major change hi the political
situation in Saigon.514
But McNamara’s visit to Vietnam in December 1963 was dismaying. Unless
prevalent trends were reversed, South Vietnam might quickly become neutralized or,
even worse, taken over by the Communists.515 McNamara recommended a greater role o f
U.S. advisors in Saigon’s decision making.516The bad news from Vietnam worried some
members o f Congress, critical o f further American involvement in Vietnam. Senator
Richard Russell (D.- GA), Chairman o f the Armed Services Committee, and long-time
friend and m entor o f Johnson, suggested that the president reach an understanding with
Saigon allowing for a quick American withdrawal from the country, without losing face
in world opinion.517
More direct was Senate Majority leader Mike Mansfield, who urged the president
in January o f 1964 to re-examine the U.S. policy in Vietnam. Mansfield felt that the
United States was close to the “point o f no return” in Southeast Asia heading toward
escalation. In Vietnam America again displayed a tendency already evident during the
Korean War “to bite off more than we were prepared to chew.”51* The administration had
to assess whether it was truly in the interest o f the United States to continue its

The Pentagon Papers, VoL ID, pp. 19-20.
sts McNamara, In Retrospect, pp. 104-105.
SISThe Pentagon Papers, VoL m , pp. 31-32; McNamara, In Retrospect, pp.I05-I06; the Mmh government
was according to McNamara, the mam culprit since it did nothing facilitate Saigon victory. ARVN strategic
operations and deployments proved unsuccessful.
517Dallek, Flawed Giant, p. 102.
S1SLetter by Mike Mansfield to the President, January 6,1964, LBJL.
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involvement and pay for it “with blood and treasure,” only to discover later that the initial
commitment was short-sighted. The solution o f the conflict was ultimately a Vietnamese
responsibility and Johnson should work for a peaceful settlement.119
When Johnson asked his leading cabinet members for advice, they strongly
recommended against a political settlement or neutralization, since it would only be the
first step for an ultimate Communist victory and emphasized that the United States had
extended security interests in the region.520 Mansfield, however, lobbied for neutralization
in the Senate. He asserted that American national interest did not require that the United
States take on prime responsibility for Vietnam sacrificing “a vast number of American
lives”. Americans were in Vietnam solely to help “improve the Vietnamese
military "^ T h e conflict in Vietnam was essentially a matter among Vietnamese and
could only be solved by them, and it should never become an American wan
Indeed, we might ask ourselves: Do we ourselves, in terms o f our national interest
as seen in the juxtaposition to the cost o f A m erican lives and resources. . . prefer
another Vietnamese type o f involvement o r a Korean type o f involvem ent in these
and other countries and elsewhere in southeast Asia? . . . Are w e to regard
lightly the American causalities which would certainly be involved?522

Even more critical o f the administration’s Vietnam policy was Senator Wayne
Morse (D - Oregon), who urged Johnson to immediately withdraw from Southeast Asia.
The American role in Vietnam since the 1950’s had not been justified and would not
stand the test o f history.523Morse also found support in Senators Allen J. Ellender (D.-La)

5,9 Mansfield letter to Johnson, January 6,1964, LBJL.
535McNamara, In Retrospect, p. 107; Gibbons, The ITS. Government and the Vietnam War, pp. 216-217.
521Congressional Record - Semite, February 19,1964, p. 3114.
522IHd.. February 19,1964, p. 3115; Mansfield, like de Gaulle could not completely guarantee that
neutralization might work but it was still the far better alternative; see: IbitL. pp. 3277-78.
53 Ibid. March 4. 1964, pp.4359,4831.
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and Ernest Gruening (D.- Alaska). The administration was shocked, as well as angered,
by the senators’ comments. It felt betrayed by the Democratic majority leader and was
concerned by the possible reaction to Mansfield’s comments in Saigon. A public debate
over Vietnam could give the impression that the United States was wary o f the conflict
leading to the collapse o f the Saigon government.524
But Johnson also was not willing to make Vietnam an American War. McNamara
testified to the House Armed Services Committee that continuous U.S. training and
supplies would be efficient to allow the ARVN to succeed against the Communist
insurgents. He added:
I don’t believe that w e as a nation should assum e the prim ary responsibility
for the war in South V ietnam . It is a counter-guerrilla war, it is a w ar that can be
only won by the V ietnam ese themselves. O ur responsibility is not to substitute
ourselves for the Vietnamese, but to tram them to carry on the operations
that they themselves are capable
o f .525

Increased turmoil and violence in South Vietnam quickly proved that American support
was insufficient to turn the tide against the insurgents. Johnson reached another cross in
the road and once more intensified his country’s commitment to South Vietnam.526

NSAM 288: Prevent the fall o f South Vietnam at all cost
As a result o f the deteriorating conditions in South Vietnam the Joint Chiefs
proposed a change in policy, requiring considerable expansion in the American effort.

Olsen, Mansfield and Vietnam, pp. 130-131.
525Pentagon Papers, VoL HI, p. 36.
526Vandiver, Shadows o f Vietnam, p. 17; Pentagon Papers, Vol, E , pp. 38-44; Herring, Longest War, pp.
I LI-113. Gen. Mmh was overthrown by Gen. Khanh ut January 1964. The next month the VC initiated a
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The new policy, as adopted in NSAM 288, not only called for an larger commitment, but
redefined the American objectives in Vietnam. A Communist victory in South Vietnam
had to be prevented at all cost, otherwise, the rest o f Southeast Asia and even the Pacific
ran might fall under Communist dominance.527 South Vietnamese military forces must be
further augmented and the United States needed greater control over the Saigon
leadership. The Joint Chiefs o f Staff also favored direct action against North Vietnam.
Johnson opposed escalation targeting North Vietnam since it might lead to increased
guerrilla activity against the South, which the Khanh government was too weak to repel.
Even worse, American escalation might result in direct Chinese or Soviet intervention.
But the president approved o f the extension o f covert operations to block North
Vietnamese infiltration and conducting retaliatory raids against the North (Operation Plan
34A).528
NSAM 288 presented a major step toward American escalation. But Johnson still
refused to deploy U.S. troops. 1964 was afterall an election year and while most
Americans accepted the current policy it was uncertain how they would react to another
war in Asia. By accepting the position that Vietnam had to be held at all costs Johnson
had moved closer to the “point o f no return.” In April 1964 Johnson sounded out
sentiments o f Congress on possible expansion o f the American role in Vietnam. He
informed congressional leaders about the new policy in a National Security Council

new offensive, attackingjoint ARVN-US units. A bomb m a Saigon movie theatre killed three Americans,
leaving 5 % wounded.
527Pentagon Papers, VoL ID, pp. 50-51.
** Ibid. p. 57: Lvndon Johnson. Pontage Pomt. pp. 66^7; McNamara,/nPetraspect, p. LI9.
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meeting.529 Johnson faced only one opposing voice in Senator Morse who favored a
negotiated settlement under United Nations supervision.530 Another NSC meeting found
even greater consensus in condemning European unwillingness to back America’s
Vietnam policy. Although, the Europeans provided some symbolic aid it seemed that they
“really do not give a damn about Communist aggression in Southeast Asia.”531
The debate and decisions o f spring 1964 evidenced that Johnson was determined
to drawn the line in South Vietnam in the Cold War against Communism. On the other
hand, Johnson did not want another Korean War possibly involving China, o r the Soviet
Union. It was also unclear whether the United States would find appreciable support
among its allies if the conflict escalated. Consequently, Johnson endorsed a middle
course hoping that American aid and guidance would be sufficient to enable a South
Vietnamese victory. As Johnson put it: “American boys should not do the fighting that
Asian boys should do for themselves.”532But the challenge was whether the “Asian boys”
could do the fighting well enough to attain American objectives.533 One option was no
longer seriously discussed by most o f Johnson’s advisors - withdrawing from Vietnam.

529National Security Meeting No. 526, April 3,1964, LBJL, pp. 3-4; McNamara presented the gloomy
facts on Vietnam and discussed alternatives, excluding negotiations. Currently, the administration rejected
direct attack ofNorth Vietnam but might be forced to do so if a stepped-up program o f assistance to Saigon
failed.
38 Ibid. p. 6; even Mansfield supported the continuation o f limited US role. Johnson dismissed de Gaulle's
plan o f neutralization as too vague. The notes o f the meeting do not indicate that congressional leaders
were informed on current covert operations.
31 National Security Meeting No. 532, May 15,1964, LBJL, p. 1,4-5. Congressman Jensen expressed
explicitly what Rusk phrased diplomatically. While Germany, France, Great Britain, and Australia
provided some aid, the US shouldered most o f the burden. McNamara affirmed that combat troops would
play not part o f the US role in South Vietnam.
32 Johnson, Vantage Point, p. 68; see also: Ball, Oral History, July 8,1971, LBJL, pp. 26/27.
33 Vandiver, Shadows o f Vietnam* p. 20; for the time being, Johnson settled on a middle course o f
gradually increasing pressure against North Vietnam without committing American troops. But it was also
clear that instead o f reducing American “advisors”' their number would have to increase.
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They accepted the assumption that Vietnam was vital to American foreign policy, that a
Communist victory would have the feared trigger effect on the entire region.
During the critical spring o f 1964, Johnson lacked incisive advice to reexamine
his Vietnam policy. McNamara and the Joint Chiefs not only condoned actions adopted
but argued for an intensified commitment. Undersecretary o f State George Ball was the
only voice m the administration questioning the domino theory and he counseled against
further escalation. To Ball, the problem lay not so much in Johnson, who was anxious to
avoid an irrevocable commitment, but in the feet that he inherited and listened to
Kennedy’s advisors who failed to critically reassess the conflict in Vietnam.534 Ball
admitted that it might have been difficult for Johnson to disengage within months after
Kennedy’s death since it would appear that Johnson was rejecting Kennedy’s foreign
policy. Such a move, undoubtedly, would lead to domestic repercussions and accusations
o f Johnson being soft on Communism by handing over South Vietnam.535 Nevertheless,
to Ball, a change in American policy was feasible and could be made at any tim e, even if
the stakes were high:
I never subscribed m yself to the b elief that we w ere ever a t a point where w e
couldn’t turn around. What concerned me then [i.e. late 1963] as it did much
m ore intensely even later was th at the more forces com m itted, the more w e w ere
com m itted to Vietnam, the m ore grandiloquent our verbal encouragement o f th e South
V ietnam ese w as, the more costly w as any disengagement.536

According to Ball, Johnson’s concern on his domestic agenda and his lack of
experience in Asian politics prevented the president to critically appraise all the aspects

Ball, The P astH as Another Pattern, pp. 374-375.
35 Ball, Oral History, July 8,1971, LBJL, p. 14.
36 Ibid, dp. 13-14.
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o f the America’s Vietnam policy. Consequently, Johnson was pulled along by events in
Vietnam, instead o f formulating a long-term strategy of his own, leaving the president
without much, room to maneuver. Johnson listened to Ball’s opinions challenging the
administration’s view on Vietnam. But Johnson did not heed Ball’s advice but used him
as a devil’s advocate against the war-hawks.537The obligation to continue on the Kennedy
course, along with pressure from the hawkish Republicans, limited his view and options
toward the unfolding events in Vietnam. Johnson admitted his dilemma in his memoirs:
Certainly I wanted peace. I wanted it every day of every month I was in
the White House. All through 1964 and after, I hoped and prayed the men
in Hanoi would sit down and negotiate. But I made it clear from the day I
took office that I was not a “peace at any price” man. We would remain strong,
prepared at all times to defend ourselves and our friends.53*

Success in Vietnam became even more illusive during late spring and early
summer o f 1964. The United States had to expand its efforts to save South Vietnam.
Johnson also needed congressional support for an up-graded commitment. His advisors
concurred. In May 1964, William Bundy, Assistant Secretary o f State for East Asian
affairs, prepared a first draft for a congressional resolution which authorized the
president, upon request by South Vietnam o r Laos, to use all measures, including the
deployment o f armed forces, for their defense against Communist aggression.539 Johnson

537Ball, Oral History, July 8,1971, LBJL, p. 20; see also: Rusk, Oral History Interview, July 28,1969,
LBJL, p. 36.
a*Johnson, Vantage Pointr p. 68.
339Frederick Dutton prepared two studies elaborating the advantages of a congressional resolution.
Accordingly, congressional backing would further convey American determination to Hanoi and Beijing.
A resolution would also preclude domestic repercussions at home, and silence Senate opponents. The
downside was that Vietnam would come to the forefront o f public opinion, but m the long run a resolution
would force the large number of undecided congressmen to endorse the administration. See; Memorandum
to McGearge Bundy, June 1 ,1964, LBJL, pp. 1-3; an± Rusk, Oral History, September26,1969, LBJL, p.
II: Rusk made the same point about potential consequences a t home if the president foiled to secure
congressional support
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was not yet willing to make such a fundamental decision. He was also concerned about
his critics in Congress and decided to wait for the time being.540 But he sounded out
congressional opinion in a series of meetings with key senators reviewing American
policy in Vietnam. The president assured the senators that he had no intention of
escalating the war, but that congressional support was needed to demonstrate to Hanoi the
American determination to prevent a take-over o f South Vietnam and Laos.541
Uncertainty about the future course in Vietnam continued to plague the
administration during early summer 1964. The presidential campaign was intensifying
and Johnson wanted to prevent Vietnam from becoming a major issue. Yet he had to
convey the image o f effectively handling the Communist threat in Southeast Asia and
avoid Republican criticism. Republican candidate Barry Goldwater o f Arizona strongly
opposed Johnson’s domestic program, which he denounced as far too “liberal.” He
attacked every aspect o f Johnson’s Great Society as “state paternalism.” To Goldwater,
“collectivism and the welfare state” were the greatest threat at home, while Communism
was the “foremost enemy around the world.”542While the federal government should only
have a minimal role m domestic politics, the United States definitely needed to adopt a
more aggressive position with foreign policy.543
The United States, according to Goldwater, could not afford to lose the Cold War
with the Soviet Union. Only victory over Communism would allow an acceptable peace

5,0 McNamara, In Retrospect, p. 120; Olsen, Mansfield and Vietnam,, pp. 133-134.
541 William C. Berman, William Fnllbnght And The Vietnam Wan The Dissent o f a Political Realist.
(Kent, Ohio, 1988), pp.19-20; Larry Berman, PlanningA Tragedy, p. 32.
542Peter Iverson, Barry Goldwater: Native Arnrnnan. (Norman, Oklahoma, 1997), pp. 92-96.
541 Ibid.. pp. 109-110; Blum, Years o f Discord, pp. 156-157; DalTek, Flawed Giant, p. 131; Goldwater
rejected federal aid to education, suggested that social security should be made voluntary, and opposed
civil rights legislation.
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with the Soviet Union. The United States had to become superior to the Soviet Union,
politically, economically and militarily. Moreover, America needed to pursue an
offensive strategy in the fight against Communism and encourage its allies to do the
same. Peoples around the globe should join together in defeating the Communists and the
United States needed to support their efforts, if necessary by military means. In Southeast
Asia, South Koreans and Vietnamese ought to cooperate with Taiwanese to liberate the
entire region. To Goldwater, bombing North Vietnam would demonstrate the American
resolve. He summed up his atdtude in his acceptance speech as Republican presidential
candidate: “Extremism in the defense o f liberty is no vice, and . . . moderation in the
pursuit o f justice is no virtue.”544 Richard Nixon, in a less extreme language, generally
concurred that Johnson was not doing enough in Vietnam. He believed that JohnsonTs
policy o f restraint would not succeed and more had to be done to defeat Communist
aggression in Asia.545While many Americans in 1964 showed little interest in Vietnam,
the Republicans were ready to make the conflict a campaign issue.
Anxious that Vietnam might undermine his domestic goals, Johnson asked his
good friend Senator Russell for advice. Russell described Vietnam as a “damn worse
mess.” The Senator had been apprehensive about American commitment to Vietnam
since 1954 and he feared that the conflict might lead to a war with China. When Johnson
asked how important Vietnam really was for the United States, Russell responded that it
was worth “a damn bit” with the exception o f the psychological impact a withdrawal
might have. Russell and Johnson agreed that the United States was bound by the SEATO

***Iverson, Goldwater, pp. I09-113; Blnm, Years o f Discord, p. 158; Dallek, Flawed Giant, p. 131.
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treaty to defend South Vietnam. Johnson was ambiguous about the view o f his advisors
yet he did not have any choice but see things through. He was worried that he would be
forced to send U.S. soldiers and face American public opposition to a war it could not
comprehend.546
Russell believed it was a mistake to get further involved because the United States
was already “in the quicksand up to our very necks.” Johnson suggested that the senator
recommend an American withdrawal in Congress aimed at preempting criticism from the
Goldwater camp. Unfortunately, Russell was not willing to comply since he was not
persuaded by either choice - withdrawal o r escalation. Johnson repeated his concerns over
the future course in Vietnam to his National Security advisor, McGeorge Bundy:
I don’t think it’s worth fighting for and I don’t think we can get out. And it’s
just the biggest damn mess... What the hell is Vietnam worth to me—
What is it worth to this country? 547

By June 1964, Johnson preferred to hold the line. Most o f his counsel favored the
idea o f a three step approach: increased pressure on Hanoi, followed by an urgent
warning to Ho Chi Minh to end his support o f the VC, and if Ho did not comply, the
bombing North Vietnam.548 Again, Johnson put escalation on hold, based on his own
doubts and campaign considerations.549 At the same time, he was busy to find European

***Nixon, Memoirs, pp. 256-258; Nixon visited Asia m early 1964 and found America’s Asian allies
complaining about the lack o f U.S. determination against the Communists.
***Dallek, Flawed Giant, pp. 144-145.
w Ibid-p. 145.
** Pentagon Papers, VoL ID, pp. 64-65; George Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern, p. 377; McNamara,
In Retrospect, p. 12.1; Herring, Longest War, p. 174.
***Pentagon Papers, VoL III, 72-76; McNamara, fn Retrospect, pp. 121-123. Hanoi was not intimidated
and remained confident that combined NFL and North Vietnamese forces would be victorious, even if this
meant direct confrontation with the tLS.; see: Herring Longest War, pp. 118-119.
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support for American actions in Vietnam but failed to overcome British and French
reservations.

August 1964: Tonkin G ulf and the Congressional Resolution
On August 2, 1964 and again two days later American destroyers M addox and
Turner Joy were attacked by North Vietnamese torpedo boats.550 President Johnson
decided not to retaliate but send a firm note o f protest to Hanoi that threatened grave
consequences in case o f another unprovoked assault. He also ordered continued patrols in
the Tonkin Gulf.551 After the second attack on American vessels the president authorized
the launch o f naval aircrafts to bomb a number o f North Vietnamese coastal
installations.552 The North Vietnamese attacks enraged Americans and gave President
Johnson the congressional carte blanche to increase the US involvement, eventually
leading to the deployment o f combat troops and the Americanization of the war.
On August 4, 1964 President Johnson informed congressional leaders about the
second assault in the Tonkin Gulf, and asked for a resolution that would sanction
retaliatory bombing o f North Vietnamese military targets. The resolution was presented

550McNamara, In Retrospect, pp. 129-131; Herring, Longest War, p. 119; Vandiver, Shadows o f Vietnam,
pp. 20-22; the Tonkin Golf Incident has been widely covered m historiography. The second attack is now
very much m doubt and at the tune being there existed already serious questions whether the American
ships ever came under fire. The first incident on the Maddox at least within 12 miles o f the North
Vietnamese coast line also raises numerous questions because its patrol followed another Oplan 34A
mission, attacking North Vietnamese on their soiL
551McNamara, In Retrospect, pp. 13I-I32; Vandiver, Shadows o f Vietnam, pp. 22-23; Johnson, Vantage
Point, pp. 112-113; McNamara and Rusk briefed the Senate on the event and explained why Johnson did
not retaliate.
552McNamara, In Retrospect, pp. 132-135; George Ball, Oral History, July 8 ,197IJLBJL, pp. 22-23; Lloyd
C. Gardner. Pay Any Pricer Lvndon Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam, fChicago. 1995), pp. 137-138.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

247
to the House o f Representatives the next day and passed unanimously on August 7. The
Senate debate took several hours and the resolution was adopted with only two votes
dissenting (Sen. Gruenmg and Morse) and ten Senators abstaining. The Tonkin Gulf
Resolution gave the president the right to take all necessary measures to repel any armed
attack on US forces, and in addition, far reaching powers “to take all necessary steps,
including the use o f armed force, to assist any member or protocol state o f the Southeast
Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense o f its freedom”553.
Although the resolution was passed by an overwhelming majority, the debate in
the Senate reflected valid concerns about the increasing American commitment in
Vietnam. Some speakers fully endorsed a hardening position towards and, if necessary,
attacks on North Vietnam, yet the great number o f debaters worried about the
administration’s Vietnam policy and the broad powers given to the president by this
congressional resolution.554The somber mood o f the debate foreshadowed the dispute the
United States would face during the next eight years. While many senators lamented the
lack o f European support to America’s Vietnam policy, in August 1964 they raised the
same issues as European observers.555
Senators Nelson, Brewster, Cooper, Gore, Church, Bartlett, and Russell viewed
the situation as a dangerous turning point toward the dangerous road o f a full U.S.

555Congressional Record - Senate, 88th Congress, 2nd Session, August 6,1964, p. 18414.
ss* For Gruening’s dissent see: Congressional Record - Senate, pp. 18413-18416; Gruenmg blamed U-S.
escalation for North Vietnamese attacks on the Maddox. The U.S. policy was a grave mistake from the
beginning and he urged his colleagues to pressure for American disengagement, concluding that “ail
Vietnam is not worth the life of a single American boy ”
555Congressional Record -Senate, August 6,1964, p. 18399-18400; Fullbright and Mansfield both
defended the resolution because ofNorth Vietnamese aggression. Putting their misgivings on America's
policy aside for the time being, the accused Hanoi o f repeated aggression. Mansfield, though, hoped that a
peaceful solution could still be found by employing the United Nations.
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military com m itm ent.556 The concern was undoubtedly shared by de Gaulle and the
British. But unlike, the Europeans the Senators felt compelled to respond to the attack on
American vessels. American honor was at stake which at least for the time being justified
a limited military response.557Senator Frank Church (D- Idaho) expressed the dilemma o f
many o f his colleagues. He believed that America’s Vietnam policy was fundamentally
flawed and lacked a realistic assessment o f American national interest, but he had to
support the Congressional Resolution and give Johnson the powers he asked for.
Congress shared the responsibility for the current situation, because it had willingly
funded the policy in Southeast Asia and thereby acquiesced to decisions made by
Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson. Church concluded:
We must accept the consequences of our own actions. We must now face
the fact that the difficulties in which we find ourselves are our responsibility,
in having chosen to pursue of action which exposed us to such hazards.”8

The overall tenor revealed that many senators rejected any action that went beyond
limited retaliatory strikes. Although aware o f the powers given to Johnson, the
overwhelming number o f Senators debating the resolution did not want a wider war and
hoped that Johnson received this message by displaying caution and restrain.559

The Road to Escalation: September 1964 to February 1965

556 CongressionalRecord-Senate, August 6,1964, pp. 18403,18406-18410. They were also critical o f the
initial Eisenhower decision to get involved in Vietnam m the first place.
5STSenators EUender (D-La.) and McGovern (D-SJD.) did raise the question whether American ships
should have been deployed that close to North Vietnam. They also wondered if this deployment was
connected to South Vietnamese raids against the North, see: Congressional Record - Senate, August 6, p.
18403,18408.
551 Congressional Record-Senate, August6, 1964, p. I84I5.
559 Ib id - dp. 18415-18416.
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Johnson used restraint until his victory at the polls. Washington was trying to
prevent any incident that could be used by Hanoi to escalate the war. For the time being,
De Soto patrols were put on hold and 34A operations were suspended.560 In several
campaign speeches Johnson restated that he had no intentions to escalate the Vietnam
conflict and presented himself as the candidate for peace, attacking the belligerent stand
o f Barry Goldwater. In Saigon events were further unraveling. On August 7, General
Khanh. announced a state o f emergency, resulting in press censorship and restriction o f
civil liberties and devised a new constitution giving him almost unlimited powers. These
measures resulted into widespread demonstrations during the second half o f August. For
weeks the government was in turmoil, and coup rumors, street protests, and efforts to find
a some kind o f compromise paralyzed the Saigon regime.561 Ambassador Maxwell
Taylor discerned two choices for the United States: continue the passive course as advisor
or assume a more active role to carry the counterinsurgency program to success. The first
option was unacceptable because it would eventually force the United States to abandon
South Vietnam.562
Since early September 1964 Johnson’s advisors also discussed systematic airstrikes against North Vietnam, its supply lines, and deployment U.S. ground troops to
South Vietnam563 The military brass, with exception o f Army Chief o f Staff General
Harold K. Johnson and Admiral Grant Sharp, were in favor o f air attacks on North
Vietnamese targets, with the goal to break Hanoi’s will to fight, and prepared a list of

560Pentagon Papers, Vol. Ill, p. 84; Herring, Longest War, p. 123.
561Pentagon Papers, VoL III, pp. 85-87.
562Ibid.. p. 87; Young, Vietnam: Wars, p. 126; Herring, Longest War, p. 124.
563Gardner,P a y Any Price, pp. I40-I4I.
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more than ninety select targets in the North.564President Johnson was reluctant to escalate
and rejected air-strikes for the time being. Again, he asked his cabinet whether Vietnam
was truly worth all the effort; yet his advisors and the Joint Chiefs insisted that the United
States could not afford to lose South Vietnam. Johnson finally approved the
recommendation allowing for retaliation in the form o f extensive air-strikes, if North
Vietnamese or Viet Cong assaulted U.S. forces or South Vietnam.355 This was another
step toward all out war.
George Ball tried to avert impeding disaster. Dominoes and containment simply
did not apply to Vietnam. He argued that American policy makers were solely concerned
with “how” they could succeed in Vietnam, but never asked “why” they were engaged in
Vietnam in the first place, and why they persisted pursuing a war that they were less and
less likely to win. Ball fully agreed with Charles de Gaulle’s assessment, with whom he
discussed Vietnam during a visit in June 1964 in an effort to win France’s support for
Johnson’s policy.556 Deeply worried about the consequences o f “tit-for-tat” escalation,
Ball sent in October 1964 a sixty-seven page memorandum to Rusk and McNamara
describing the dangers o f a further expanded American engagement. Ball noted that the
political structure in South Vietnam was increasingly disintegrating and that he could not

544Dallek, Flawed Giant, pp. 238-239; McNamara, In Retrospect, pp. 151-153,156; McNamara also
harbored doubts whether bombing might work and he was surprised to learn that Gen. Johnson shared
these concerns since the Chiefs did not mention it. Admiral Sharp, Commander in Chief for the Pacific,
judged the situation m Saigon as so volatile that a review o f American policy was necessary, indicating that
disengagement should be considered.
565Johnson, Vantage Point, pp. I20-I2I; McNamara, In Retrospect, p. 155; George Ball, Oral History,
July 8,1971, LBJL, p. 26; Ball stressed that the president never pushed for escalation, that he got dragged
along, avoiding to make a final decision. Dean Rusk also doubted that bombing could succeed given the
particular situation o f the predominantly agricultural North Vietnam. Korea had demonstrated that despite
extensive bombing the enemy was still able to supply an army o f halfa million men. See: Dean Rusk, Oral
History, September26,1969, LBJL, pp. 22-23
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foresee the formation o f any government that could unify its people, or mobilize its
military, to successfully defeat the insurgents. Based on the situation in South Vietnam,
the United States had four policy alternatives: continue along current lines, take foil
responsibility for the war, aerial attacks on North Vietnam, or a political settlem ent567
BaH obviously preferred negotiation with the goal to guarantee the viability o f South
Vietnam allowing for an American disengagement His assessment closely resembled the
analysis o f Britain’s Robert Thompson and o f de Gaulle. According to Ball, the
administration had to realize that Vietnam was unlike Korea in 1950. Despite infiltration
from the North, many countries regarded the conflict as a civil war, which did not require
nor justify intervention by any foreign power.568 A deeper American involvement in
Vietnam could lead to serious repercussions within the international community. The
Western allies already expressed concerns about Washington’s commitment to their own
security:
O ur allies believed that we were ‘engaged in a fruitless struggle in South Vietnam’ and
feared that if we became too deeply involved ‘in a w ar on the land mass o f Asia’, we
would lose interest in their problem s. W hat w e had most to fear was ‘a general loss o f
confidence in American judgm ent that could result if we pursued a course which many
regarded as neither prudent nor necessary’.569

Most disturbing to Ball was the possibility o f U.S. military actions against North
Vietnam. He rejected the notion that bombing would not lead to further escalation, but
insisted that the United States eventually had to make the next step and deploy ground

566Ball, ThePast Has Another Pattern; pp. 376-379; BflhGeo/geBiofl, p. 159; see above: Chap. 2 on
Ball's discussion with, de Gaulle.
567BaH, The Past Has Another Pattern,, pp. 380-381.
568IbicL. p. 381.
569Ibid.. p. 382.
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troops, and with it, increasingly lose any initiative in the war.^O nce the United States
was on the “tiger’s back” it could no longer choose when to get o ff and this ride could
lead to a major conflict involving China and possible the Soviet Union:
Nobody was prepared to concede that any particular step would require any
further step. This was kind of a standard assumption which I kept repeating
again and again was a false assumption. . .You go forward with this further step,
and you wili substantially have lost control. Finally you’re going to find
the war is running you, and we’re not running the war.571

The next years proved Ball correct both on Vietnam and allied reaction to
America’s escalation o f the conflict. But he, like the Europeans, failed to impress his
superiors. Rusk and McNamara were shocked and dismissed the political solution
promoted by Ball. To them, negotiations without guarantees to South Vietnamese
independence would have the same result as unconditional withdrawal, leading to a
Communist victory in South Vietnam and the potential fall o f Cambodia and Indonesia.
Both believed that negotiations at this time would be seen as a sign o f weakness. Hanoi
had to first realize American determination by stopping Its infiltration into the South and
Its giving support to the Viet Cong.572Neither Hanoi nor the Viet Cong were willing to
cease their struggle. As long as they refused to do so Washington was also not willing to
retreat. Despite continuously bad news from South Vietnam, most o f Johnson’s counsel
could simply not perceive the possibility that the United States might foil in Vietnam. Yet

570Ball, The Past HasAnother Pattern, pp. 382-383; He reminded Johnson that his predecessors had
committed themselves to Vietnam sorely to help the Vietnamese defend themselves and not to fight a
conflict the Vietnamese might not even want.
m George Ball, Oral History, July 8,1971, LBJL, pp. 30-31.
572 Ibid.. o p . 29-30: Ball. The Past Has Another Pattern, p. 383; McNamara, In Retrospect, pp. 156-158.
Interestingly, Rusk did not comment on the Ball memorandum both m the Oral History interview or his
memoirs.
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by making every American response contingent on North Vietnamese/ NLF action
Washington placed itself in the defensive further limiting its freedom of action.
On November I, 1964 the Viet Cong attacked the American base at Bien Hoa,
near Saigon, killing four Americans and destroying five B-57 bombers. The Joint Chiefs
recommended immediate air-strikes against the North, but Johnson decided against it.
Yet, pressure on the administration to approve additional military action continued. On
the same day McNamara met with Earle “Bus” Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, who expressed the deep concerns o f his colleagues, suggesting that the situation in
South Vietnam required intensified military operations including air-strikes over both
North and South Vietnam. Wheeler pointed out that if the president decided against
further action it would be better for the United States to withdraw from Vietnam.573
Wheeler placed his finger at the core o f the issue. Either the United States employ its
military might without restriction and fight for complete victory in Vietnam or decide to
call it quits. Limited military reaction would simply not succeed. De Gaulle made the
same point when he told Ball that unless the United States were willing to take the war all
the way to North Vietnam and even China, negotiations were the only feasible solution.
Johnson, still uncertain what to do, ordered the creation o f a working group
headed by Assistant Secretary o f State William Bundy to assess policy options. The
group admitted that the conflict did not fit the traditional framework o f Communist
aggression but was to a large degree a domestic struggle. Hence, U.S. military assistance
might not prevent the fall o f South Vietnam.574 Despite this assessment, the Bundy group

573Johnson, Vantage Point, p. 121; McNamara, In Retrospect, p. 159.
m See for the complete memorandum: Pentagon Paper?, VoL HL, pp. 657-666.
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upheld the domino theory. The fall of South. Vietnam could “unravel the whole Pacific
and South Asian defense structures”.575 The group also worried about the impact
American failure in Vietnam would have abroad.576But as long as the United States
maintained its image o f a strong, determined nation, the fallout from a debacle in
Vietnam might be acceptable to American friends and allies. In Europe, Great Britain and
Germany sympathized w ith American policy whereas with France “we are damned either
way we go.”577American prestige in Europe depended on the U.S. conduct in Vietnam:
[0 ]u r key European allies probably would now understand our applying an
additional measure o f force to avoid letting th e ship sink; but they could become
seriously concerned i f w e get ourselves involved in major conflict that
degraded our ability to defend Europe and produced anything less than an
early and com pletely satisfactory outcome.578

The Bundy group was correct but failed to follow its own analysis in its
recommendation what Washington should do next The committee favored the
combination o f military pressure and negotiation and sought a compromise between hard
liners and critics o f further escalation. The report illustrated the self-imposed quagmire o f
Washington. South Vietnam could not fall, but all out war to defend its independence was
a dismal alternative as well. Nobody was satisfied with the group’s recommendations.
The Joint Chiefs preferred the foil use American military might to gain a victory on the
battlefield.579 Ambassador Taylor and General Westmoreland wanted to give Saigon more
time to re-organize, but hoped to use the threat o f bombing North Vietnam to make Hanoi
more amenable to a settlement. George Ball rejected the entire argument as another

575Pentagon Paper, VoL III, p. 658
Ibid.
S7TIbicL. p. 659.
Ibid.
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example o f wishful thinking and “bureaucratic casuistry” that turned logic upside down
and completely disregarded the realities in South Vietnam.580 President Johnson was
deeply frustrated with both the developments m Saigon and the multitude o f opinions and
advice from his staff. He was anxious about the consequences o f stepped up military
operations and felt his landslide victory against Goldwater did not give him the mandate
for all out war in Vietnam.581
Nevertheless, Johnson inched step by step further toward escalation. On
December I, 1964 he accepted a two phased program. Phase I insisted that the Saigon
government finally solve its internal quarrels and adopt a program o f reform before
considering further military operations. Phase II authorized the U.S. Saigon mission to
develop jointly with the South Vietnamese plans for reprisal operations. Despite the
admonitions o f Ambassador Taylor, the leaders in Saigon did not comply and the
question o f air-strikes was back in the debate. Yet, for the time being, the president only
agreed to continue the Oplan 34A mission and ordered armed reconnaissance flights over
Laos, operation Barrel Roll, to strike at North Vietnamese infiltration routes, with both
measures aimed at increasing the pressure on Hanoi.582 Once more, Washington moved
closer to an “endless entanglement,” as de Gaulle had told Kennedy, in the hope that each
step would turn the tide.
In Congress, a few voices o f concern about the dangers o f escalation could also be
heard. Most outspoken was Senator Mansfield, who sent a memorandum to the president

579Pentagon Papers, p. 270.
580McNamara, [n Retrospect, p. 162; BaH, The Past Has Another Pattern, pp. 388-389.
m Dailefc, Flawed Giant, p. 241.
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ia early December 1964 warning o f the dangers o f further military action. The United
States was in a similar position to that o f France in the early 1950’s, when South Vietnam
was without a truly legitimate government, held together only by foreign support, ha
addition, the m ilitary situation was turning worse and Mansfield feared that the fighting
would spill beyond the borders o f South Vietnam.583 He recommended negotiation
involving both China and European mediation. If the administration rejected this course,
it would face a long term commitment to South Vietnam, possibly a larger Asian war.
Such commitment must be explained to the American public “in no uncertain terms” so
that the nation was fully aware o f what might lay ahead.5®* Mansfield made quite clear
that he was against any attacks on North Vietnam, a sentiment that was shared by the
majority o f his colleagues. According to a poll by the Associated Press, only seven out o f
eighty-three senators favored the deployment o f American ground forces and bombings
o f North Vietnam, while a considerable number o f senators preferred a political
settlem ent585 Again, this disparity between the official line on the importance o f the
Vietnam and the unwillingness to sacrifice American lives to defend that Southeast Asian
country is intriguing. But it is also a reflection o f American democracy in general. The
commitment to a global role had to be defended at home. Another Korea-like war was not
what many senators and American citizens aspired to.
Mansfield’s recommendations were discarded by Johnson’s counsel, which
increasingly favored attacking North Vietnam using the full might o f American power to

552McNamara, Ire Retrospect, pp. 163-164; Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern, p. 389; Pentagon Papers,
Vol HI, pp. 248-253.
5C Olsen, M ansfieldand Vietnam, p. 137.
5**IbfcL. pp. 137-138; Berman, Futtbright and the Vietnam War, p. 33.
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force a change in Communist policy. They were joined by conservative voices who
demanded a greater military effort in Vietnam. Criticism evoked Johnson’s fear that a
Democratic president could not survive failure in Vietnam, since it was the general belief
at the time that Democrats were “soft on Communism abroad.” Moreover, Johnson
worried that his “Great Society” would be derailed by congressional attacks on his
performance in Vietnam. He felt that giving up in Vietnam would make things even
worse domesticaIly.5S6He addressed the situation in Vietnam publicly in his State o f the
Union address in January 1965, pointing out that America had pledged its support to
South Vietnam ten years ago and was not willing to break that promise. Ultimately,
America desired peace in Southeast Asia but it could only be achieved “when aggressors
leave their neighbors in peace”.587
McNamara and McGeorge Bundy were determined not to fail in Vietnam. They
favored the military option outlined in a memorandum submitted to the president in
January 1965, which argued for sustained reprisals against the North. They were folly
aware o f the consequences o f their suggestions but believed that the current policy would
not lead to success and thus advised the president to approve increasing American
military operations:
Both o f us [i.e. M cNamara, Bundy] understand the very grave questions presented
by any decision o f this sort. W e both recognize that th e ultim ate responsibility is
not ours. Both o f us have supported your unwillingness, in earlier months, to m ove
out the middle course. W e both agree that every effort should still be made to
improve our operations on the ground and to prop up the authorities in South Vietnam
as best as we can. B ut w e are both convinced th at none o f this is enough, and the tim e
has come for harder choices.58*
5S5Berman, Fullbright and the Vietnam War, p. 33.
516Dallefc, Flawed Giant, p. 244; Keams, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream, pp. 258-259.
5ITPublic Papers of the President - Lyndon B. Johnson, January4,1965, p. 3.
81 McNamara, In Retrospect, p. 168; Johnson, Vantage Point, pp. 122-123.
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Not every cabinet member agreed with these recommendations. Rusk opposed any
military action that would expand the war into North Vietnam and his concerns were duly
noted by McNamara and Bundy. While Rusk firmly stood behind the American
commitment to South Vietnam, he believed the United States should continue the present
course advising the South Vietnamese to help themselves.
[ believed we should persevere w ith our policy o f advising and assisting the
South V ietnam ese and playing for breaks, rather than risking a m ajor escalation
i f one could be avoided. At this stage, in late 1964, the stakes w ere high enough
th a t w e couldn’t sim ply withdraw, b ut neither did I w ant us to go all out fighting
a guerrilla w ar. Unless the South Vietnamese themselves could carry the m ajor
burden, I didn’t see how we could succeed.589

McNamara and Bundy won the debate. Following a Viet Cong attack on an
American airbase near Pleiku and a U.S. helicopter base at Camp Holloway on February
6, 1965, Johnson decided to escalate. On February 8, Johnson endorsed a strategy o f
reprisals against North Vietnam and indicated his willingness to send a substantial
number o f American ground forces to secure American bases in South Vietnam.590
Another Viet Cong attack in Qui Nhon two days later that killed twenty-three Americans
further strengthened Johnson’s determination. He authorized an expanded bombing
campaign o f North Vietnamese targets, operation Rolling Thunder.m On February 26,
1965, Johnson approved sending two Marine Battalions to Vietnam. They landed near
Da Nang on March 8. On April 1 ,1965 Johnson authorized the deployment o f two more

m Rusk, A s I Saw It, p. 447.
590547th NSC Meeting, February 8 ,1965, LBJL,. pp. 2-3.
591Pentagon Papers, VoL HI. pp.271-272.
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battalions, increasing the level o f U.S. troops to more than 33,000 men. He also expanded
their mission from base security to active combat.392
The subsequent escalation of America’s war in Vietnam has been told and
analyzed in minute detail by historians. Despite the growing number o f American troops,
Washington did not win the war. Domestic and European skeptics who warned against
escalation were proved correct although nobody relished in the fact. Vietnam was an
unnecessary war that extracted a far too high price from all combatants. Johnson
indirectly admitted the failure o f his Vietnam policy in March 1968 and withdrew from
public service. Certainly, he was not the only one to blame for quagmire in Vietnam but
he was responsible for escalating the war.
The conflict might have been avoided long before Marines set foot on Asian soil
in March 1965. De Gaulle’s insistence on retaining Indochina in 1945 led to the Fust
Indochina War. Truman’s fear o f losing France to the Communist Party, reinforced by
pleas for American help by French Prime Minister Paul Ramadier, resulted in growing
American aid to the French straggle in Indochina. Mao Zedong’s victory in China in
1949 and the Korean War brought Southeast Asia to the forefront o f American policy
making in Asia. Thence, containment, falling dom inoes., and national security defined the
American foreign policy paradigm from Truman to Johnson. Eisenhower took the next
step by solidifying U.S. commitment to Diem’s Vietnam in 1954. Kennedy inherited this
commitment and, against his better judgement, not only reaffirm ed but expanded
America’s role in Vietnam. His concern about losing his political mandate at home
prevented any profound reassessment o f the situation in Vietnam and its actual

592 Pentagon Papers, VoL HI, pp. 389-392.
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importance for the United States and the Free World. Neither he nor Johnson heeded the
voices o f dissent among their advisors. Also, they did not acknowledge British, French,
and German concerns about America’s Vietnam policy. We must again ask why?
The answer is complex. First, the ideological paradigm o f containment confined
American policy makers. With the acceptance o f the status quo in Europe, Cold War
“proxy wars” were fought in the Third World. South Vietnam became another battle-line,
as had West Germany and South Korea, where the United States was determined to not
allow further Communist encroachment. Second, ideological thinking not only affected
American policymakers but pervaded American public opinion, partly as a result o f
public relations campaigns by American leaders. Cold War rhetoric o f “Free World
against Communist” oppression was convincing and catching. Third, the combination o f
Cold War ideology and the belief that South Vietnam was the domino that could not fall
petrified American bureaucracy. Officials in Washington and Saigon provided
information they thought Washington wanted to hear.593 Last, there was what C. Vann
Woodward described as a “commitment to American pride” rooted in a “legend o f
invincibility ” Based on America’s historical experience o f victorious wars, defeat by a
far less powerful enemy was unthinkable.59* The consequences o f these various factors
were tragic for both Americans and the Vietnamese.
In the context o f U.S.- European relations, the “Vietnam question” had profound
repercussions. The United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic o f Germany

m Daniel Ellsfaerg, “The Quagmire Myth and the Stalemate Machine,” Public Policy, Spring 1992, p. 218.
Accordingly, the “machine” dictated most policy decisions on Vietnam. Kennedy and Johnson could not
overcome the rigidity and self-interest o f the bureaucracy. Galbraith, McNamara, and Ball made the same
point by pointing to the difficulties o f acquiring objectives analysis on Vietnam-
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increasingly became disillusioned about Washington because o f Vietnam. Washington
felt the same way because its European allies were either reluctant or outrightly refused to
support America’s policy. What was needed and did result from the “Vietnam question”
was a genuine re-assessment o f the transatlantic alliance. The Vietnam conflict revealed
not only the respective foreign policy paradigms o f the four allies but also the inherent
limitations in their policy-making On the one hand, the European view on Vietnam,
though realistic, appeared parochial and self-centered to Washington. On the other hand,
the American experience during the twentieth century until Vietnam demonstrated that
the United States had the military might and resources in overcoming any obstacle.
Whenever American might was employed, victory ensued. South Korea, albeit a bitter
struggle, was secured for the West. In Latin America the Monroe Doctrine had become
reality. Johnson’s reaction to turmoil in the Dominican Republican proved the point. U.S.
marines prevented a “leftist putsch” in April o f 1965.595
If the Marines had successfully turned the tide in the Dominican Republic, why
could they not do the same in Vietnam? The conflict in Vietnam went beyond any
previous American experience. Regardless o f reports from American officials in country,
every fact-finding mission by high-ranking members of both the Kennedy and Johnson
administrations brought back news o f further deterioration. In light o f the self-imposed
restrictions, neither Kennedy nor Johnson considered negotiations or even disengagement
a valid option but allowed the United States to become enmeshed in the quagmire o f

594C. Vann Woodward, The Barden o f Southern History. (Baton Rouge and London, 1993),Third revised
edition, p. 219.
595On U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic see: Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Giobaiistn: American
Foreign Policy since 1938. (New York. I991),SbcthRevisedEdition,pp.2I8-22I.
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V ietnam As painful as the Vietnam experience was, it provided opportunity. Once the

clouds over the conflict had cleared, Washington and its European allies - though step by
step - redefined their mutual relations by learning to better listen and respect each others
point of view. Cooperation and consultation proved to become the key to successful U.S.
relations with its principal partners in Europe. Washington learned that advice horn less
powerful friends should be considered and mutual concerns openly discussed to prevent
further “Vietnams.”
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Failures can be retrieved and harmony restored. It is the question o f
learning the lessons, not shirking the role.
Robert Thompson, No E xit From Vietnam, 1970

Conclusion
On March 31, 1968 Lyndon B. Johnson announced to an astounded national
audience that he had ordered the cessation o f American bombing raids against North
Vietnam. The president was also willing to enter into peace talks and hoped that Hanoi
would respond favorably. Johnson’s concluding statement was even more unexpected; he
refused to either seek or accept the nomination o f the Democratic Party for another term
as President. Therefore, it was clear that America’s war in Vietnam had entered a new
phase in which the United States still maintained the hope o f saving South Vietnam but
finally decided to negotiate directly with Hanoi.596
While the Vietnam conflict continued, Johnson’s decision to pursue negotiations
marked a turning point in trans-Atlantic relations. The president’s revised approach
indirectly admitted the validity o f French and British criticism o f Washington’s
traditional Vietnam policy. Nonetheless, Johnson and his advisors arrived at the same
conclusion in spite o f European counsel. The fateful Tet offensive o f early 1968, though
militarily a debacle for the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese, revealed to Washington that
the war in Vietnam could not be won unless the United States further escalated its efforts.
Facing intense domestic pressure, Johnson reasoned that he could not surpass the current
level o f American engagement.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

264
The Europeans received the news o f the American de-escalation in Vietnam with
relief Johnsons’s decision signaled a major step toward ending a conflict that none o f the
Europeans had wanted. Prime Minister Harold Wilson was surprised by Johnson’s
resignation but pleased that Washington once more called upon the United Kingdom for
help in securing peace in Vietnam. An official British statement “warmly welcomed”
Johnson’s proposals for Vietnam. Within hours Wilson’s foreign secretary Michael
Stewart approached the Soviets and urged Moscow to work with London in facilitating
negotiations concerning Vietnam.597 Parliamentary debate on the “dramatic change” in
America’s Vietnam policy revealed an almost gleeful satisfaction on the part o f the
British that Washington had finally agreed with the British Vietnam policy. Both Labour
and Tory MPs entreated the Wilson government to initiate another British diplomatic
effort aimed at both the Soviets and the United Nations Secretary General, hoping for a
truce and eventual peaceful settlement in Vtetnam.598The British expected to play a vital
role in the restoration o f peace in Southeast Asia.
French President Charles de Gaulle was also elated that Johnson had finally
accepted the realities m Vietnam and sought a negotiated settlement. After eight years o f
advising that negotiations were the only solution for Vietnam, de Gaulle, like his British

Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives o f the Presidency 1963-1969. (New York,
1971), p.435; George Herring, America’s Longest Wan The United States and Vietnam. 1950-1975.
Second Edrdon, (New York, 1986), pp. 206-213.
597Harold Wilson, The Labour Government. 1964-1970. (London, 1971), pp. 519-520; Johnson called on
Britain and the Soviet Union as Geneva co-chairmen to “do all they can” to move to “genuine peace in
south-east Asia.” Wilson worried whether Johnson’s resigiation might induce Hanoi just to play the
waiting game in search o f better concession from another president. See also: The Times, April 2,1968, p.
I on the Stewart talks with the Soviet ambassador to the UK.
** Times, April 2,1968, “Vietnam: new doors opening.” p. 5; Conservative MPs Eldon Griffith, and Sir
Alec Douglas-Home reminded the Labour government that Hanoi had to do its part and renounce
aggression.
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counterparts, felt vindicated. He called Johnson's decision to halt the bombing o f North
Vietnam “tm premier pas dans Fa direction de la paix” and commended Johnson for this
act o f reason and political courage.S99De Gaulle and his foreign secretary Couve de
Murville were not only relieved by American concessions to their point o f view vis-a-vis
Vietnam, but believed that Johnson had removed a major obstacle in Franco-American
relations. O f course, they maintained that had the Americans listened closer to French
advice, peace negotiations might Iiave commenced years earlier.400
Johnson’s statement met with approval in West Germany as well. Bonn once
more demonstrated its loyalty to Washington by emphasizing that the United States had
proved its willingness to initiate negotiations and hence it was up to Hanoi to accept to
Johnson’s offer. Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger expressed his respect for Johnson's
decision and his appreciation o f the president's desire for peace. Kiesinger hoped that the
American initiative would improve chances for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam. The
chancellor felt that any talks should first aim at ending hostilities, and then hopefully
arriving at a just and durable peace in Southeast Asia. Kiesinger stressed that further
progress depended greatly on positive reactions from Hanoi. The German media gave
Johnson’s speech mixed reviews. Regret over Johnson’s resignation was met with
questions about whether the American president was truly sincere in his decision against

599Le Monde, April 4,1968, p. I.
600Maurice Couve de Murville, AussenpoIftOc. 1958-1969. translated into German by Hermann Kusterer,
(Munich, 1973), pp. II5-II7.
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seeking another term in office. AH questioned the chances o f the American initiative
succeeding to end war in Vietnam.601
While Johnson’s concessions on Vietnam were a first step toward removing the
contentious Vietnam issue as a major obstacle in U.S .-European relations, the election o f
Richard Nixon signaled a fresh beginning in the trans-Atlantic relationship to America’s
European allies. Better than Johnson, Nixon understood that the United States needed the
support and backing o f its European allies. Hence, it was important to sound out
European opinions before making major American foreign policy decisions. Shortly after
his inauguration Nixon traveled to Europe to demonstrate that he was not “obsessed with
Vietnam” and to prove to his domestic audience that he commanded respect abroad.602
During his first stop at NATO headquarters in Brussels, Nixon expressed a desire to
“listen and leam,” and successfully pursued the same strategy subsequently in London.
Wilson was obviously impressed that the new president was sincerely interested in
considering the British point o f view on Vietnam as well as other issues. Nixon pleased
his host and both leaders regarded their encounter as a significant step forward in
improving Anglo-American relations.603
Nixon’s encounter with de Gaulle was even more beneficial. Nixon believed that
de Gaulle’s cooperation “would be vital for ending the Vietnam War.” The American

601 Le Monde, April 3,1968, p. 8; Stem, April 14,1968, p. 17, “Der ungeliebte Kaiser von Amerika”;
C omm entator Wolf Schneider acknowledges LBJ’s far-reaching achievements in domestic politics but
squarely blames Johnson for escalating civil strife m Vietnam to a full-blown bloody war. Hence, LBJ
sincerely damaged the international standing o f the United States.
601Richard Nixon, The Memoirs o f Richard Nixon. (New York, 1990), p. 370.
601 Wilson, Labour Government, pp. 619-621; Wilson points out that the visit already began positively
when Nixon expressed his hope for better Anglo-American relations. Wilson was particularly impressed by
Nixon willing ness to listen and the PM certainly liked to hear Nixon’s appreciation o f the Commonwealth.
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leader also hoped for French assistance in establishing a dialogue between Washington
and the People’s Republic o f China. The French undoubtedly interpreted Nixon’s visit as
initiating a new phase in French-American relations and marking a distinct departure
hrom the policy o f the Johnson administration. Nixon acknowledged a new equality in
the trans-Atlantic partnership and accepted that America’s preponderance over its
European allies and their policies had considerably lessened.604 Concerning the Vietnam
question, Nixon proved as interested in negotiations with Hanoi as de Gaulle.
While America’s European allies appreciated the increased attention from the
Nixon administration it was clear to them that American motives were based primarily on
U.S. self-interest. Regardless o f these concerns, Nixon’s readiness to consider the
European point o f view marked an appreciable step toward a mutualistic approach in
European-American relations. From the U.S. point o f view, restoring good relations with
the Europeans would benefit America’s global position and have a positive impact on
domestic opinion. Nixon best summarized his agenda:
I felt that the European trip had accomplished all the goals we set for it. It showed the
NATO leaders that a new and interested administration which respected their views had
come to power m Washington. It served warning on the Soviets that they could no longer
take for granted - nor advantage o f - Western disunity. And the TV and press coverage
had a positive impact at home, instilling however briefly, some much needed pride in our
sagging national morale.605

There is no doubt that Nixon was not only well prepared but certainly eager to demonstrate his respect o f
Britain in order to restore confidence m the U.S. administration; see: Nixon, Memoirs, pp. 370-371.
“ *Murville, AussenpolUik, pp. 126-128; Nixon, Memoirs, pp.370-373.
605Nixon, Memoirs^ p. 375.
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By adopting a pragmatic foreign policy, Nixon succeeded in improving transAtlantic relations.606 Although Nixon’s approach resembled traditional European
policymaking far more than that o f previous administrations and was easier for the
Europeans to understand, the new situation was only a partial “victory” for America’s
allies. In adopting the role o f honest listener, Nixon worked toward preventing further
European criticism o f American foreign policy. He was folly aware o f the damage an
independent European stand could elicit and had already generated for Washington.
While the new American president pursued U.S. foreign policy-making in the traditional
European strategy o f national interest, it was precisely this neo-realist approach that
prevented any collective and effective European response to America’s Vietnam policy.
The European sentiment o f vindication following Johnson’s offer to conduct peace
negotiations with Hanoi only temporarily obscured serious shortcomings in policies
adopted by London, Paris, and Bonn. Neither European country had been able to
significantly influence Washington’s Vietnam policy from 1961 onward. American
domestic opposition and the shock o f the Tet-Offensive forced Washington to rethink its
strategy in Southeast Asia. In the final analysis, London, Paris, and Bonn had little impact
on Johnson’s decision to seek negotiations with Hanoi.
The trans-Atlantic debate over Vietnam exemplified the global ramifications o f
U.S. policy-making. The Vietnam question revealed inherent tensions among the transAtlantic allies but also manifested the mutual dependence existing among the members o f

406Peter Bender, Die “Neue Ostpolitjk" und ihre Fofeenr Vom Mauerbau bis zur Wiedervereinignng.
Fourth Edition, (Munich, 1996), p. 156; Bender emphasizes Nixon’s expertise in foreign policy and also
credits National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, a German emigre, with perceiving politics m terms o f
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the trans-Atlantic alliance. London and Paris had ample experience in Asia and were both
trying to convey the lessons o f their past shortcomings to Washington. Certainly this
“history lesson” was guided by British and French self-interest aimed at enhancing then:
role in global politics. West Germany also pursued its own national agenda. Unlike
Britain and France, Germany had to deal with the legacy o f its military aggression in
Europe and hoped to overcome some o f the consequences o f total defeat through German
unification. Regardless o f their past, the three European powers had to acknowledge their
status as secondary powers in the international scene and admit the necessity o f
cooperation with the United States. Through its own painful experience in Vietnam the
United States realized its global limitations as well as the importance o f undertaking
multilateral as opposed to unilateral actions in the future.
Historian C. Vann Woodward’s reflections on America’s war in Vietnam provide
important insights into American as well as European thinking. Woodward maintained
that America’s experience since the country’s independence led U.S. foreign
policymakers to the belief that they would always succeed regardless o f any obstacles
America might face. Britain, France, and Germany subscribed to similar concepts. As any
nation, they valued their role and contribution in global politics. Woodward argued that
based on the legend o f “national innocence,” America simply could not be blamed for
“imperialism” in Vietnam. America’s record differed from that o f the “colonialist”
Europeans.607 The conflict in Vietnam painfully shattered the positive image many

Realpolitik. Murville also stresses that Nixon was well trained in foreign policy as Vice-president during
the Eisenhower admmistration- see: Murville, Aussenpolitik, pp. 126-127.
607C. Vann Woodward, The Burden o f Sonthem History. (Baton Rouge and London, 1993), Third Revised
Edition, pp. 221-222. Woodward discussed America's Vietnam experience as part o f the “irony o f southern
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Americans had o f their country. Woodward addressed a pertinent predicament Americans
have had to face ever since the Vietnam War. How could American ideals be reconciled
with the real challenges the nation faced globally? America’s image and identity was
undermined by the tragedy o f Vietnam that divided the country in a degree only second to
the Civil War.
The trans-Atlantic debate over the “Vietnam question” revealed once again the
profound relevance o f national pride and identity among all four allies. The historic and
cultural legacy o f each country and their respective foreign policy decisions were not easy
to dismiss. The viability o f the trans-Atlantic alliance depended upon a better
understanding o f the heritage and past differences among its members.
The process o f how the United States, Great Britain, France, and West Germany
responded to and interacted on the Vietnam question reflects the on-going task o f
balancing a nation’s perceived interest with the challenges imposed by global forces. The
United Kingdom has realized that it needs both a solid grounding in Europe and also
maintain the “special relations” with the United States. In 1973, Britain finally joined the
European Community. France, after de Gaulle, has accepted that grandeur is limited by
larger European and global realities. The “Chunnel” is the most visible example o f how
far Anglo-French relations have improved during the last thirty years. The Federal
Republic o f Germany, perhaps, has learned the most from its failures dining the 1960’s.
Chancellor Willy Brandt’s O stpolitik ended a defensive W est German foreign policy that
merely hoped for unification while denying the realities o f a divided Europe. He chose

history.” While he leaves no doubt that the South fell short fir dealing with its own past, the defeat o f the
South ht the Civil War as well as its legacy provided a paradigm, to reassess also generally accepted view
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engagement with, the East over the denial o f division. While developments within the
Soviet Union were far beyond German influence, Brandt’s approach set the comer-stone
on which Germany unification was finally achieved. Nixon’s new approach in transAtlantic relations evidenced that the U.S. learned some important lessons from the failure
o f America’s Vietnam policy during the Kennedy and Johnson administration. Nixon set
the path followed by his successors in acknowledging that the United States needed its
trans-Atlantic allies. The Europeans, though economically strong, also realized that they
could not succeed in meeting global challenges without the support and friendship o f the
United States. The Vietnam experience, while causing friction with the alliance, taught
the Western powers an extremely important lesson: the alliance’s continuance and
validity depended on the support o f all members, and each member, to varying degrees,
was dependent on the well-being o f the trans-Atlantic alliance. As Robert Thompson
stated “failures can be retrieved and harmony restored.” The basis o f harmony was, and
is, an honest dialogue.

that prevailed among American leadership during the Vietnam War.
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